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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Class actions incite both delight and disgust.  Several 
complementary themes in popular culture embrace the class action, 
including sympathy for underdog litigants challenging powerful 
malefactors, fascination with massive redistributions of wealth from 
corporations to individuals, and reluctance to permit large and 
influential wrongdoers to escape justice merely because of their size 
and clout.  Class actions have thus become an appealing procedural 
counterweight to the burdens that modern society imposes on 
consumers and citizens, giving many little Davids a fighting chance 
for protection from or retribution against political and economic 
Goliaths.  But class actions also expose and rile competing visions of 
the judicial system: suspicion of large-scale judicial proceedings, 
wariness of high-paid plaintiffs’ lawyers, and a sense that society may 
subsidize the jackpot payouts that often result from group litigation 
and settlement.  These crosscurrents of attraction and repulsion have 
propelled class actions to a level of political and academic prominence 
far exceeding the attention devoted to any other aspect of civil 
procedure. 
Despite the critical attention focused on class actions, the 
debate over how best to reform them has not identified a conceptual 
flaw at the core of their design.  Academic scrutiny of class actions 
over the past sixty years has usually built upon three overlapping 
themes: the potential utility and fairness (or disutility and unfairness) 
of aggregating individual claims as a solution to collective action 
problems that inhibit enforcement of substantive rights, the extent 
and significance of agency costs and diminished individual autonomy 
in representative litigation, and the relative roles that courts, 
legislators, and administrative agencies should play in redressing 
widespread injuries.  These themes at an abstract level frame the 
debate over whether class actions are desirable as a matter of public 
policy, and at a technical level frame arguments for or against the 
myriad procedural reforms that scholars and legislators have proposed 
to expand, curtail, or manage class litigation.1  However, analysis of 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 1. A vast and growing literature analyzes the structure, role, and utility of class actions 
(as well as other aggregative devices) and proposes an equally vast array of regulatory, remedial, 
and procedural reforms to federal and state laws governing the prevention and remediation of 
injuries affecting large groups.  Among the many excellent contributions to the field are: 
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE 
GAIN (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) [hereinafter Coffee, Accountability]; 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs’ 
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whether and how to reform class actions often overlooks a critical 
theoretical concept that has little direct connection to either the 
collective action, agency cost, or institutional role strands of class 
action scholarship.  This Article seeks to correct that theoretical 
oversight, to explore some of its practical implications, and to 
demonstrate how rethinking the principles that animate class actions 
reveals a novel avenue of class action reform. 
The pivotal issue in most proposed class actions seeking 
damages is whether class members’ factual and legal circumstances 
are sufficiently alike to permit resolution of contested claims and 
defenses collectively rather than through traditional case-by-case 
adjudication.  This issue of “alikeness” arises because the factual 
circumstances of multiple plaintiffs seeking to join in a single 
proceeding are seldom precisely the same.  Factual distinctions at 
various levels of subtlety and materiality usually permeate the legal 
claims of putative class members, such that their collective claims 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class 
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Private Enforcement]; 
Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, & Conflict of Interest, 4 J. 
LEG. STUD. 47 (1975); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, & 
Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEG. F. 475 (2003); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class 
Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the 
Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337; Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The 
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941); Benjamin Kaplan, 
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-400 (1967); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Francis E. McGovern, Class Actions 
and Social Issue Torts in the Gulf South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1655 (2000); Arthur R. Miller, Of 
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 
HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979); Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions in the Gulf States: Empirical Analysis 
of a Cultural Stereotype, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1681 (2000); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence 
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003) [hereinafter 
Nagareda, Preexistence]; Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass 
Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002); George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive 
Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 521 (1997); Martin H. Redish, Class 
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and 
Public Roles, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71; Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: 
Relationships, Representation & Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1996); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” 
to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5-46 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in 
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class 
Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter 
Rosenberg, Mandatory Litigation]; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure 
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Thomas D. Rowe, 
Jr., Beyond the Class Action Rule: An Inventory of Statutory Possibilities to Improve the Federal 
Class Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186 (1996); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party 
and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class 
Certification & Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, 
You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465 
(1998). 
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raise both “common” and “individual”2 questions relevant to proving 
liability and damages.  The answer to common questions (such as 
whether a product was defectively designed or whether an 
advertisement was misleading) are identical for every class member, 
and can often be determined accurately and efficiently in a single 
proceeding before a single finder of fact.  However, the answer to 
individual questions (such as whether a design defect was the 
proximate cause of an injury or whether a consumer relied on a 
misleading representation) can vary from plaintiff to plaintiff and may 
require time-consuming and costly proceedings to assess the merit and 
monetary value of each class member’s claim.3 
Common and individual questions pull in opposite directions on 
the issue of whether a court should certify claims for class action 
treatment.  The prevalence of important common questions suggests 
that consolidating otherwise disparate claims into a class action would 
efficiently deploy scarce judicial resources while providing plaintiffs 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  Elsewhere in this Article, I use the words “similar” and 
“dissimilar” in lieu of “common” and “individual” to illustrate the problems that arise when 
courts attempt to resolve questions that do not yield identical answers for each class member. 
 3. The nature and significance of individual issues is a function of the substantive liability 
and damage rules applicable to asserted claims and defenses.  I assume in this Article that most 
common law and statutory sources of rights that create private remedies will continue to include 
elements—such as proximate causation—that may require varying proofs depending on 
particular class members’ circumstances.  The design of procedural rules should accommodate 
the individualized elements of substantive laws that the procedures help to enforce.  See infra 
Part III.B.  However, to the extent that the content of substantive law creates undesirable 
obstacles to the development of fair and efficient procedures, policymakers can amend 
substantive rules through appropriate judicial or legislative avenues to better exploit the 
advantages of available procedures.  For example, developments in consumer protection law that 
permit plaintiffs to prove reliance based on general evidence without offering direct testimony 
arguably illustrate the evolutionary adaptation of substantive law to a procedural environment 
that favors common elements over individual elements.  Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing 
Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1654 (2000) (reviewing 
developments in the law of reliance and arguing that “[i]n the case of reliance, the certification 
battles are best understood as ongoing uncertainty over the true state of substantive law”).  
Similarly, the growing literature considering whether the basic structure of tort law can tolerate 
relaxation of causation and injury requirements to treat the imposition of risk as an actionable 
harm is highly relevant to the debate over class actions (although it is usually not framed in 
those terms) because risk-based claims are easier for large numbers of claimants to prove by 
common evidence than are claims premised on palpable individual injuries.  The question of how 
the structure of tort constrains the definition of required elements thus has ramifications for 
which procedural remedies will be available to enforce substantive rights, which in turn 
determines how effective liability rules are likely to be in vindicating the compensation, 
deterrence, and insurance objectives of tort law.  For a general discussion of risk-based liability 
theories, see generally Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death & Harm: The Normative Foundations of 
Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1436-42 (2003); Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating 
General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
2117 (1997); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 
(2002); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risk, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 439 (1990). 
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with an opportunity to leverage their own resources against the 
defendant’s inherent economy of scale.4  In contrast, the presence of 
salient individual questions suggests that adjudicating a class action 
would either require numerous hearings on individualized questions 
of law or fact, or would induce courts to adopt substantive, procedural, 
or evidentiary shortcuts around such hearings.5  Extensive hearings 
may become impractical, while shortcuts around them may become 
unfair.  Courts considering whether to certify proposed class actions 
thus face a recurring dilemma about how to resolve the tension 
between common and individual questions that arises when class 
members present factual circumstances that are similar, but not 
exactly alike. 
The theoretical and practical dimensions of the tension 
between common and individual questions are strikingly 
underexplored beyond the literature addressing agency costs.  The 
consequences of diversity among class members have been carefully 
analyzed in the context of decisions about the propriety of allowing a 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 4. Class actions potentially promote social welfare by overcoming collective action 
problems inherent in the regulation of conduct affecting disorganized groups.  Injurers can derive 
large benefits from imposing comparatively small costs on each member of a risk-bearing 
population.  The injurer’s ability to derive a concentrated benefit from imposing diffused costs 
creates a significant asymmetry of resources and incentives between injurers and victims.  The 
injurer has a strong incentive to continue its conduct and has the resources to defend itself, while 
no individual victim has a comparably strong incentive or sufficient resources to compel the 
injurer to stop.  When the conduct is complete, the injurer’s size and potential exposure provide 
it with the resources and incentives to avoid being held accountable, while the victims 
individually often lack the incentives or resources to sustain the effort of investigating potential 
claims and obtaining a remedy for losses.  The traditional single plaintiff versus single defendant 
model of private dispute resolution thus does not provide a viable means for compensating 
victims or deterring injurers because victims are unlikely to sue, and if they do sue, injurers are 
likely to have an advantage in the litigation’s war of attrition.  The theory underlying the class 
action is that aggregating victims into a single fictional unit – “the class” – places incentives and 
resources into a more equitable balance and neutralizes the defendant’s otherwise overwhelming 
tactical advantage.  See, e.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 686: 
Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such group injuries for which 
individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do 
not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive.  If each is 
left to assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and 
fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all. 
See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 48 (2d ed. 1971) (analyzing obstacles to the optimal creation of collective 
goods inherent in the costs of organizing groups and in the variance between marginal costs and 
marginal benefits to individual group members); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence 
Between The Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 575 (1997) 
(noting that victims of wrongs do not fully internalize the benefits of litigation and thus may 
have insufficient incentives to file socially desirable suits). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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single agent to represent diverse principles.6  In contrast, the 
consequences of diversity for the valuation of aggregated claims – and 
thus for the effectiveness of aggregative procedures as a tool for 
implementing substantive rules and remedies – has received 
comparatively little explicit attention.  Politicians, courts, and 
commentators have focused on controlling when, where, and by whom 
class actions are filed, managing class actions after they are certified, 
and policing how they are settled, but have given only minimal 
scrutiny to the logically antecedent question of how to decide whether 
a class action is a procedurally viable means of resolving the similar 
and dissimilar aspects of contested claims and defenses.  In particular, 
rules for assessing the significance of common and individual 
questions within putative class actions – notably Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3)7 – have not evolved since their creation in 1966, 
have received virtually no helpful clarification from the Supreme 
Court, have bewildered lower courts, and have not attracted 
substantial scholarly scrutiny. 
The lack of critical attention to rules for assessing the 
similarity of putative class members’ claims outside the agency 
context has allowed a conventional wisdom to evolve that misstates 
the nature and overlooks the seriousness of the problems that a lack of 
similarity creates.  The consensus view among courts and 
commentators is that the critical determination in deciding whether to 
certify claims for class action treatment is whether the factual and 
legal questions that unite class members are relatively more 
significant than the questions that divide them.8  The formal 
embodiment of this approach is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3), which asks judges contemplating whether to certify a class 
action to decide whether “questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members.”9  The problem with this “predominance” 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 6. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry 
into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEG. F. 581; Rhode, supra note 1.  This Article does 
not address issues relating to the construction of principal-agent relationships.  Instead, the 
Article assumes the existence of a representative who can advocate on behalf of the class 
consistent with due process, and asks when the effect of diversity among putative class members’ 
factual and legal circumstances on the valuation of claims at trial or in a settlement should 
provide an independent basis for refusing to certify a class action. 
 7. For a discussion of Rule 23(b)(3)’s text, purpose, and shortcomings, see infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra notes 128-138, 164 and accompanying text. 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).  For example, in a proposed class action by 
ratepayers against an electric utility challenging rates exceeding a statutory tariff, the legality of 
the rate would be a common question, while the amount of any overcharge could vary for each 
person in the class.  Likewise, in a proposed class action by consumers suing a credit card issuer 
for fraudulent oral misrepresentations, the truthfulness of the issuer’s statements in a sales 
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approach is that the extent of dissimilarity among class members’ 
circumstances turns out to be a much more important indicator of 
whether claims are suitable for class action treatment than the extent 
of any similarity.  Accordingly, the certification inquiry should not ask 
whether class members’ circumstances are more similar than 
different, but rather whether their circumstances are sufficiently 
different to preclude resolving their claims in a single proceeding.  
Unfortunately, the debate over class action reform does not recognize 
serious flaws in current certification criteria for assessing the 
similarity and dissimilarity among class members’ circumstances, and 
thus these criteria remain relatively immune from proposed reforms 
even though they are the source of many of the problems that 
reformers are trying to solve.  Accordingly, this Article seeks to 
highlight the importance of certification rules that have largely 
escaped critical scrutiny, to illustrate how these rules hinge on 
conceptually incoherent criteria and inspire equally confused doctrine, 
and to explain how reliance on these criteria both inflates and reduces 
the expected litigation and settlement value of claims processed 
through class actions.  The Article then identifies principles from 
which replacement certification criteria can be drawn, and proposes a 
new rule for courts to use when deciding if a class action would be an 
appropriate procedural vehicle for adjudicating the common and 
individualized elements of contested claims and defenses.10 
________________________________________________________________________ 
script could be common to the class, but proof of whether a class member heard and relied on the 
representations in a particular script would depend on each member’s individual circumstances.  
Rule 23(b)(3) would require a court considering a motion to certify a class in these hypothetical 
cases to decide whether the common questions of rate legality or truthfulness of a telemarketing 
script “predominate” over the individual questions of damages or reliance. 
 10. My examination of class action principles, rules, and doctrine focuses on Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”), which governs class certification in federal courts and is the 
model for most state class action rules.  See infra notes 119-121 (reviewing state class action 
rules and noting that predominance is a certification factor in 45 of the 48 states with rules or 
statutes permitting class actions).  I focus on Rule 23(b)(3), which permits class actions seeking 
primarily monetary damages, and which has become the most litigated and controversial of the 
three categories of class actions that Rule 23(b) creates.  See THOMAS WILLGING ET AL., 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 118 (1996).  The (b)(3) category has also been the focus of 
most recent debate over class action reform proposals.  See Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) 
Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 928 (1998).  The other two categories of class 
actions – codified in Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) – are generally available when plaintiffs seek 
primarily injunctive relief or when payment of individual damage claims would risk depleting a 
common fund and prejudicing litigants whose claims would not be addressed until after the 
defendant loses the ability to pay them.  Neither of these categories relies on the concept of 
predominance as a criterion for certification.  Instead, rules tailored to the unique institutional 
and policy concerns raised by injunctions (often to enforce civil rights statutes) and common fund 
distributions have evolved to manage the cases that fall into the (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories.  
Although this Article’s analysis tracks the current tripartite structure of Rule 23(b), it would 
apply even if the rule were rewritten to create a single trans-substantive certification standard 
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The Article’s analysis proceeds in four parts.  Part II 
establishes the practical importance of dissimilarity among class 
members’ circumstances by explaining how dissimilarity creates 
subtle distortions in the presentation and assessment of claims and 
defenses that either inflate or dilute the perceived value of the overall 
class claim and are a significant source of inaccuracy in class 
adjudication and settlement.11  I define and explore three examples of 
these distortions: “cherry-picking” (the tendency of aggregate 
proceedings to generalize from examples that do not fully represent 
the diversity of individual claims), “claim fusion” (the process by which 
claims in the aggregate merge to assume characteristics that no 
individual claim possesses), and “ad hoc lawmaking” (the 
manipulation of substantive rules to assist in resolving or preventing 
practical difficulties that arise in the course of adjudicating dissimilar 
questions of fact and law).  In addition, Part II explains why the fact 
that most class actions settle – which is often cited as a reason not to 
care too deeply about flaws in certification criteria – is actually a 
reason to reconsider such criteria due to their effect on the outcome of 
negotiated agreements.  Part II concludes in light of these 
observations that there is a pressing need to analyze the theoretical 
and practical coherence of criteria for assessing similarity and 
dissimilarity among claims in proposed class actions.12 
Part III develops three general principles of civil procedure and 
class actions – “finality,” “fidelity,” and “feasibility” 13 – that should 
________________________________________________________________________ 
because the tension between common and individualized issues that I discuss would affect any 
effort to parse monetary claims that are suitable for aggregate treatment from those that are 
unsuitable. 
 11. Accuracy is of course not the only value that procedure should promote – others include 
efficiency, distributive justice, an opportunity to be heard and participate, and the avoidance of 
invidious bias – but is a useful concept to consider when evaluating the wisdom of a procedural 
rule.  See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 
23 J. LEG. STUD. 307 (1994). 
 12. The certification inquiry (both before the trial court and on interlocutory appeal) on 
which the Article focuses is generally the judiciary’s sole opportunity to assess whether 
particular claims are suitable for class action treatment.  Cases that are not certified are usually 
dropped or settle, and cases that are certified usually settle before trial, such that there is rarely 
non-interlocutory appellate review of the certification decision (aside from the relatively 
unrigorous review of certification criteria that occurs in the context of approving settlements 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)).  Cf. infra note 96.  The certification decision is therefore the pivotal 
moment in the life of a putative class action, with the judge acting as a gatekeeper to the 
procedural benefits of Rule 23.  Similarity among claims and defenses is a key that unlocks the 
gates to class action status, while dissimilarity is a force that slams the gates shut. 
 13. For a detailed explanation of each principle, see infra text accompanying notes 44-98.  
Briefly, the “finality” principle captures the need for class actions to vindicate the dispute 
resolution and behavior modification goals of civil procedure by eventually resulting in a 
judgment reflecting the rights and obligations of the parties.  The timing and preclusive effect of 
this judgment may vary from case to case, but at a minimum class actions seeking damages 
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shape the judicial test for assessing similarity and dissimilarity 
among class member’s claims.  My goal is to anchor the assessment of 
individual and common questions more securely in broader principles 
that animate civil procedure generally and class actions in particular.  
The finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles collectively establish 
guideposts for evaluating how the similar and dissimilar elements of 
group claims should affect a court’s decision about whether to certify a 
class.  The need for a judgment (finality), the need to ensure that each 
beneficiary of that judgment is entitled to it (fidelity), and the need to 
resolve individual issues within resource constraints (feasibility) 
suggest that courts should certify classes featuring some dissimilarity 
among members’ circumstances only if there is a feasible plan for 
resolving factual and legal disputes regarding each element and 
defense applicable to each class member’s claim and for eventually 
entering judgment for or against class members for a specified sum of 
money.  The court should either provide an opportunity for the parties 
to litigate individual claims or defenses, should have a reason to 
believe that such an opportunity is not necessary under the applicable 
substantive law, or should have a reason to believe that a settlement 
can fairly account for dissimilarity without any need for adjudication.  
The principles leave room for imaginative judicial solutions to complex 
management problems while providing a check on the permissible 
scope of experimentation. 
Part IV applies the lessons learned from Part III to Rule 23’s 
predominance test, concluding that the concept of predominance and 
the doctrine that it has spawned are inconsistent with the principles 
that should guide certification criteria.  To prove this point, the Article 
discusses the historical origins of the predominance test, the failure of 
its drafters to provide any interpretative guidance, the ineffective 
efforts of the Supreme Court and lower courts to divine its meaning, 
its inherent conceptual flaws, and the dubious doctrine that courts 
have developed to apply the predominance rule to recurring fact 
patterns involving individualized defenses, individualized damages, 
and choice of law in cases with multistate contacts. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
should culminate in a judgment that determines who owes or does not owe what to whom.  The 
“fidelity” principle addresses the connection between procedural and substantive rules, 
establishing a constraint on the ability of courts to permit class action procedures to alter 
analysis of substantive claims and defenses.  Certifying classes may have the desirable effect of 
removing practical obstacles to the fair and efficient determination of the merits of claims and 
defenses, but certification is not a license for courts to tweak the merits by modifying the content 
of applicable substantive law.  The “feasibility” principle reflects the tension between aspirations 
and capacity in the management of complex litigation.  Courts often want to accomplish more 
than they are able to achieve in class actions given constraints of time, talent, and resources, and 
must therefore think carefully about the feasibility of potentially costly and improvident 
procedural remedies before embracing them. 
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The basic problem with the predominance test is that it 
requires elaborate efforts to answer a question that is not worth 
asking.  The answer to the question “which issues predominate” is 
neither interesting nor useful, and is not grounded in any relevant 
principle.  The predominance inquiry fixates on the notion that class 
actions are viable when class members share similar factual 
circumstances and raise similar legal questions.  However, similarity 
among claims is an unhelpful concept when one thinks about the 
practical consequences of certifying a class and the procedural 
principles (such as finality, fidelity, and feasibility) to which class 
adjudication should conform.  A more relevant concept is dissimilarity.  
The existence of some similarity within the class is what makes class 
actions potentially efficient and appealing, but it is the lack of 
substantial dissimilarity that makes class actions a fair and 
procedurally viable means of rendering judgment for or against the 
class and its members.  The predominance concept conflates the 
similarity and dissimilarity inquiries into a single balancing test, thus 
obscuring the practical and theoretical importance of dissimilarity 
standing alone. 
The predominance balancing test is an exercise in futility 
because it relies on a subjective comparison of inherently 
incomparable factors that is not grounded in a principled assessment 
of their independent significance.  The ensuing weighing process is 
analogous to asking a starving person to balance the nutritional value 
of vitamins in his only potential food source against the negative 
effects of poison in the same food.  Any sort of balancing would be 
pointless.  A huge nutritional value would be irrelevant if the poison is 
fatal, and if the poison is not fatal then any amount of nutrition would 
justify consumption absent a superior alternative food source.  The 
same analysis applies when deciding whether to certify a class 
because dissimilarity among class members’ claims at a sufficient dose 
is a fatal poison to class adjudication.  When individual questions of 
law or fact unique to particular class members raise insurmountable 
obstacles to class adjudication, then the number and importance of 
common questions is irrelevant.  On the other hand, if the proposed 
class action would be “superior”14 to possible alternative forms of 
litigation even accounting for the efforts needed to cope with difficult – 
yet manageable – individualized issues, then denying certification 
based on an arbitrary notion of whether common questions 
“predominate” would be gratuitous.  Individualized questions of law or 
fact viewed in isolation thus either should or should not preclude 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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certification in any particular case; their relative “predominance” with 
respect to common questions should neither salvage an otherwise 
uncertifiable class nor derail a class that should otherwise be certified.  
Certification rules relying on the “predominance” test thus enshrine a 
pointless concept that obscures the need to evaluate individual 
questions of law and fact directly rather than in comparison to 
common questions. 
Having rejected the predominance test, I propose in Part V a 
“resolvability” test that would reconcile the practical demands of class 
litigation with theoretical constraints.  The new test would permit 
certification only when the court has a feasible plan to answer all 
disputed questions of law and fact that must be resolved before 
entering judgment for or against class members under the law 
governing each class member’s claim and applicable defenses.  The 
test also suggests a framework for considering the propriety of 
settlements of otherwise uncertifiable classes, although defining the 
precise limits on such settlements requires developing a normative 
theory of consent that is beyond the scope of this Article.15  The new 
resolvability approach to dissimilarity would channel the inherent 
subjectivity of certification decisions along more clearly defined paths 
and would realign certification analysis with principled constraints 
from which the predominance test has drifted.  Rules should ideally 
facilitate the implementation of guiding principles, but the 
predominance test does the opposite, interposing a meaningless and 
distracting wedge between principle and practice. 
Part V also notes some of the broader implications of my 
proposal linked to unraveling the dynamic connection between 
substantive and procedural constraints on the regulation of behavior 
that affects large groups.  Class actions have become a crutch on 
which policymakers lean to provide a procedural boost to the efficacy 
of substantive rules regulating behavior.  Replacing the predominance 
test with a resolvability test would likely make that procedural boost 
more difficult to obtain, which suggests that policymakers and 
commentators concerned about deterring corporate wrongdoing and 
compensating victims should refocus the debate about class actions to 
consider new approaches to substantive regulation for which class 
adjudication might be a more suitable enforcement mechanism.  In 
addition, rather than making questionable use of the class action to 
optimize the remedial power of substantive liability and damage rules, 
there may be a need to tailor substantive rules to operate more 
effectively under existing individualized procedures for resolving 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 196-199. 
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disputes, or to develop new and more effective aggregative procedures.  
While procedures must evolve in response to substantive preferences, 
policymakers must also reconsider substantive preferences in light of 
limitations on procedure. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DISSIMILARITY FOR THE LITIGATED AND 
NEGOTIATED VALUATION OF CLASS MEMBERS’ CLAIMS 
This Part contends that dissimilarity among class members 
distorts the outcome of class actions through three phenomena – 
cherry-picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking – that current 
class action scholarship either overlooks or underweights.  When class 
actions are adjudicated to trial, effective advocates can harness these 
phenomena to exploit dissimilarity among putative class members and 
thereby alter the probability of a liability finding and the calculation 
of aggregate damages.  Even when parties settle class actions before 
trial, bargaining occurs in the shadow of the expected trial procedure, 
and thus a settlement will likely replicate any distortions that 
dissimilarity would create during formal adjudication. 
 
A. A Thought Experiment Confirming the Distorting Effect of 
Dissimilarity 
A simple thought experiment confirms the importance of 
dissimilarity to analysis of certification criteria.  Imagine that class 
actions were available only in cases where the claims of all class 
members were exactly alike in every detail and subject to proof 
through identical evidence, and where individuals could prove their 
membership in the class by purely objective submissions, such as the 
defendant’s business records naming the people with whom the 
defendant interacted. 
In these hypothetical circumstances, it is difficult to imagine 
that class actions would generate substantial controversy or occupy 
their current position high on political agendas.  Class actions 
featuring such ultra-commonality would present only minor 
coordination problems, would be only marginally less manageable 
than any constituent claim standing alone, would be unlikely to 
confuse juries any more than non-class cases, would have outcomes 
approximately as predictable as outcomes in ordinary non-class 
litigation, and would not involve substantial conflicts among class 
members’ interests.  The expected outcome of a trial for any one 
plaintiff picked at random from the homogenous class should not 
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differ from the expected outcome for any other class member.  The 
case presumably would settle after no more than a few sample trials of 
randomly selected class members’ claims that would establish a range 
of outcomes to serve as the template for a classwide settlement.  The 
ability to pinpoint a reasonably accurate average claim value would in 
turn minimize agency costs because the court could monitor 
settlements with an eye toward the divergence of settlement values 
from expected litigation outcomes.  Settlements would vindicate both 
the compensation and deterrence objectives of applicable substantive 
laws because defendants would pay roughly what the merits of claims 
suggest is warranted, and plaintiffs would receive roughly what they 
would be entitled to receive (assuming that jury verdicts in sample 
trials would be roughly accurate).  Because all claims would be 
identical and all class members identifiable, the averaging of sample 
trial verdicts would not have any distributive consequences beyond 
the unobjectionable smoothing over of lucky or unlucky high-end or 
low-end jury awards.16  Trying a few claims would thus be functionally 
equivalent to trying them all.17 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 16. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of 
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 569-70 (1993) (“[W]hen factual issues are identical 
throughout the class, the class action functions as a trivial form of sampling. The court in effect 
relies on a sample of one case, that of the representative plaintiff’s, to adjudicate liability for the 
entire class.”). 
 17. Plaintiffs might object that class proceedings would deprive them of their autonomy, but 
that objection would wilt if we assume that the economic value of plaintiffs’ claims is small 
relative to the defendant’s aggregate stakes in the litigation, such that plaintiffs would likely be 
unable to litigate at all – let alone autonomously – outside of a class action.  In any event, the 
critique of class actions premised on a plaintiff’s right to autonomous control over litigation is 
questionable given the lack of substantial autonomy that exists even in nominally individualized 
suits and the costs that an autonomy norm would impose on third parties competing for scarce 
judicial resources or hoping to benefit from the deterrent effects of collective litigation.  See 
Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice – Ex Ante v. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1838 (1997) 
(observing that individuals behind a veil of ignorance might rationally prefer to sacrifice 
autonomy in favor of efficient and accurate aggregative procedures); Deborah R. Hensler, 
Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-97 (discussing the 
obstacles to meaningful participation that plaintiffs face even in traditional non-class suits); Eric 
D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 800 
(1997) (noting that adjudicative resources are scarce, such that providing autonomy to each 
litigant has distributional consequences); Rosenberg, Mandatory Litigation, supra note 1, at 841-
43 (noting that litigation autonomy fosters opportunistic personal wealth-maximizing behavior 
by litigants that undermines the deterrence and insurance objectives of tort law).  But see Lon L. 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357, 364 (1978) (defining 
“participation” of litigants through the presentation of reasoned argument as a feature 
distinguishing adjudication from other mechanisms of “social ordering”, such as elections and 
contracts); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. 
REV. 779, 822 (1985) (“[G]iven the traditional respect afforded an individual tort litigant’s right 
to control the prosecution of a substantial personal injury or wrongful death claim, and that the 
plaintiff loses much of this individual control when the court certifies a class action, courts 
should avoid using this joinder device to try these cases.”); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the 
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The difference between the thought experiment above and the 
highly controversial modern class action is that the circumstances of 
plaintiffs who claim to fit a proposed class definition are rarely exactly 
alike.  Distinctions among class members could include, for example, 
the degree to which their contact with the defendant was direct or 
attenuated, the precise nature of the defendant’s behavior toward 
them, the collateral circumstances of their interaction with the 
defendant, their mental state during their dealings with the 
defendant, the type and severity of their injuries, the ranking of their 
remedial preferences, and the nature and strength of the defenses to 
which they may be subject.  If these differences are material – i.e., if 
the substantive law imposed by the institution with legitimate 
political authority to create rights and regulate behavior deems the 
differences potentially outcome-determinative – than procedure 
should have a mechanism to tailor adjudicated outcomes to the 
varying circumstances of individual plaintiffs.18 
Once one moves from an imagined world of complete similarity 
to the real world of partial dissimilarity, opportunities exist to 
manipulate the presentation of evidence and legal argument in a 
manner that highlights favorable or unfavorable aspects of unique 
individual claims.  Judges and jurors trying to assess the merit and 
value of these distinct claims must then engage in the difficult 
cognitive task of aggregating their analysis while tracking material 
variables that differ from claimant to claimant.  As the next 
subsection explains, there is little reason to believe that courts and 
jurors adjudicating classwide liability and damages questions can 
accurately account for the full effects of dissimilarity. 
B. Trial Distortions: Cherry-Picking, Claim Fusion, and Ad hoc 
Lawmaking 
The practical problems with certifying class actions despite 
dissimilarity among claims arise from the natural human instinct to 
simplify the inherently complex and to create order out of what 
appears chaotic.  These instincts manifest in class actions in the form 
of procedural shortcuts to squeeze heterogeneous claims into a 
homogenous mold and thereby avoid the procedural difficulties that 
dissimilarity would create.  The effect is akin to mixing different colors 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 572 (1997) (arguing that due process 
principles require providing plaintiffs with a right to be heard directly rather than through a 
representative). 
 18. For further development of the normative foundations for the need to integrate 
substance and procedure, see infra Part III.B. 
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of paint into a large vat: the vibrant reds, greens, and blues will blur 
into gray.  This blurring of constituent parts into an undifferentiated 
whole may be unobjectionable if one does not care about the color of 
the final product, but would be a serious problem if one were 
interested in preserving the palette of original ingredients in the mix.  
Likewise, aggregating distinct individual claims into a class obscures 
differences among class members in ways that engender substantive 
consequences. 
The hypothesis that certification of dissimilar claims tends to 
distort assessment of their merits is grounded in three recurring 
phenomena of class litigation, which I call “cherry-picking,” “claim 
fusion,” and “ad hoc lawmaking.”  Each of these concepts describes a 
means by which certification can inflate – and sometimes deflate – the 
aggregate value of class claims beyond the sum of the values of 
individual claims. 
“Cherry-picking” refers to the fact that plaintiffs’ counsel often 
controls the presentation of plaintiffs’ case and can hand-pick the most 
persuasive individual examples of a defendant’s alleged wrongdoing to 
stand as representatives for the alleged classwide problem.19  The 
“true” persuasiveness of class members’ dissimilar liability claims may 
lay on a spectrum, but the class can present examples from only the 
top of the spectrum and thus skew the jury’s assessment of the merits.  
For example, in a class action against a credit card issuer for making 
misleading representations about interest rates, class members may 
have had varying levels of financial sophistication, may have seen 
various disclosures that were more or less misleading than others, and 
may have relied on the misrepresentations to different extents.  Yet a 
smart class counsel will not make his case through testimony of, say, a 
doctor who read a relatively benign disclosure on which he did not 
rely; instead, the star witness is likely to be a very sympathetic and 
unsophisticated victim of the most egregious example of the 
defendants’ misconduct.  The defendant can try to counter the effect of 
this testimony by spotlighting cases from the bottom of the spectrum, 
but realistically this is not likely to happen; most defendants want to 
deny liability, not highlight the fact that sometimes their behavior 
was less culpable than at other times.  The consequence is that 
plaintiffs’ ability to cherry-pick the best examples from among a pool 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 19. The extent of plaintiffs’ control over witness selection at trial will vary depending on the 
role that the court plays in managing the presentation of evidence.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) 
(vesting broad management powers in district courts presiding over class actions).  A defendant 
contemplating settlement at an early stage of a class action often will not be able to predict the 
extent of plaintiffs’ power to cherry-pick, and must factor that uncertainty into its settlement 
calculus. 
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of diverse claims skews the defendants’ potential exposure above what 
a case-by-case merits review would suggest is the appropriate 
damages figure.  Class members with weak claims in essence ride the 
coattails of class members with stronger claims and benefit from the 
jury’s perception that the defendant’s conduct in the aggregate was 
worse than it may actually have been. 
The upward skewing of claim values can apply in reverse if the 
class representative turns out to be a lemon rather than a cherry.  The 
class in these circumstances would be attempting to prove its claim 
based on an example drawn from the bottom of the diverse spectrum, 
which would artificially deflate the jury’s assessment of liability and 
calculation of aggregate damages.  The lemon-picking phenomenon 
thus helps to explain plaintiff-protecting critiques of class actions 
premised on agency costs by illustrating the potentially adverse effect 
of dissimilarity among claimants on the selection of a representative. 
“Claim fusion” describes the phenomenon that occurs when the 
claims of the class morph to assume aspects of disparate individual 
claims, such that the class has a claim that is stronger than the claim 
of any particular member.  The class claim in effect becomes a 
composite fusing the best components of its dissimilar constituent 
claims.  Building off the example above, suppose that a credit card 
issuer mails three types of solicitations that are each misleading, but 
for different reasons.  Each class member receives one of these 
solicitations, but none receive all three.  The claims of the class will 
gain strength from the cumulative effect of the three 
misrepresentations, which in the jury’s mind will likely fuse into one 
massive misrepresentation despite the fact that no class member 
received all three solicitations.20  Even if claimants were divided into 
three subclasses, each subclass would benefit from the jury’s 
awareness of the defendant’s misconduct toward the other subclasses.  
Moreover, even assuming that only one rather than three types of 
misrepresentation are at issue, the claim fusion problem could occur 
with respect to collateral facts surrounding plaintiffs’ claims.  For 
example, suppose that one class member called the credit card issuer 
to complain about unexpectedly high interest rates and testifies as to 
her perception that she was treated rudely, that another testifies that 
she was particularly aggrieved because of her low income, and that a 
third testifies that she suffered substantial stress as a result of her 
dealings with the defendant.  The alleged indifference of the defendant 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 20. Most courts have not recognized the problem of claim fusion, although the Fourth 
Circuit has noted the practical difficulties that arise when the aggregation of dissimilar claims 
creates a “fictional composite” claim that is stronger than its individual components.  Broussard 
v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 345 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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and the alleged stress and poverty of the plaintiffs will infuse the class 
claim even though most individual class members would not have any 
basis for alleging any of the grievances of the three testifying 
plaintiffs.  Allowing the jury to know the myriad manifestations of a 
defendants’ misconduct may not seem undesirable, but from the 
perspective of ensuring accurate judgments the fusion of dissimilar 
circumstances into a more compelling whole likely skews litigation 
outcomes above what the merits warrant by making liability findings 
more probable and inflating damages assessments.21 
The claim fusion problem also applies in reverse as defense 
fusion.  If the defendant has varying defenses to some individual class 
members’ claims, the defenses may fuse to form an artificially strong 
classwide defense that skews the value of class members’ claims 
downward.  For example, if one of the class representatives in the 
above credit card hypothetical lied on her application, and another 
had an independent source of knowledge correcting the omissions in 
the misleading solicitations, a jury might allow those defenses to blur 
together and to color their perception of absent class members’ 
claims.22 
“Ad hoc lawmaking” occurs in class actions when courts 
attempt to devise substantive and evidentiary shortcuts around 
management problems that dissimilarity imposes on the resolution of 
otherwise similar claims.  For example, courts will create 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 21. Experiments by psychologists studying juror behavior have not directly addressed the 
hypothesis that claim fusion and cherry picking exploit cognitive biases and therefore skew claim 
valuations.  However, more general experiments establish that jurors have difficulty 
compartmentalizing information in complex cases and that the size of a plaintiff population and 
distinctions among plaintiffs’ circumstances can sway assessment of aggregate liability and 
damages depending on the process by which jurors receive information.  See, e.g., Irwin A. 
Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of 
Plaintiffs on Jurors’ Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence, 
85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 916 (2000); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of 
Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, & Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury 
Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 211-13, 225-26 (1988); Dennis J. Devine, et al., Jury 
Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 622, 671-72, 699 (2001).  Further empirical study would be helpful in assessing the cognitive 
foundation for the claim fusion and cherry picking phenomena in consolidated litigation. 
 22. Although this Article focuses on claim fusion as a problem affecting the design of class 
certification standards, another way to conceptualize the problem would consider the standards 
that should govern the admissibility of evidence in class actions.  For example, one area meriting 
further consideration is whether courts adjudicating class actions should strictly interpret the 
relevance requirement in FED. R. EVID. 402 to preclude any testimony or evidence at the liability 
phase of a case that is not relevant to the claims of the entire class.  In this manner, courts could 
prevent parties from introducing evidence about the unique circumstances of particular class 
members, which in turn would prevent juries from making unwarranted extrapolations that 
inflate or dilute aggregate claim values. 
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irrebuttable23 evidentiary presumptions to avoid having to consider 
individualized questions of fact on legal elements such as reliance,24 
invent new theories of liability to avoid having to consider the 
circumstances of individual class members,25 bend the rules of 
evidence and alter burdens of proof so that contested facts can be 
resolved on a common rather than individualized basis,26 manipulate 
choice of law analysis to minimize the diversity of applicable rules,27 
and try to disentangle claims and defenses so that juries consider 
aggregate classwide liability before they consider whether defendants 
have defenses to individual claims that might reduce the size of their 
aggregate exposure.28  Nothing inherent in the class action device 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 23. The inferences must be irrebuttable because if they were rebuttable the individual 
issues would remain in the case (subject to a flipped burden of proof) and would still present 
obstacles to adjudicating class actions. 
 24. For example, plaintiffs often propose that when liability is premised on a consumer not 
knowing a certain fact, or relying on a given representation, the court should presume that all 
class members who acted in a specified manner must have had a certain level of a knowledge or 
been relying on a misleading statement.  See, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 
807, 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (citing cases).  Under these proposals, objective 
evidence (such as the defendant’s business records) of how the class member acted, which is 
generally easy to present in a class action, would substitute for subjective proof of knowledge or 
reliance, which is generally difficult to present in a class action.  See, e.g., Sandwich Chef v. 
Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 220 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A class cannot be certified 
when evidence of individual reliance will be necessary.”).  Many proposed presumptions depend 
on analogies to federal securities law, which permits a presumption of reliance in 
misrepresentation and omission cases based on the specific wording of the applicable statute and 
the assumption that false or misleading disclosures affect all participants in an efficient market.  
See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972).  A problem with this analogy is that most consumer 
markets do not feature the fast and broad transmission of information characteristic of an 
efficient securities trading regime, so there is no factual basis for presuming that a particular 
piece of false or misleading information had any effect on any particular consumer.  See Sikes v. 
Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing securities and RICO 
contexts for purposes of applying statutory reliance element). 
 25. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that in attempting to “streamlin[e]” management of a class action, the district court had 
merged distinct state law liability standards into an “Esperanto instruction”); Epstein, supra 
note 1, at 489-514 (discussing substantive legal developments arising from class actions in the 
employment, antitrust, and securities fields). 
 26. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir. 
1998) (finding that admission of speculative evidence related to “average” class member damages 
impermissibly relieved plaintiffs of their burden of proving actual damages with reasonable 
precision). 
 27. For an overview and critique of how courts attempt to sidestep the inconvenient 
implications of rigorous choice of law analysis in complex litigation with multistate contacts, see 
Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996). 
 28. See, e.g., Garner v. Healy, 184 F.R.D. 598, 602 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (proposing to decide the 
common question of whether defendants were liable to the class before deciding individualized 
questions of whether any class member could prove proximate causation); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 560-61 (Tex. App. 2002) (noting that trial plan had scheduled 
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distorts substantive or evidentiary rules in this manner, but 
certification has that practical effect when judges try to manage the 
dissimilar aspects of class members’ claims.29  These innovations by 
courts trying to cope with dissimilarity may or may not be legitimate 
in particular cases, but they collectively help to explain the perception 
that class actions often produce outcomes that are not consistent with 
applicable substantive law.30 
The combined effect of cherry- and lemon-picking, claim and 
defense fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking is that class actions exploit or 
obscure dissimilarity rather than resolving it.  Plaintiffs’ counsel find 
creative ways to infuse the class claim with the best of its dissimilar 
aspects, and judges find innovative ways to make any vestiges of 
dissimilarity disappear from the case.  Defendants in turn try to 
counter these efforts by tarring the class with the least desirable traits 
of members with the weakest claims.  The result of these efforts is 
that class litigation is a process of forced homogenization; the more 
heterogeneous claims are to begin with, the greater the effects of 
homogenizing them.31 
C. The Distorting Effects of Dissimilarity on Valuation of Class Action 
Settlements 
The problems with dissimilarity discussed in this Part arise 
because of the practical difficulties that individualized questions of 
________________________________________________________________________ 
calculation of classwide damages prior to presentation of the defendant’s individualized defenses 
to liability). 
 29. Some commentators have noted the general practice of courts using the class action as a 
procedural opportunity to modify substantive rules, but these observations are usually not linked 
to the problems of dissimilarity that I argue are a primary cause of such substantive 
modifications.  See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via 
Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 873 (1995) (noting attempts by courts to “fit[] the substantive 
law into the class action mold”). 
 30. Ad hoc shortcuts can prejudice both plaintiffs and defendants, although defendants are 
more likely to suffer prejudice because most shortcuts are designed to facilitate the plaintiffs’ 
preferred manner of proof.  Plaintiffs’ counsel usually requests the shortcuts, and generally do 
not do so for the defendant’s benefit.  However, plaintiffs are not immune from prejudice because 
their counsel’s zeal to ensure certification may lead to shortcuts that circumvent substantive or 
evidentiary rules that favor some members of the diverse class. 
 31. Even apart from the cherry-picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking phenomena, 
problems associated with dissimilarity among claims manifest themselves in other 
undercurrents of the class action reform debate.  For example, debate about conflicts among class 
members’ remedial preferences is usually framed as relating to agency costs inherent within the 
class action device, but can be reconceptualized as reflecting a concern about how to balance 
similarity and dissimilarity among class members’ preferences and circumstances when deciding 
whether to certify a class.  Likewise, debate over whether class actions create unnecessary 
burdens for courts can be framed as a disagreement about how courts at the certification stage 
should balance the similar, easy to manage aspects of proposed class claims against the more 
difficult to manage dissimilar aspects. 
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law or fact create when a court attempts to litigate a class action.  Yet 
most certified class actions settle,32 so the practical problems 
associated with litigating individualized questions rarely arise, or are 
resolved through the parties’ voluntary adoption of expedited claims 
processing procedures to distribute the proceeds of an agreed 
settlement.  The fact that most class actions settle may suggest that 
difficulties in managing them should not bar their certification.  For 
example, if a defendant does not plan on litigating the question of 
liability, then the difficulty that plaintiffs would have in proving 
liability on a classwide basis arguably should not bar them from an 
opportunity to negotiate a fair and efficient settlement of claims that 
might otherwise go uncompensated.33  Likewise, the fact that damages 
would be difficult to prove in jury trials that no party intends to 
initiate should not be a reason to preclude plaintiffs from proving 
damages through an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that 
all parties are willing to accept.  However, this Section will show that 
the distortions that dissimilarity causes in trial outcomes also plague 
settlement outcomes, such that the near-ubiquity of settlement 
replicates rather than resolves the problems that the remaining parts 
of this Article seek to correct. 
Dissimilarity distorts settlement outcomes in two principal 
respects.  First, dissimilarity among claims prevents judges from 
effectively monitoring agency slack during settlement, which creates 
maneuvering room for agents to negotiate low-ball settlements that 
reward the agents without fully compensating their clients.  Second, 
settlement bargaining involves an attempt to predict trial outcomes, 
and thus the value of a negotiated agreement will reflect trial 
distortions that the parties believe might arise from material 
dissimilarity among class members. 
1. Ineffective Monitoring 
A standard critique of class actions is that lawyers who act as 
agents for the class have financial incentives to negotiate settlements 
that prioritize their own interests at the expense of class members’ 
interests.34  One reason that class counsel are able to get away with 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 32. See Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 151 (“[C]lass actions today serve as the 
procedural vehicle not ultimately for adversarial litigation but for dealmaking on a mass basis.”). 
 33. See Green, supra note 17, at 795 (“Everyone knows the case is not going to be tried, 
but . . . appraise the case under the Rule 23 criteria as if it were.  That seems to me an Orwellian 
approach . . . .”). 
 34. For example, class counsel may: (1) fear competition for fees from lawyers pursuing 
rival class actions and therefore engage in reverse auctions with defendants in which they trade 
diminished client compensation for the certainty of their own reward, see, e.g., Coffee, Class 
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settling claims for less than their true value is that even well-
intentioned potential monitors (such as courts) lack the ability to 
second-guess settlements because the information needed to 
determine the expected litigation value of claims is difficult to 
obtain.35  Yet one reason why expected values are so difficult to 
calculate is that class members are often differently situated, which 
increases the number of variables in any calculation of aggregate 
expected damages. 
For example, assume that L equals the probability that an 
average jury would find the defendant liable to a plaintiff, and that D 
is the amount of damages that an average jury would award.  Now 
imagine two classes: one class contains 1000 members identical in all 
respects to representative V, while a second class contains 250 
members with circumstances identical to V, 250 with circumstances 
identical to W, 250 with circumstances identical to Y, and 250 with 
circumstances identical to Z.  The expected aggregate litigation 
outcome for the more uniform class is 1000 x Lv x Dv.  But the 
expected aggregate litigation outcome for the more fragmented class is 
(250 x Lv x Dv) + (250 x Lw x Dw) + (250 x Ly x Dy) + (250 x Lz x Dz).  
The first calculation is obviously much simpler than the second 
because it requires the court to estimate the value of fewer contested 
variables.  Judicial monitoring of settlements thus becomes more 
viable when there is relatively little outcome-determinative 
dissimilarity among class members.  The enhanced ability of courts to 
monitor settlements in homogenous cases should in turn act as at 
least a partial check on agency costs, assuming that courts are willing 
to expend the effort necessary to fulfill their monitoring role.36  
Accordingly, there is an often unnoticed – albeit indeterminate – 
correlation between the extent of dissimilarity among class members’ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Wars, supra note 1, at 1370; (2) perceive that the effort necessary to produce a marginal dollar of 
compensation for clients is not worth the fraction of that dollar that they will see in fees, see, e.g., 
Coffee, Private Enforcement, supra note 1, at 690; (3) conclude that the risk of holding out for a 
better deal for their clients is not worth putting the certainty of their own fee in jeopardy, such 
that they lose interest in zealously pursuing the case once their fee reaches a satisfactory level, 
see Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (“[A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more than 
the vision of a much larger one in the bush.”); and (4) collude with defendants by accepting a 
large fee in exchange for agreeing to a settlement that allows the defendant to purchase 
litigation peace at a low overall cost, see, e.g., Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 1, at 1367-68. 
 35. See, e.g., Coffee, Accountability, supra note 1, at 376 (noting that a “distinctive” feature 
of class actions relative to other contexts in which principals do not directly appoint their 
representatives is that there is no effective third-party monitoring to minimize agency costs); 
Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that settlement hearings ostensibly designed to give 
courts the information necessary to perform their monitoring function are usually “pep rallies 
jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel”). 
 36. For a discussion of why courts lack incentives to monitor class action settlements 
closely, especially in negative value cases, see Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 1, at 1369-70. 
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circumstances and a court’s ability to monitor and remediate the 
possible effect of agency costs on settlement values. 
2. Tainted Bargaining 
Settlements generally cannot produce accurate valuations of 
dissimilar claims within a class action proceeding because of the 
distortions that dissimilarity creates in anticipated litigation 
outcomes.  Prevailing models of settlement establish that parties will 
seek to avoid a prolonged and expensive trial by attempting to 
anticipate the outcome of litigation and agreeing to accept or pay an 
amount that approximates the expected net gain or loss.37  Each party 
will calculate the expected value of claims (which is the probability of 
success multiplied by the potential reward), adjust for expenses and 
risk aversion, discount to present value, and thus establish 
parameters for a potential settlement.  The case will then settle if the 
parties’ settlement ranges overlap and if strategic behavior (such as 
low-ball offers or unrealistically high demands) do not derail 
negotiations.  The settlement value should roughly reflect the relative 
merit of each side’s position, but only if the litigation process whose 
outcome the parties are trying to predict is an accurate means of 
resolving disputed claims.  For example, a settlement negotiated by 
experienced lawyers in a typical single-plaintiff versus single-
defendant slip-and-fall negligence case in a fair judicial forum will 
probably closely correlate with the merits of the claim because 
litigation is presumably a reasonably accurate means of resolving such 
recurring negligence disputes and the lawyers can draw from prior 
experience when attempting to predict the suit’s outcome.  In contrast, 
if the same two lawyers were told that their clients’ dispute would be 
resolved by a game of chess, the settlement value would bear no 
relationship to the merit of the claim and would instead reflect the 
odds associated with the chess game. 
For the same reasons that the settlement value of a claim 
subjected to resolution by chess instead of litigation would not 
correlate with its merits, the settlement value of a claim that would be 
resolved through a class action despite distortions – such as cherry-
picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking – created by dissimilarity 
would also not reflect the merits of the parties’ positions.  Calculation 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 37. For a critique of expected value models, see Joseph Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The 
Unexpected Value of Litigation (Stanford Law School / Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 
No. 292) (arguing that claims may settle for more or less than their expected value based on the 
parties’ perception of how each will gather and exploit new information about contested facts and 
legal theories during multiple stages of litigation). 
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of expected values would be a function of each party’s prediction of 
who would suffer greater prejudice from the distorted class action trial 
procedure.  The parties would not be attempting to predict the 
outcome of any rational or known process because no such process 
exists for the types of claims being discussed, and thus the odds that 
litigation would produce an accurate outcome that the parties could 
predict are extremely low.  The settlement value of any class action 
where claims are substantially dissimilar thus relates more to 
perceptions about which party will suffer greater prejudice from a 
trial conducted in violation of the principles discussed in Part III than 
to perceptions about which party has the more meritorious case.  An 
example illustrates the point. 
Suppose that a class of insurance policyholders who received 
lower-than-requested payments for property damage to their homes 
sue the insurer for systematically underpaying claims.  Plaintiffs 
propose to present as evidence internal corporate memoranda 
discussing the insurer’s claims adjustment techniques, which 
plaintiffs characterize as a “common classwide scheme” to defraud 
policyholders by providing a level of coverage that is in practice less 
than what policyholders had expected or paid for.  The insurer 
believes that the challenged general claims practices were used in 
adjusting half of the one million property damage claims that were 
resolved during the proposed class period for less than the demanded 
amount, and that the practices reduced the value of affected claims by 
an average of $500, for a total classwide loss of $250 million (i.e., 
500,000 claims x $500 loss).  Moreover, the insurer believes that if a 
court reviewed each of the 500,000 affected claims, there is a 60 
percent chance in each case that the court would conclude that the 
challenged claims practices were legal under the circumstances.  The 
insurer thus has three individualized “defenses” to each class 
members’ claim: (1) that the class member was not one of the insureds 
whose claim was affected by the challenged claims practices; (2) that 
the claims practices were legal under the circumstances of the class 
member’s case; and (3) that the class member is entitled to lower 
damages than his complaint demands.  In the vernacular of plaintiffs’ 
“common scheme” allegation, the defendant would be using individual 
counterexamples to refute the existence of the scheme, denying 
whether the scheme affected any particular person, denying that the 
scheme was illegal in any particular case, and disputing the extent of 
damages that the alleged scheme may have caused. 
Now imagine the settlement value of the case under each of 
two proposed procedural mechanisms for litigating it, assuming that 
the insurer succeeds in convincing the plaintiffs that its calculations 
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discussed above are accurate.  For each proposal, assume that the 
parties are represented by well-financed and competent counsel.  
Under one proposal, the court would (assuming infinite time and 
resources) individually examine all one million claims files and assess 
liability on a file-by-file basis, entering a judgment for or against each 
class member.  The expected value of a judgment in these 
circumstances would be $100 million (the plaintiffs’ 40 percent 
probability of success multiplied by the $250 million potential 
exposure).  The settlement value of the case would therefore begin at 
$100 million and move higher or lower depending on the parties’ risk 
aversion and anticipated litigation costs. 
Now suppose that the court decides to permit plaintiffs to 
litigate as a class action the “common” question of whether the 
insurer’s claims practices were in general illegal without permitting 
the insurer to present defenses to individual class members’ claims 
until after the jury rules on the common question, and even then only 
in a quasi-administrative claims proceeding.  The expected value of a 
judgment would probably change in two ways. 
First, the parties may conclude that a trial limited to the 
abstract question of whether the insurer’s general practices were 
illegal would be more likely than a file-by-file review to result in a 
finding of liability because the jury would not have a context for 
assessing the reasonableness of claims decisions in concrete situations 
and would be influenced by cherry-picking and claims fusion.  
Moreover, the parties would probably believe that convincing a jury 
that a large corporate defendant had a propensity to behave poorly is 
much easier than proving that the defendant behaved poorly in any 
particular case, especially when the evidence of such a propensity 
consists of internal corporate documents not linked to a specific 
context.  The prospect of a classwide liability finding (rather than file-
by-file liability assessments) may therefore raise the insurer’s 
aggregate expected probability of a loss from 40 percent to, say, 60 
percent. 
Second, the parties would realize that if the insurer loses on 
the common question of whether its claims practices were in general 
illegal, then the claims resolution process would be likely to conclude, 
based on inertia and the truncated scope of alternative dispute 
resolution procedures, that the previously established illegal claims 
practice tainted a particular claims file.  The parties might therefore 
conclude that, say, 60 percent rather than 50 percent of files would be 
found to have been tainted, and that the average estimate of damages 
would be $600 rather than $500.  Settlement values would thus 
change dramatically.  The defendant would face a 40 percent chance of 
 1020 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4:995 
 
 
 
complete victory (assuming that courts in other jurisdictions grant 
preclusive effect to the judgment), but a 60 percent chance of a $360 
million exposure (600,000 files x $600 file).  The expected value of a 
judgment would more than double from $100 million to $216 million 
(60 percent probability of loss x $360 million exposure).  The starting 
point for settlement talks would therefore be $216 million, and the 
insurer would likely be more risk averse due to its higher total 
exposure.38 
The likely settlement value of the common issues class action 
would thus be substantially higher than the settlement value of the 
hypothetical case where a court devoted time and energy to assessing 
the merits of each individual claim without relying on generalizations 
based on “common” evidence and inferences.  The settlement value of 
the class action would not reflect the merits of the case so much as the 
parties’ assessment of how a distorted litigation process would 
prejudice the defendant by inflating the defendant’s probability of 
losing on common issues, diminishing the defendant’s probability of 
prevailing on defenses, and increasing the defendant’s total exposure. 
Alternatively, one can imagine a scenario in which the 
settlement value of the class action would be lower for plaintiffs than 
if cases were litigated individually.  Suppose in the example above 
that the plaintiffs’ “common” evidence of illegal claims practices is 
weak, but that a file-by-file review creates a much stronger inference 
of wrongdoing in the insurer’s adjustment of claims.  Even assuming 
that the plaintiffs could present a statistical analysis of selected 
claims files to support their allegation of classwide wrongdoing, the 
parties might conclude that the “common” claim would be so 
complicated that the jury might reject it even though a significant 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 38. The supposition that defendants will be risk-averse when threatened with a large 
damages award may seem counterintuitive in light of conventional models of settlement 
behavior, which assume that defendants are loss-averse and therefore favor the risk of trial over 
settlement in the hope of avoiding all liability.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses & the 
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 123 (1996).  However, the cognitive psychology 
experiments on which these settlement models are founded were not designed to address risk 
aversion in the context of the large potential losses that are possible in class actions, see Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, 
S258 (1986) (noting that experimental evidence about risk perceptions “may not apply to ruinous 
losses”), and to the extent relevant predict that decisionmakers focus on the magnitude of 
potential losses while underweighting the low probability of their occurrence, see Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453, 
455 (1981).  Existing scholarship about risk preferences is therefore consistent with the 
hypothesis that a corporate defendant faced with a massive potential class action judgment is 
more likely to avoid risk than to seek it.  Cf. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: 
A Study of Settlement Negotiations & the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 383 
(1991) (concluding that the extent of a defendant’s risk-aversion may partly depend on the 
difference between its net worth and its exposure). 
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percentage of individual claims are meritorious.  The expected value of 
a class action judgment would therefore be lower than the value of a 
judgment in the hypothetical case where the court reviewed and 
rendered judgment on each file separately. 
Of course, the hypothetical option of adjudicating all one 
million claims for the small sum of $500 does not exist in the real 
world, so the settlement value of the insurance cases above absent 
certification of a class is probably $0 or nuisance value.  The ostensibly 
neutral point that settlements are problematic when the litigation 
procedure that motivates them would not accurately value claims is 
thus in many circumstances a veiled (but no less troubling) way of 
saying that defendants should escape liability entirely unless 
somebody invents a more accurate mechanism to hold them 
accountable for injuries imposed on a large group of somewhat 
similarly and somewhat dissimilarly situated victims.  One could 
avoid this implication by making the fair and accurate resolution of 
group claims less difficult by, for example, amending substantive law 
to jettison hard-to-prove individualized elements, developing 
streamlined dispute resolution procedures geared toward quickly and 
accurately resolving large numbers of somewhat similar claims, or 
rethinking the extent to which society should care if a settlement 
correlates with the merits of claims.39  However, as explained in Part 
III, such innovations should be debated and discussed through 
legitimate democratic channels, and should not be achieved covertly, 
as they often are now, as an ad hoc incident to judicial attempts to 
squeeze a square peg of dissimilar claims through the round hole of 
class certification criteria. 
I am not arguing here that class action settlements are 
appropriate only in cases that could be manageably litigated.  In some 
circumstances, the parties might be able to predict how a court would 
resolve claims if the court had sufficient resources to do the job 
properly.  For example, if the obstacle to certification is that holding a 
hearing for each of one million similarly situated class members would 
be impossible, a class action settlement might be appropriate if the 
parties could accurately predict the likely outcome of those hearings, 
perhaps based on statistical analysis of a random sample (assuming 
that the applicable substantive law permits such sampling).40  A 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 39. See infra Part V.B. 
 40. For discussions of the benefits and limitations of statistical sampling techniques, see 
Bone, supra note 16, at 568 (noting that a “critical question” when considering sampling “is how 
to distribute fairly a limited number of process opportunities among persons with equal 
participation rights”); Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 
78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1490 (1992) (suggesting “the use of statistical claim profiles, or models, to 
set baseline appraisals of the value of individual claims”); Rosenberg, Mandatory Litigation, 
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settlement in these circumstances could embody a fair and accurate 
assessment of expected values roughly linked to the merits of class 
members’ claims in the aggregate even if a class action trial would not 
be practicable, although there would still be unresolved questions 
about how much of an award to distribute to differently situated 
individual class members.41  However, where the unwieldy nature of a 
class action would distort its likely outcome, as in the insurance 
coverage example above, then its settlement value is likely to 
incorporate that distortion and unlikely to reflect a socially desirable 
level of compensation and deterrence.  Certification criteria for 
settlement classes must therefore permit courts to distinguish 
between class actions that would be manageable but for a lack of 
resources and class actions where manageability problems would 
cause the resolution of common questions to distort the valuation of 
dissimilar individual claims.42 
Accordingly, underemphasizing dissimilarity among claims on 
the assumption that class actions will eventually settle without 
considering whether the action could in theory be fairly litigated 
injects the unfairness of potential litigation into the terms of 
________________________________________________________________________ 
supra note 1, at 853 n.47 (advocating “averaging” in the “sense of disregarding differences in 
litigation value among claims in order to redistribute claim-related wealth in a manner 
consistent with tort deterrence and insurance objectives”); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, 
Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1998) (proposing expanded use of established survey 
methodologies to assess damages). 
 41. The existence of classwide settlements in uncertifiable cases may seem counter-intuitive 
because the lack of manageability would render the plaintiffs’ threat of obtaining certification 
hollow and defendants would have little to fear from refusing to settle.  However, defendants 
may perceive a class action settlement as a favorable alternative to defending against numerous 
individual claims, and may therefore seek to buy peace on a classwide basis even though a class 
action would otherwise be uncertifiable.  For an example of such a settlement in the context of 
asbestos claims, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 42. The Supreme Court has partially recognized the need to consider similarity among 
claims at the certification stage of a proposed settlement class, albeit in a disjointed manner.  On 
the one hand, the Court has held that “[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only class 
certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present 
intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial.”  Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).  Yet on the other hand, the Court has held that 
“permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation” is generally not appropriate 
because the fair settlement value of the case cannot always be determined without reference to a 
credible threat of litigation.  Id. at 621.  The gist of the court’s seemingly inconsistent reasoning 
seems to be that manageability is not important if no trial is contemplated, but that the 
underlying factors that would render the case unmanageable may defeat certification for other 
reasons.  For example, the “divers[ity]” among claims and defenses that would defeat 
predominance and inhibit a classwide trial under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) may likewise render any 
classwide representation in settlement negotiations inadequate under Rule 23(a)(4).  Id. at 622 
n.17.  Understood in this manner, the Court’s opinion in Amchem is consistent with my analysis 
above suggesting that the propriety of class action settlements is not a function of whether 
claims could actually be litigated, but rather whether the settlement terms could be tested 
against the expected outcomes of a predictable and fair adjudicative process. 
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settlements.  The settlement value of such cases would reflect a 
reaction to perceived quirks in how an unwieldy class action would be 
resolved rather than a rational assessment of the case’s merits.43  
Assuring that settlements bear a relationship to the merits of claims 
therefore requires devising certification criteria that account for the 
potential distorting effect of dissimilarity among class members. 
 
*  *  * 
In sum, diversity among the circumstances of individual class 
members and judicial reactions to that diversity are an often 
overlooked source of controversial shortcomings in the class action 
device.  Class actions are not inherently incapable of resolving cases 
accurately, but in practice collectively litigating or settling dissimilar 
issues can distort the valuation of individual and aggregate claims.  
Accordingly, a central question for observers concerned about tension 
between the substantive aspirations of regulation and the procedural 
reality of adjudication should be whether courts have coherent criteria 
to assess how dissimilarity affects the propriety of certifying a 
putative class.  Part III seeks to create a principled foundation for 
such criteria. 
III. PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD SHAPE RULES GOVERNING THE EFFECT 
OF INDIVIDUALIZED ISSUES ON CLASS CERTIFICATION DECISIONS 
The previous Part demonstrated that dissimilarity among 
putative class members’ circumstances can distort the valuation of 
claims, raising the question of how certification rules should measure 
and assess dissimilarity within putative classes.  The next three Parts 
of the Article seek to answer that question.  This Part identifies and 
analyzes three broad principles from which to extract more specific 
criteria for assessing the significance of individualized issues.  Part IV 
then tests the “predominance” rule against these criteria and finds the 
rule conceptually flawed, and Part V proposes a replacement. 
The significance of individualized questions in proposed class 
actions is a matter of degree rather than of absolutes.  Different class 
members often act with different degrees of reasonableness, intent, 
and knowledge, are injured to different extents, value their losses 
differently, and have differing goals for the outcome of litigation, but 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 43. Such settlements might raise additional problems if the dissimilarity among differently 
situated claimants leads lawyers representing one group to negotiate a settlement that does not 
adequately address the needs of other groups.  This concern about adequacy of representation 
has been the primary focus of the Supreme Court’s decisions reviewing class action settlements.  
See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-27. 
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these differences are not necessarily relevant or material in every 
case.  For example, the fact that different purchasers of a computer 
intended to use it for different purposes would be irrelevant in an 
antitrust class action against the seller for price-fixing, but would be 
highly relevant in an implied warranty class action against the seller 
claiming that the computers were unfit for a particular purpose.  
Designers of class certification rules must therefore develop criteria 
capable not only of recognizing the existence of diversity within 
proposed classes, but also of assessing whether that diversity could 
materially affect resolution of class members’ claims. 
Testing whether current rules governing class certification 
adequately assess and account for diversity among putative class 
members’ circumstances requires identifying a broader set of 
principles to which such rules should conform.  Drawing from general 
themes of civil procedure, it would be possible to identify at various 
levels of abstraction hundreds of principles that certification rules 
would need to reflect on any number of topics and subtopics from the 
initial filing of class actions to the final enforcement of classwide 
judgments.  However, my goal is not to reinvent the class action from 
scratch.  For present purposes, I identify three principles and that set 
minimum parameters for rules guiding judicial discretion in assessing 
the similarity and dissimilarity of individual claims in a putative class 
action.  From each principle we can derive preliminary conclusions 
about how to draft certification rules.  We can then combine the three 
principles to derive more concrete drafting criteria, and then test 
those criteria against current rules governing class certification. 
The three principles, explained in greater detail below, are 
that: (1) a certified class action for money damages must eventually 
result in an enforceable judgment resolving the claims of all class 
members (the “finality” principle); (2) a class member may not receive 
a judgment in his or her favor unless he or she proves the substantive 
elements for the applicable cause of action and survives any applicable 
defenses (the “fidelity” principle); and (3) attempts to adjudicate class 
actions in conformity with principles 1 and 2 must occur within 
resource and management constraints (the “feasibility” principle).  
Class certification is thus proper only if the court has a plan for 
eventually reaching an adjudicated or negotiated judgment that 
reflects the parties’ rights under controlling law.  These three 
principles may not seem controversial when phrased at this level of 
abstraction, but we will see in Part IV that current class action rules 
and doctrine often overlook or contradict these ideals.  Alternatively, 
some of the principles may seem counterintuitive based on 
conventional wisdom about class actions, but we will see that 
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conventional wisdom has slipped from its theoretical moorings. 
A. The Finality Principle: A Certified Class Action Seeking Damages 
Should Eventually Result in a Judgment Resolving the Claims of All 
Class Members 
A hallmark of American judicial procedure is that absent a 
voluntary act by the parties (such as settlement) or dismissal by the 
court, civil litigation eventually culminates in a final judgment 
establishing the rights of the litigants with respect to the subject of 
the suit.  If a plaintiff prevails, the judgment requires the defendant to 
take some action with respect to the plaintiff, such as paying a 
specified amount of money or refraining from a course of conduct.  If a 
defendant prevails, the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion and the 
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause generally terminate the 
plaintiff’s ability to litigate against the defendant again about the 
subject addressed in the judgment.44  Judgments do not always come 
quickly, but the judicial system aspires to eventual closure. 
The normative foundations of the need for a judgment reflect at 
least three distinct concerns about civil process – cost, scarcity, and 
efficiency.  First, adjudication is costly to provide and should therefore 
produce at least some benefit.  The principal potential benefits of 
adjudication in the context of suits for damages are the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, official determination of culpability (or lack 
thereof), amelioration of uncertainty about contested rights, payment 
of compensation (or termination of contingent liabilities), and the 
modification (or ratification) of contested behavior.45  These benefits do 
not fully accrue in cases where the court would be unable to enter a 
judgment resolving the dispute or ruling on the propriety and 
consequences of the contested conduct.  Indeed, even if the purpose of 
adjudication is understood in non-instrumental terms – for example, 
as promoting human dignity by providing a mechanism for the redress 
of grievances – it is difficult to see how leaving litigants twisting in 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 44. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  Loopholes in the doctrine of claim preclusion permit 
plaintiffs in some circumstances to file multiple suits challenging different aspects of the same 
offensive conduct, but finality is still a goal within each separate proceeding with respect to the 
issues being contested.  See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 875-81 (1984) (holding 
that a judgment rejecting class action claims alleging that the defendant engaged in a 
discriminatory employment practice did not preclude class members from pursuing individual 
discrimination claims that did not depend on “pattern or practice” allegations). 
 45. Cf. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1975) 
(reviewing the “conflict resolution” and “behavior modification” models of civil procedure).  
Adjudication may also serve additional purposes when employed as a vehicle for reforming social 
and political institutions.  See Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976) 
(“Adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning to our public values.”). 
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the wind without an enforceable judgment would promote any 
plausible value or norm.  Second, adjudication is a scarce resource for 
which demand exceeds supply.  A sensible threshold sorting criteria 
for allocating this resource is to give it only to people who have a 
chance of becoming better off after adjudication than they were 
before.46  A judgment is the embodiment of such potential relief.  If 
there is no realistic possibility that a judgment can be entered for a 
particular claimant, distributive concerns suggest that the scarce 
resource of litigation should be given to another claimant who might 
be able to derive some benefit from it.  Finally, from an efficiency 
perspective, adjudication diverts the parties from more socially 
productive pursuits, so there is value in eventually terminating 
litigation in a manner that justifies its existence and that returns the 
parties to more productive endeavors.47 
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) are no different from 
ordinary civil suits in their need to result in a judgment.  Each class 
member claims entitlement to a sum of money, and each seeks to walk 
away from the judicial proceeding enriched by that sum.48  Defendants 
have countervailing interests in terminating the case in their favor 
without paying damages, and in not being sued again by members of 
the same class raising the same claims.49  Both sets of parties 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 46. This sorting criteria is evident in federal standing doctrine, which limits the availability 
of judicial dispute resolution to cases and controversies in which a judgment could redress a 
plaintiff’s injury.  See infra note 61. 
 47. See Priest, supra note 1, at 543-44 (defining “finality,” along with “efficiency” and 
“equity,” as a principal goal of tort law because “there is a value . . . to allow[ing] both plaintiffs 
and defendants to return to increasing social productivity”). 
 48. In reality, most plaintiffs have no idea of the existence of class actions in which they are 
potential beneficiaries, and therefore in a formal sense do not seek or expect damages.  However, 
the lawyers who file class actions derive their compensation from the damages awards that they 
obtain for the class and thus, as proxies for their clients, seek judgments specifying the nature 
and size of financial entitlements. 
 49. The bar against so-called “one-way intervention” in class actions is a manifestation of 
defendants’ interests in assuring eventual peace: plaintiffs cannot chose to stay on the sidelines 
of class litigation until the likely outcome is clear, and then intervene only if the result is 
favorable while avoiding the binding effect of an unfavorable judgment.  See Am. Pipe & Constr. 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974):  
A recurrent source of abuse under the former Rule lay in the potential that members 
of the claimed class could in some situations await developments in the trial or even 
final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation would be 
favorable to their interests. …The 1966 amendments were designed, in part, 
specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that 
members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be 
bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.   
But cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (endorsing the doctrine of 
offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, which is in effect a form of one-way intervention).  
Potential class members must instead decide whether to participate in the class action before the 
court resolves the merits so that the defendant is able to bind the entire class to an unfavorable 
  
2005] REGULATING CLASS ACTIONS 1027 
therefore want the arbiter of their dispute – a civil court – to 
definitively state who owes or does not owe what to whom.  Rule 23 
recognizes the parties’ mutual interest in finality by requiring class 
actions to culminate in some form of judgment covering all parties to 
the case,50 and there is no indication in the Rule – with the exception 
of a provision for “issue classes” discussed below –51 that class actions 
warrant a departure from the general principle that civil litigation 
culminates in final judgments specifying the rights and obligations of 
the parties.52 
The need for a final judgment specifying the rights of the 
parties has important implications for how courts should evaluate the 
significance of similarity and dissimilarity among claims when 
deciding whether to certify a proposed class action.  Similarity among 
claims facilitates crafting a judgment that specifies the rights of all 
class members, while dissimilarity may necessitate fact-intensive 
case-by-case inquiries into the propriety of judgment that would make 
class litigation difficult, if not impossible.53  Certification criteria must 
therefore assist the court in determining which proposed class actions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
judgment.  Without the bar against one-way intervention, defendants would never be certain 
that even a string of victories in high-stakes class action litigation would prevent an 
opportunistic plaintiff from eventually getting lucky and subjecting the defendant to the risk of a 
large classwide damages award.  A defendant faced with the prospect of being unable to achieve 
peace even by winning multiple trials might therefore be willing to settle cases for far more than 
their merit warrants simply to limit its potential exposure to windfall verdicts. 
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) & 23(c)(3); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 n.8 (1975):  
The certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the 
unnamed members of the class.  If the suit proceeds to judgment on the merits, it is 
contemplated that the decision will bind all persons who have been found at the time 
of certification to be members of the class.   
The judgment requirement is buried within Rule 23(c)’s provisions governing class action notice 
rather than in Rule 23(b)’s criteria for certifying classes, and therefore does not factor into 
certification decisions as frequently as it should (as discussed infra in Part IV). 
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64. 
 52. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (governing entry of judgment in federal civil litigation).  
For an example of a similar context where the Supreme Court has held that class actions do not 
alter generally applicable procedural principles absent express indication in a statute or rule, see 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978): 
There are special rules relating to class actions and, to that extent, they are a special 
kind of litigation. Those rules do not, however, contain any unique provisions 
governing appeals.  The appealability of any order entered in a class action is 
determined by the same standards that govern appealability in other types of 
litigation. 
 53. Courts could elect to achieve finality without case-by-case inquiries into the varying 
circumstances of each individual class member if they decide that the outcome of such inquiries 
would not be relevant under the applicable substantive liability and damage rules.  The 
temptation to reach such a conclusion can be strong in cases where class certification appears to 
be the only way to achieve rough justice for groups that lack access to alternative remedies, 
which explains the ad hoc lawmaking phenomenon described above and illustrates the need for 
the fidelity principle described below. 
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can be litigated to judgment and which cannot, and which can be 
settled fairly based on the expected value of a final judgment and 
which cannot.54 
Three hypothetical examples illustrate how different proposed 
class actions might be more or less suitable for certification depending 
on how common and individual questions influence the difficulty of 
crafting a judgment to resolve all class members’ claims.  In each 
example, a significant aspect of the defendant’s potential liability to 
class members is a common question, but aspects of liability and proof 
of damages vary for each class member.  In the first example, 
resolution of the common question advances class members’ quest for 
a judgment very far, but in the second and third examples resolution 
of the common question would still leave difficult individual questions 
for the court to resolve before it could enter a judgment. 
Example 1.  Suppose that thousands of customers of a local 
telephone company allege that a surcharge of a few cents for calls to 
411 violates a statute setting permissible telephone service rates and 
seek recovery of the overcharges.  Classwide resolution of the common 
question of whether the charges were legal would clearly move each 
class member significantly closer to a final judgment.  Further inquiry 
into each individual case would be necessary to confirm that each 
class member in fact incurred the alleged overcharge in a particular 
amount, but merely introducing copies of phone bills should suffice to 
prove each individual claim to the satisfaction of a fact-finder.  The 
individual issues that remain after resolution of common questions in 
this example are thus a relatively inconsequential obstacle to 
rendering a final judgment for each class member.55 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 54. Whether a judgment will be preclusive is a separate question from whether it must be 
final.  The drafters of Rule 23 have been hesitant to codify the preclusive effect of class action 
judgments for fear of violating the Rules Enabling Act by specifying the substantive rights that 
flow from a procedural rule.  See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 393; James Wm. Moore & Marcus 
Cohn, Federal Class Actions–Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555, 556 
(1938).  The absence of a uniform rule governing preclusion has led to substantial uncertainty in 
assessing the preclusive effect of class action judgments.  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An 
Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998) (analyzing 
the evolving and often inconsistent treatment of preclusion in equity practice and early class 
action litigation).  Preclusion issues have also proven particularly tricky in class actions because 
unlike traditional suits in which plaintiffs join all transactionally related claims against a 
defendant into a single action, class actions usually focus on a relatively narrow subset of 
contestable issues, potentially freeing class members to file additional suits against the 
defendant on related issues without fear of preclusion.  See supra note 44.  It is not necessary 
here to flesh out the extent to which class action judgments must be preclusive.  At a minimum, 
the parties must have a final judgment before they can try to enforce it, attack it, or avoid it.  
Thus, at a minimum, class certification rules should link the question of certification to the goal 
of eventually entering a judgment. 
 55. Some individual claims might present problems if, for example, the defendant contends 
that a phone bill submitted into evidence is forged, or that a plaintiff was in arrears on her bill 
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Example 2.  Suppose that thousands of consumers receive an 
identical written solicitation from a financial planner promising to 
provide a valuable introductory financial consultation if the consumer 
makes a “free” call to a specified ten-digit phone number.  The 
solicitation fails to advise consumers that the specified area code is in 
the Cayman Islands (which is an international toll call for most U.S. 
residents despite the absence of an international dialing prefix), and 
that callers will incur whatever long-distance charges their telephone 
company normally imposes for such calls.  Thousands of consumers 
have lengthy and helpful conversations with the planning service, but 
are shocked to receive long-distance telephone charges for the “free” 
calls and sue the planner for fraud.  Resolution of the common 
question of whether the solicitation was misleading because it omitted 
disclosures about long-distance charges or represented the calls as 
“free” would help class members to prove liability.  However, because 
a consumer’s knowledge of the truth – or failure to exercise reasonable 
diligence in learning the truth – is usually a defense to a common law 
or statutory fraud claim,56 and given the general understanding 
among most telephone users that dialing strange area codes might 
result in high telephone bills, the defendant would want an 
opportunity to explore in each case whether the caller knew that the 
area code being dialed would incur long-distance charges or took any 
steps to determine how the call would be billed.  Assuming that there 
is a plausible reason to believe that some class members may have 
incurred long distance charges voluntarily or negligently, resolution of 
common liability questions would still leave substantial obstacles to 
entering a final judgment entitling particular class members to 
reimbursement of phone charges.57 
________________________________________________________________________ 
and thus never paid an overcharge.  However, a court should presumably be able to cope with 
these isolated defenses (which would likely depend on the defendant’s business records) while 
still moving the remainder of claims along to a final judgment. 
 56. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Bell Atl., 177 F.R.D. 279, 293-94 (D.N.J. 1997) (refusing to 
certify statutory fraud class in part because of individual issues of whether plaintiffs “already 
knew” allegedly omitted information); Zekman v. Direct Am. Marketers, 695 N.E.2d 853, 861 (Ill. 
1998) (rejecting statutory fraud claim because plaintiff’s knowledge that dialing a “900” number 
would incur charges precluded him from challenging warnings about such charges); Agnew v. 
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 502 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Ga. App. 1998) (Georgia’s fraud statute bars 
claim by plaintiff who already knew information allegedly concealed from him). 
 57. Holding the defendant liable for fraud regardless of any idiosyncrasies in what class 
members knew about the possibility of long distance charges and how diligent they might have 
been in anticipating such charges may be socially desirable.  However, the optimal scope of fraud 
doctrine and the availability of individualized defenses are questions distinct from whether class 
certification would be appropriate under existing fraud doctrine.  For additional discussion of the 
relationship between substantive causes of action and procedural mechanisms for obtaining 
remedies, see infra notes 62, 70, 95, and Part V.B. 
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Example 3.  Suppose that thousands of purchasers of an 
automobile contend that the parking brake was defectively designed, 
causing it to fail when they engaged it, such that the car incurred 
damage by rolling out of a parking space and striking a blunt object.  
Answering the common question of whether the brake was defectively 
designed would be helpful in resolving each individual class member’s 
claim, sparing them the costly burden of proving a complex scientific 
point in each of thousands of cases.  However, resolving a common 
question about brake design would still leave class members a long 
way from establishing entitlement to damages.  Each plaintiff would 
still need to prove that the design defect was the proximate cause of 
the roll-away (rather than, for example, their failure to properly 
engage or maintain the brake) and that the damage to the car did not 
pre-date the accident.  Assuming that the defendant elects to put 
plaintiffs to their proof, resolution of individual claims could require 
testimony from each of thousands of plaintiffs and examination of 
each of thousands of brakes.  The effort and expense needed to move 
from resolution of classwide common issues to a final judgment for 
each class member would thus be substantially greater in Example 3 
than in Example 1. 
The foregoing examples illustrate that the practical 
significance of any individual issues remaining as an obstacle to entry 
of final judgment after resolution of common questions varies from 
case to case, even when cases appear to involve similar subject matter 
(such as the dispute over telephone charges in Examples 1 and 2).  My 
point is not to show that certification should always be granted in 
cases similar to Example 1 and always denied in cases similar to 
Examples 2 and 3 – more information would be necessary to make 
that determination.  Instead, my point is that a court must be able to 
understand why the foregoing examples are differently suited to class 
action status if it is to have any hope of making an appropriate 
certification decision. 
The limitations that the finality principle imposes in damages 
cases need not entirely frustrate efforts to squeeze specific issues 
arising in such cases into the class action mold.  In theory, courts may 
be able to fragment damage claims into components, confine 
certification to only some of these components, and then render a final 
class action judgment limited to the certified components rather than 
the ultimate question of who owes or does not owe what to whom.  For 
example, in proposed products liability or securities fraud damages 
class actions, a court might render a “judgment” that “product X is 
capable of causing disease Y” or “proxy statement Z is misleading.”  
Class members who claim to have been aggrieved by X or Z could then 
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attempt to use the judgment offensively in subsequent individualized 
proceedings against the defendant, either in the same forum or 
elsewhere.  This approach could be useful in cases where rendering a 
classwide judgment on all contested damages questions would be 
impractical, such that the only alternative to a limited classwide 
judgment would be no classwide judgment at all (and probably no 
judgment of any kind given the collective action problems that inhibit 
redress of injuries to large groups).  Rendering such a limited 
judgment could be an efficient use of scarce and costly judicial 
resources – and therefore consistent with the spirit of the finality 
principle – if it resolved uncertainty about contested questions and 
thereby facilitated settlement, or if it materially aided class members 
in their subsequent individual suits. 
Although fragmenting putative class claims may present a 
safety valve to the demands of the finality principle, the utility of such 
“issue classes” in damages cases is questionable – assuming that 
certification rules even permit them.58  First, issue classes should be 
understand as injunction classes rather than as damages classes, and 
therefore do not directly implicate the concerns addressed in this 
Article.  A plea for a court to rule on a discrete factual or legal 
question is essentially a request for a declaratory judgment rather 
than a request to adjudicate a claim for damages – the damages 
component of the case is relevant only to post-class action proceedings 
rather than to the class action itself.  A plaintiff’s request to fragment 
what would otherwise be a 23(b)(3) damages class action into an 
issues class thus, for practical purposes, seems to transfer the 
certification inquiry’s focus from the 23(b)(3) factors addressed in this 
Article to the 23(b)(2) factors.59  Second, federal courts may conclude 
that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue issue classes, either because of 
prudential constraints on the use of declaratory judgment actions60 or 
because the possibility that plaintiffs will be unable to exploit an 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 58. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(A) provides that “when appropriate,” “an action 
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”  For competing 
views about the permissible scope of “issues” classes, compare Laura J. Hines, Challenging the 
Issue Class Action End Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709 (2003) (endorsing a relatively narrow view), with 
Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular 
Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249 (endorsing a relatively broad view). 
 59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (expressly encompassing requests for injunctive and 
declaratory relief). 
 60. Compare Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (holding that Article III 
precludes adjudication of declaratory judgment actions seeking resolution of “a collateral legal 
issue governing certain aspects of [class members’] pending or future suits”), with Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (holding that Article III permits an insurer to seek a 
declaratory judgment about the validity of an insurance policy in anticipation of future 
litigation). 
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issue-class judgment in subsequent proceedings attenuates the 
judgment’s ability to resolve a concrete case or controversy.61  Third, 
issue class actions regarding common liability questions divorced from 
individualized claims for damages will likely be rare because few 
lawyers will have an incentive to file them.  The lucrative potential 
payday for class action lawyers arises from securing a damages award, 
not from obtaining a declaratory judgment that individual class 
members may – or may not – eventually parlay into damages in future 
individualized proceedings that the class lawyer would not necessarily 
control.  Fourth, even if a lawyer could obtain a quasi-declaratory 
ruling on a subset of contested issues, the shift from a class-versus-
defendant to an individuals-versus-defendant procedural posture 
would vitiate the lawyer’s settlement leverage and permit defendants 
to regress to their standard tactic of stonewalling individual cases to 
deflate settlement values.  Indeed, from the defense perspective, such 
stonewalling would have the added benefit of deterring other 
plaintiffs’ lawyers from attempting similar bifurcated class actions in 
the future.62  Fifth, the utility of limiting a class action judgment to 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 61. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 
517 U.S. 544, 558 (1996) (noting that if class actions and other forms of representative litigation 
“failed to resolve the claims of the individuals ultimately interested, their disservice to the core 
Article III requirements would be no secret”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
61 (1992) (the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing analysis is that a 
favorable resolution of the plaintiff’s claim will “likely” “redress” a concrete injury) (citations 
omitted); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (“The ‘personal 
stake’ aspect of mootness doctrine also serves primarily the purpose of assuring that federal 
courts are presented with disputes they are capable of resolving.”); Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (“Even when a case falls within [Article III’s] constitutional 
boundaries, a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the 
judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights 
would be vindicated.”). 
 62. There is nothing inherent in the process of allocating damage awards that renders class 
action litigation impracticable, and thus there is no principled reason why a bifurcated 
proceeding could not resolve classwide liability issues and then distribute damages among class 
members.  For example, if the only remedy available under the applicable substantive law is a 
$100 per person penalty award, then distributing damages to class members would not create 
any significant procedural challenges after resolution of liability questions (assuming that the 
identities of class members can be determined objectively).  However, most current forms of 
substantive regulation follow a corrective justice model of remedies in which the court must 
award damages based on individual class members’ proof of entitlement to compensation, which 
can be time-consuming and costly to establish.  I assume for purposes of this Article that the 
entitlement/compensation model of remedies is valid in spite of the constraints that it imposes on 
the design of efficient adjudication procedures.  For an argument that damage allocation criteria 
should implement principles other than compensation that are easier to prove within the 
framework of a bifurcated class action trial, see David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and 
Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002) 
(arguing that distribution of damage awards should follow principles of insurance); see also Gary 
T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 
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common issues is questionable because the rendering court would 
probably be unable to dictate the preclusive effect of its order in other 
jurisdictions, creating uncertainty about the order’s enforceability and 
potential inequality of treatment in different fora.63  In sum, if 
certification rules permit issue classes, and if plaintiffs have standing 
and incentive to file them, and if they prevail, there is still a 
substantial possibility that plaintiffs would face insurmountable 
practical obstacles to translating their issue-judgment into damages-
judgments for all or many class members, which calls into question 
whether adjudicating the issue-class action would be worth the 
effort.64  In any event, for present purposes it is sufficient to observe 
that the finality principle comes into play whenever a plaintiff seeks 
to a certify a (b)(3) damages class rather than an issue class, and so it 
is useful to assess the rules that courts should apply to such requests. 
 
*  *  * 
The foregoing discussion suggests a preliminary conclusion 
that, in combination with conclusions from the sections below, could 
assist in drafting rules governing certification of classes: courts should 
certify class actions seeking damages only when the individual 
questions of law and fact that remain after resolution of common 
questions can be definitively resolved in a final judgment establishing 
the rights and responsibilities of the plaintiffs and defendants.  This 
principle leaves room for courts to develop creative adjudication or 
negotiation mechanisms for resolving individual claims in preparation 
for a final judgment.  There is no single “correct” way for a court to 
winnow the scope of a case and to reach conclusions about contested 
________________________________________________________________________ 
TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (noting overlooked areas of commonality between deterrence and 
corrective justice approaches to regulation). 
 63. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A court conducting an action cannot predetermine 
the res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subsequent action.”); 
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 737 F. Supp. 1289, 1307-08 (“[A] declaration concerning issue 
preclusion by a court certifying a class action, for intended use in future litigation in another 
court, is not procedurally viable.”), amended by 838 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Kauhane v. 
Acutron Co., 795 P.2d 276, 278 n.3 (Haw. 1990) (noting “the fundamental tenet of the doctrine of 
res judicata that the court issuing the initial judgment lacks the authority to determine the 
preclusive effect of that judgment”).  But cf. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action 
Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005) (contending that courts have substantial authority to 
control the preclusive effect of class action judgments). 
 64. An interesting question for further study is how much of an anticipated benefit should 
be required to justify the transaction costs of an issue class.  Presumably, only a fraction – large 
or small – of all class members who prevail in an issue class action would be able to parlay that 
success into a satisfying victory or settlement in subsequent damage proceedings.  The 
anticipated size of this fraction relative to transaction costs may be relevant to deciding if 
adjudicating the issue class action is worth the court’s time and effort. 
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evidence in individual disputes.  To the contrary, the large body of 
scholarship assessing procedural devices for resolving complex factual 
disputes attests to the variety of paths that courts can take.  However, 
class litigation under Rule 23(b)(3) should eventually culminate in a 
final judgment informing the plaintiffs and defendants who owes what 
to whom.  If adjudication cannot produce such a judgment, and if a 
settlement cannot do so fairly65 (or if the parties are not willing to 
settle) then the class should either not be certified or should be 
decertified when the problem becomes apparent.  As we will see in 
Part IV, current certification rules and doctrine often overlook this 
principle, resulting in the certification of class actions in 
circumstances where the court does not have the faintest idea of how 
the case could be resolved if the parties do not agree to a settlement 
and insist on litigating the merits. 
B. The Fidelity Principle: A Class Member Should Not Receive a 
Favorable Judgment Unless He or She Can Prove the Substantive 
Elements for a Cause of Action and Survive Any Applicable Defenses 
This Section builds on the previous discussion of finality by 
exploring how, if at all, class actions alter the manner in which a 
plaintiff can establish entitlement to a judgment in his or her favor.  
An underlying assumption of this Section is that substantive laws that 
regulate behavior and create enforceable entitlements have definable 
elements and defenses that should constrain how courts resolve 
contested questions.66  The section concludes that the procedural 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
 66. Some conceptions of the nature of substantive law would be skeptical of this 
assumption.  For example, instrumentalist (sometimes called realist or reductionist) approaches 
to tort law often postulate that the compensation and deterrence goals of tort determine the 
meaning of tort elements in particular cases, such that the content of a rule is partly a function 
of the context in which it is applied.  These visions of tort law suggest that the distinction I draw 
between procedural fidelity to substantive law and ad hoc lawmaking is illusory because the 
content of substantive law is in some sense inherently ad hoc.  A logical extension of such 
arguments would be that if class actions can improve the deterrent and compensatory force of 
tort, then judges in class actions can define “elements” of torts – such as breach of duty, 
causation, and injury – to maximize deterrence and compensation without any preconceived 
notion of how these elements would apply in other procedural contexts.  Debating such 
instrumentalist visions of malleable tort elements is beyond the scope of this Article (suffice to 
say that it is questionable even on instrumentalist terms whether an amorphously defined tort 
standard provides adequate warning to potential wrongdoers about the likely consequences of 
their actions, such that actors faced with uncertainty may over- or under-invest in safety).  For 
present purposes, I assume that substantive rules have at least some content capable of 
transcending procedural context, although this content is flexible and should evolve over time to 
cope with new regulatory dilemmas.  See infra Part V.B.  For a helpful taxonomy and discussion 
of competing conceptualizations of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort 
Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003). 
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context in which a claim is adjudicated should not alter the content of 
these elements and defenses or the outcome of their application.  Class 
actions should thus feature procedural fidelity to substantive law, 
meaning that the merit of claims presented in a class action should be 
assessed using the same substantive rules that would apply if 
plaintiffs litigated their claims separately.67 
There are several prerequisites to entry of judgment in 
ordinary civil litigation where a single plaintiff sues a single 
defendant.  The plaintiff must identify a legally recognized right 
creating a private remedy, present sufficient evidence to show that the 
defendant infringed the right, rebut objections that the defendant 
raises to the significance of that evidence, prove damages, and defeat 
any affirmative defenses.  A plaintiff who cannot carry her burden of 
proof or overcome defenses cannot obtain a judgment in her favor.68 
Class actions do not alter the basic proof-and-defense structure 
of adjudication.  A class action merely changes the manner in which 
class members and defendants present the evidence and argument 
needed to prove or refute each of their claims or defenses.  Instead of 
each class member presenting her own evidence, a representative 
plaintiff attempts to prove the claims of all absent class members 
using evidence common to each of them.  Likewise, instead of refuting 
each class member’s claim, the defendant attempts to prevail over the 
entire class by defeating the claim of the representative plaintiff and 
attacking the sufficiency of any “common” evidence of classwide 
liability.  After resolution of common issues, each party’s focus shifts 
to whatever individualized issues remain.  Class actions do not – or 
should not – change the substantive elements of a claim, relieve class 
members of their burden of proof, or deprive defendants of their right 
to raise applicable defenses.69  Policymakers are, of course, free to 
mold the content of substantive regulations to best exploit the 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 67. Part IV.D. will discuss how current class action doctrine often overlooks or violates the 
fidelity principle. 
 68. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted”); FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (allowing judgment against a party when “there 
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party”); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 56 (allowing summary judgment when the moving party establishes that there is “no genuine 
issue as to any material fact” affecting its entitlement to judgment). 
 69. The leading early proponents of class actions did not perceive their proposed procedural 
innovations as altering the substantive law applicable to claims and defenses.  See, e.g., Kalven 
& Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 694 n.33 (“When the case is conducted as a class suit, regardless of 
the variety of individual differences, the defendant is never deprived in any way of his right and 
opportunity to present any defenses arising from any of these individual variations.”).  
Unfortunately, however, these early commentators did not explain how a court should decide 
when individual variations among claims should preclude certification, and assumed the problem 
out of existence by speculating that individual variations among class members’ claims would 
likely be “trivial or irrelevant” and not unduly “inconvenient.”  Id. 
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procedural benefits of class actions, but nothing within the class 
action device itself alters the elements and burdens of proof associated 
with the parties’ claims and defenses.70 
There are several reasons why class actions should not modify 
the nature of claims and defenses.  First, the statutes authorizing 
courts to promulgate procedural rules governing class actions do not 
ordinarily allow procedures to modify substantive rights.  In the 
federal system, the Rules Enabling Act forbids the Supreme Court 
from drafting rules of civil procedure that “abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right,”71 which prevents Rule 23 from altering the 
nature of the parties’ claims or defenses.72  Many states have their 
own rules enabling statutes that similarly limit the scope of 
procedural rules.73 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 70. To the extent that some commentators see class actions as a useful tool for permitting 
novel extensions of substantive law – such as various proposals to impose liability for risk and 
for altering proof of causation and damages in mass tort cases – the innovation is best 
understood as an evolution of tort law rather than class action jurisprudence.  The practical 
dispute resolution possibilities that class actions create may provide the inspiration for 
substantive legal innovation, but the class action device itself ultimately follows where the 
substantive law leads.  See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980) (“[T]he 
right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of 
substantive claims.”); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 423 (1980) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties 
or to try a case before a jury instead of a judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a 
particular context.”).  Cf. Arthur R. Miller, supra note 1, at 674-76 (arguing that the surge of 
class action litigation in the 1960s and 70s was a reaction to “larger social forces” that adopted 
the class action as a convenient vehicle for implementing, rather than creating, newly recognized 
substantive rights); Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 158 (distinguishing between the 
structure of procedural mechanisms and their “external policy goals”). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2004).  The Rules of Decision Act further constrains the ability of 
federal courts to modify substantive rules in situations where courts must apply state rather 
than federal law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2004).  Federal courts therefore lack authority to create 
a substantive common law for use as an adjunct to Rule 23 when resolving state law claims.  See 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 72. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (“The Rules Enabling Act 
underscores the need for caution” in interpreting the scope of Rule 23); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“Rule 23’s requirements must be interpreted in keeping 
with . . . the Rules Enabling Act.”); Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The 
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements 
Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 462 (1997) (arguing that under the 
Rules Enabling Act, procedural rules “aim to cause dispositions on the merits, not to redefine 
those merits”). 
 73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-2-7(4) (2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-109(A) (2003); ARK. CONST. 
amend. 80 § 3; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2-108 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14(a) (1991); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 602-11 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 1-213 (2004); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 8 (2004); 
MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 477.010 (2005); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 3-2-701 
(2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 2.120(2) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1(A) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
27-02-10 (2004); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.735(1) (2004); PA. CONST. 
art. 5, § 10(c); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-403 (2004); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a) (2005); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-115(b) (2004) (“[procedural rules] shall 
neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any person”).  Class actions in some 
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Second, even if the Rules Enabling Act did not constrain the 
permissible scope of procedural rules, there is no indication that rules 
creating class actions were intended to modify substantive rights or to 
invalidate otherwise applicable defenses to class members’ individual 
claims.  No such intent is evident in the text of Rule 23, in the official 
notes of its drafters, or in contemporaneous commentaries discussing 
its origins.  Congress or a state legislature could in theory enact a 
statute allowing certification of a class to alter otherwise applicable 
substantive laws, but apparently such legislation has not been 
adopted. 
Third, allowing class actions to modify substantive laws as an 
ad hoc incident to the convenient resolution of a particular case is not 
consistent with the customary detachment between rule-formulation 
and rule-application in a democracy, at least with respect to statutory 
rights and to a lesser extent with respect to common law rights.  
Substantive conduct-regulating rules and compensation-awarding 
remedies are usually the product of democratic institutions such as 
legislatures, administrative agencies subject to democratic oversight, 
or an established process of common-law rulemaking by courts whose 
decisions are open to review and debate by political institutions.  
Regardless of their origin, substantive rules reflect (in theory) a 
reasoned balancing of their relative social costs and benefits across a 
range of foreseeable contexts through a process that has some political 
legitimacy.  If the content of substantive law is altered to 
accommodate complexities raised by the procedural device that the 
plaintiff chooses to use in filing her claim – for example, by creatively 
interpreting a statute or regulation to apply differently in class actions 
than one might expect based on its application in non-class cases – 
then courts in effect would be rebalancing the social costs and benefits 
of a particular rule on an ad hoc basis.  This rebalancing would occur 
without the oversight and political legitimacy that normally 
accompanies a decision about the nature of a substantive rule and 
without the detachment that one would expect to see between the 
formulation of a rule and its application to a particular 
circumstance.74 
________________________________________________________________________ 
states are creations of statute rather than administratively promulgated rules and therefore 
could, in theory, alter substantive rights, although none of the state class action statutes indicate 
such an intent.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23 (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-801 et seq. 
(2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (2005); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 591 et seq. (West 2005); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-6-
23 et seq. (2003); WIS. STAT. § 803.08 (2004). 
 74. Ad hoc lawmaking of this type could in theory have democratic legitimacy if Congress 
authorized it by delegating substantive rulemaking power to the judiciary as an incident to 
judicial authority to craft procedural rules, but the Rules Enabling Act expressly disclaims any 
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The ad hoc lawmaking problem is less acute, although still 
serious, when a court accommodates the complexities of a class action 
by modifying a common law rule rather than a statute or regulation.  
Unlike legislative statutes or executive regulations, common law rules 
are judicial creations and therefore prone to judicially-imposed 
changes that adapt rules to new demands.  There is no reason why a 
class action cannot be a catalyst for the reform of the common law any 
more or less than the myriad other facts that have transformed 
common law rules over the centuries.75  Nevertheless, there is 
something discomforting about changing common law liability or 
damage rules as an afterthought to a procedural dilemma in a 
particular case, rather than with full consideration of the costs and 
benefits of modifying the rule in all of the procedural contexts in 
which the rule might be litigated.76  The discomfort grows when one 
considers that many successful class actions can have unintended 
consequences on matters that involve a delicate balance between 
competing policy interests.  For example, a large damage award based 
on the side effects of a drug or vaccine might prematurely pull the 
product off the market to the disadvantage of people who need it.  
Likewise, a successful classwide challenge to insurance claims 
adjustment practices can have the effect of raising premiums and 
pricing consumers out of the insurance market.  Facilitating claims 
against drug manufacturers and insurance companies for the massive 
levels of damages that class actions can deliver is thus not as clearly 
desirable as it might seem when viewed in the narrow context of a 
particular class action filed by aggrieved victims, rather than in a 
more self-consciously detached lawmaking context designed to weigh 
competing social interests in the abstract without regard for the facts 
of particular cases or the emotional pressure of dealing with a large 
________________________________________________________________________ 
such delegation.  See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.  The constitutionality of such a 
delegation of legislative power to the judicial branch would be hotly contested.  See generally Eric 
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1621 
(2002) (assessing the debate over the nondelegation doctrine’s constitutional origins).  For a 
discussion of the practical consequences of legislative delegation of rulemaking power to courts, 
see Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2002). 
 75. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 824 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (observing that state courts had “developed general common-law 
principles to accommodate the novel facts of this litigation”). 
 76. The concern over democratic legitimacy would be even greater if there were reason to 
suspect that the interests of diverse class members were not fully represented in the litigation 
process.  See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 
(1997) (developing a model of democratic legitimacy for judicial outcomes premised on interest 
representation). 
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class of injured claimants.77  Allowing courts to bend substantive rules 
to the procedural needs of particular cases is thus inconsistent with 
the normal process of rulemaking and prone to prioritize the welfare 
of litigants over broader social welfare with undesirable distributive 
consequences.78 
Fourth, a corollary to the previous argument is that allowing 
courts to depart from substantive rules to facilitate the resolution of 
particular claims raises questions about democratic transparency and 
accountability.  Lawmakers – whether elected or subject to the 
oversight of elected officials – should be accountable for the rules that 
they create.  If the content of these rules varies depending on the 
procedural context of particular cases, then the public will have 
greater difficulty assessing the rules that their representatives have 
created or supervised because the content of rules would be fluid; 
sometimes the rules would mean one thing, and sometimes they would 
mean something else.79  Class actions thus create a troubling 
opportunity for lawmakers and courts to dodge accountability by 
permitting the implementation of substantive rules in a manner 
distinct from their apparent and advertised meaning.80 
Finally, allowing certification of a class to alter the substantive 
law applicable to claims and defenses arguably raises due process 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 77. The tension between private and public perspectives on risk management is particularly 
acute in an emerging category of class actions known as “social issue” or “social policy” suits, in 
which plaintiffs seek remedies against actors whose profits arise from activities that cause 
negative social externalities, such as tobacco companies, gun manufacturers, and health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs).  For a general discussion of this trend, see Deborah R. 
Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale 
Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 206-12 (2001); McGovern, supra note 1, at 1656 n.1. 
 78. Cf. Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 204 (arguing that the “central planning” 
inherent in reform of broadly applicable substantive laws should occur through political 
institutions rather than self-appointed class representatives). 
 79. Accountability and transparency problems arising from ad hoc lawmaking affect the 
judicial branch as well as the legislative branch because procrustean distortion of substantive 
rules to accommodate novel procedural circumstances enables judges to cloak substantive 
innovations with a procedural gloss.  The significance of a judicial opinion endorsing a particular 
substantive theory thus will often not be apparent to readers who lack a detailed familiarity with 
the facts of the case and the applicable law.  This lack of transparency reduces the extent to 
which the court can be held accountable for its decision.  For a general discussion of the 
importance of transparency in judicial opinions, see David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial 
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 2003 SUP. 
CT. REV. 231, 255-56. 
 80. This Article approaches the problem of democratic accountability within aggregative 
litigation as a function of the ad hoc nature of substantive rulemaking when conducted as an 
incident to facilitating application of a particular procedural device to particular facts.  An 
alternative approach would be to conceptualize the accountability problem as arising from the 
displacement of traditional compensatory models of litigation with a bounty hunter model that 
alters the remedial focus of substantive laws.  For an argument developing this latter view, see 
Redish, supra note 1, at 107-29. 
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concerns by inhibiting defendants’ ability to raise defenses that would 
be valid if plaintiffs pursued their claims individually rather than as a 
class.  There is nothing inherently wrong with denying a defendant 
the defenses of its choice.  For example, defendants in federal 
securities fraud cases would prefer to argue that particular purchasers 
of an overpriced security did not rely on the defendant’s 
misrepresentations and thus have no claim for damages, but the 
fraud-on-the-market rule makes the question of reliance irrelevant.81  
Likewise, defendants in employment discrimination cases would 
prefer to avoid being held liable for violating Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act82 if they did not intend to discriminate, but their lack of 
intent can be irrelevant if their actions have a disparate impact on a 
protected minority group.83  Neither the fraud-on-the-market theory 
nor the disparate impact doctrine violate procedural due process – 
even though they deprive defendants of their preferred means of 
defending themselves from allegations of wrongdoing – because 
defendants must adjust to generally applicable laws and tailor their 
defenses to the elements of claims.  However, suppose that the fraud-
on-the-market and disparate impact theories did not generally exist, 
but were invented by courts solely to facilitate the efficient resolution 
of class actions.  An individual securities purchaser who wished to sue 
an issuer for misrepresentation would have to prove reliance, but a 
member of a class of purchasers would not.  Likewise, an individual 
job applicant protesting hiring criteria would have to prove a 
discriminatory intent, but a member of a class of job applicants would 
not.  Due process concerns in these circumstances would appear much 
more significant.  The defendant would have a statutory right under 
the applicable substantive law to raise a defense to individual claims, 
but would lose that right depending on the procedural mechanism 
chosen by plaintiffs for adjudication.  A defendant might find itself 
unable to conform its conduct to rules that vary with the procedural 
context of a claim, thus rendering it liable to groups for conduct that is 
not illegal with respect to any individual member of the group.  The 
caselaw and scholarship in this area are undeveloped, but there is a 
plausible reason to believe that using the class action device to deny a 
defendant its otherwise applicable right to raise defenses to individual 
claims, or to relieve class members of their obligation to prove 
otherwise required elements of their individual claims, would violate 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 81. See supra note 24. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq (2005). 
 83. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1975); Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
  
2005] REGULATING CLASS ACTIONS 1041 
the defendant’s rights to procedural due process.84  At a minimum, the 
scope of defendants’ procedural due process rights in the class action 
context warrants additional scholarship. 
In short, class certification should not transform an individual 
class member’s losing claim into a winning claim, except in the sense 
that it may level the procedural playing field by giving class members 
access to better counsel and more resources with which to develop and 
pursue their claims.85  The merit of each class member’s claim – and 
the applicable elements and defenses – should remain the same 
whether or not the claim is certified for class treatment.  A class 
member who would deservedly lose his case in a traditional suit 
against the defendant for want of sufficient proof or ability to 
overcome defenses – even if represented by adequate counsel with 
adequate resources – should also lose in a class action.  The same 
principle applies in reverse.  A defendant who would be unable to 
overcome a suit by any one class member should not be able to 
manipulate the class action device into a victory (or a low-ball 
settlement) over all class members.  Rules governing class actions 
thus must provide some mechanism for ensuring that the beneficiaries 
of a judgment are in fact entitled to that benefit, and likewise that the 
persons whose rights a judgment prejudices deserve to suffer such 
prejudice. 
A concrete example illustrates the foregoing abstract point by 
positing four claims that remain constant despite changes in the 
procedural mechanism through which they are brought.  The change 
in procedural context cannot alter the merit of the claims and should 
not alter the outcome of the suit.  If the outcomes nevertheless differ 
from one context to another – despite equivalent juries, judges, 
lawyers, and available resources – then procedural rules are not being 
properly formulated or applied. 
Assume that four consumers – W, X, Y, and Z – each purchase 
the same model of Acme waffle iron from the same authorized retailer 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 84. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (“Due process requires that there be 
an opportunity to present every available defense.”); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (vacating certification in part because “defendants 
have the right to raise individual defenses against each class member”); Western Elec. Co. v. 
Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (denying defendants a right to “present a full defense 
on the issues would violate due process”); Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437 
(Tex. 2000) (noting in the context of class action litigation that “basic to the right to a fair trial – 
indeed, basic to the very essence of the adversarial process – is that each party have the 
opportunity to adequately and vigorously present any material claims and defenses”). 
 85. Certification may arguably have a more transformative effect on claims for injunctions 
against public actors by creating a class that is an entity with rights and characteristics distinct 
from its individual members.  For a theory of how group rights in institutional reform litigation 
may differ from the sum of constituent individual rights, see Fiss, supra note 45, at 19. 
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on the same day.  Each plugs the waffle iron into an electrical outlet, 
precipitating an immediate explosion.  Evidence suggests that a 
manufacturing defect that randomly effects some, but not all, Acme 
waffle irons could cause such an explosion.  W, X, Y, and Z each file 
separate suits against Acme for property damage caused by the 
allegedly defective exploding waffle irons.  As explained above, W, X, 
Y, and Z can prevail only if each can prove all the elements of their 
claims: for example, that Acme breached a duty of care to purchasers 
by negligently manufacturing the waffle iron, and that this breach 
proximately caused injury in a specified amount.  Acme would have an 
opportunity to challenge plaintiff’s proof by evidence, argument, and 
cross-examination.  Assuming that W, X, Y, and Z survived these 
challenges, Acme would also have an opportunity to raise affirmative 
defenses. 
Assume that at each trial, each plaintiff testifies about how he 
or she was injured, and Acme’s counsel vigorously cross-examines 
them.  Acme also conducts discovery into the circumstances of each 
claim and incorporates what it learns into its defenses. 
The trials result in the following outcomes.  W wins because 
her testimony persuasively shows that she followed the waffle iron’s 
instructions, acted with great care, suffered extensive damages that 
could have been caused only by a manufacturing defect, and Acme’s 
lawyers could not find any persuasive defenses.  X loses because cross-
examination reveals that he ignored Acme’s explicit instructions to 
plug the iron into a grounded outlet, and only when the iron was dry.  
X instead plugged the iron into a jury-rigged outlet overloaded with 
extension cords after having washed the iron’s circuitry with a damp 
cloth.  The jury concludes that the cause of his injuries was his own 
negligence and that there was no evidence that any manufacturing 
defect affected the particular iron that he purchased.  Y loses because 
discovery of repair invoices for his kitchen reveals that all of the 
claimed damage was caused by a cooking mishap that pre-dated his 
purchase of the iron.  Z loses because Acme is able to show that a 
series of pre-suit letters between Z and Acme in which Z requested 
and Acme paid limited compensation constituted an accord and 
satisfaction and waiver of all legal claims.  In sum: W proves all 
elements and survives all defenses, X and Y fail to prove their claims, 
and Z loses on an affirmative defense. 
Now assume the exact same facts, but that W, X, Y, and Z all 
have the same lawyer and elect to bring their claims in a single action 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 or 42(a) or similar state 
joinder and consolidation rules.  The results of their individual claims 
should clearly be the same (assuming equivalent lawyering, judges, 
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and juries): W should still win, and X, Y, and Z should still lose.  
Nothing inherent in the joinder of the four individual consumers’ cases 
should affect the cases’ merit.  Assuming that the judge and jury 
properly do their jobs, X, Y, and Z cannot ride W’s coattails to victory. 
Now assume that instead of a joined action under Rule 20 or a 
consolidated action under Rule 42(a), W files a class action under Rule 
23 for damages on behalf of all Acme waffle iron purchasers claiming 
to have suffered property damage caused by defective waffle irons 
during the relevant time period.  X, Y, and Z (and hundreds of others) 
meet the class definition.  Instead of appearing in court (as in the 
prior examples) X, Y, and Z are anonymous class members who 
attempt to have their claims proven by W – the named plaintiff who 
acts as their representative.  Assuming that W tells her compelling 
story and prevails on her individual claim, X, Y, and Z should not be 
entitled to judgment in their favor as well.  W is merely a 
representative for X, Y, and Z.  Her existence cannot change the 
strength of their personal claims, nor can W’s invulnerability to 
Acme’s defenses immunize X, Y, and Z.  If Acme is able to make a 
showing that the outcome of X, Y, and Z’s cases might differ from W’s 
based on the unique circumstances of their individual claims, then 
some mechanism must exist to allow Acme to present that information 
to the finder of fact before entry of judgment in X, Y, and Z’s favor.  If 
such a mechanism does not exist, then it would be inappropriate to 
allow X, Y, and Z to ride on W’s coattails despite their own claims’ lack 
of merit.  Similarly, if one assumes that X is the named class 
representative instead of W, it would be inappropriate to extinguish 
W’s meritorious claim based on X’s failure of proof. 
The waffle iron hypothetical thus confirms the abstract 
principle discussed above: class certification should not entitle a class 
member to a judgment to which that person would not be entitled if 
required to litigate on her own rather than as part of a class.  
Certification might as a practical matter improve a class member’s 
chances of prevailing by giving her access to a better lawyer who 
presents better arguments and has the resources to locate better 
evidence than the class member would have found if required to 
litigate on her own, but certification should not alter the merits of her 
claim. 
There is a difference between allowing the resources that 
certification brings to polish a diamond hidden in the rough and 
allowing the pressure that certification brings to create a diamond 
from coal.  For example, if certification provides Z with access to a 
skilled lawyer who can defeat Acme’s accord and satisfaction claim, 
then certification has served a useful purpose by helping to neutralize 
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the defendant’s often overpowering resource advantage.86  But if 
certification creates a situation where the court simply ignores Acme’s 
otherwise dispositive accord and satisfaction defense and allows Z to 
prevail, then certification has achieved an impermissible purpose by 
manufacturing a whole (the class) whose claims exceed the sum of its 
parts (individual class members).87 
The fidelity principle remains an important constraint on 
certification even when the parties are willing to settle in lieu of trial.  
A negotiated settlement is nominally a voluntary agreement that 
waives recourse to procedural alternatives.  Settlements thus in 
theory should not raise any concerns about fidelity to substantive law 
because the contractual law that the parties negotiate displaces 
whatever principles of law might have governed if the parties had 
instead elected to risk a trial.  However, if a settlement occurs solely 
because one or more parties fears the outcome of a trial that would be 
conducted in violation of the fidelity principle, the contractual law that 
the settlement creates might not be voluntary in any meaningful 
sense, and the negotiated contractual law would be no more legitimate 
than the ad hoc law whose threatened application motivated the 
settlement.88  The prospect of settlement in the shadow of a 
certification order that would violate the fidelity principle thus adds 
an extra complication to class action doctrine, requiring courts to 
develop a theory of consent to operate in tandem with the fidelity 
principle so that courts can decide when fidelity-related obstacles to 
trial also bar certification aimed at encouraging a settlement.  
Developing such a theory of consent would be beyond the scope of this 
Article, and would require addressing several emerging fields where 
the consent norms underlying contract law overlap and potentially 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 86. Cf. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 500 (1969) 
(“[I]nsofar as class actions will enhance the forensic opportunities of hitherto powerless groups, 
they will tend to probe the terrae incognitae of substantive law.”). 
 87. Some commentators perceive a certified class as a legal “entity” whose interests are 
distinct from the interests of its individual members.  See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 1, at 919.  
This may be a helpful way to conceptualize classes when confronting issues related to defining 
the “parties” to a class action for purposes of assessing the adequacy of representation and the 
binding effect of judgments.  However, for the reasons explained in the main text, the claims of 
the class “entity” do not have special merit merely because a class raises them.  The merit of 
class claims is a function of the merit of individual claims, although that merit might be easier to 
discern or to prove when individuals aggregate their resources.  Of course, one could rewrite 
substantive law to create rights and remedies tailored specifically for “entity” litigants rather 
than individual litigants, see id. at 941-42, but that is a change that should arise from politically 
legitimate sources external to the class action rather than as a result of ad hoc procedural 
convenience, see supra text accompanying notes 74-80. 
 88. Cf. supra Part II.C. (discussing the distortions in settlement value that occur when 
parties attempt to resolve class actions encompassing individual claims of varying merit). 
  
2005] REGULATING CLASS ACTIONS 1045 
conflict with the due process norms underlying civil adjudication.89  
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that aggregate 
settlements of dissimilar claims do not avoid the fidelity constraint on 
certification so much as shift its emphasis from the legitimacy of the 
substantive law that would apply at trial to the legitimacy of the 
contractual law that would be created by negotiation in the shadow of 
trial.90 
The discussion in this Section thus suggests a second 
preliminary conclusion to help shape the drafting of certification 
criteria in cases involving claims with some degree of similarity and 
some degree of dissimilarity where the parties have no ex ante 
agreement to settle.  A class should not be certified unless either: (1) 
proof of the named plaintiff’s individual claim would also prove the 
claims of the absent class members based on the similarity between 
the representative and absentees, such that there is no need to inquire 
separately into the merit of each individual class member’s claims; or 
(2) there is an appropriate litigation or negotiation mechanism for 
resolving individual questions unique to particular class members at 
some point between resolution of common questions and entry of 
judgment.  Either way, the procedural device of certification should 
not circumvent resolution of individual issues that would be salient 
under applicable substantive law if each class member’s claim were 
tried separately.  Potentially outcome-determinative issues unique to 
individual class members’ claims thus either preclude certification or 
must be accommodated in a manner consistent with applicable 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 89. For a discussion of “privatization of public processes” through contractual opt-outs to 
otherwise binding state-created procedures and its implications for analysis of civil adjudication, 
see Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 623 (2005).  See also 
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing the enforceability of contractual waivers of 
amenability to aggregative litigation).  Cf. Marcus, supra note 29, at 881 (“Rule 23 may provide 
the glue that allows the parties to arrange tort reform by consent,” but only if the consent is 
“meaningful.”); Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 158 (“The power to alter rights in a 
manner that individuals may not avoid generally rests with democratic institutions, not class 
counsel and courts by way of a judgment approving a class settlement.”). 
 90. An entirely different problem arises when all parties affirmatively want to settle a 
dispute, and seek class certification as a vehicle for giving their agreement maximum effect.  In 
these circumstances, the settlement is truly voluntary (assuming that the agents representing 
the class are in fact implementing class members’ preferences), and the parties do not care how a 
trial would be conducted because the point of certification is merely to ratify a negotiated 
agreement (indeed, in some cases the agreement may pre-date the court’s involvement in the 
case).  Fidelity theory has no role in these circumstances, although there may be other reasons to 
question the propriety of certifying a “settlement class.”  See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Taking 
Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement 
Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687 (2004). 
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substantive laws (or norms governing the scope of permissible consent 
in settlements) before entry of judgment.91 
C. The Feasibility Principle: Attempts to Adjudicate Class Actions 
Should Occur Within Resource and Management Constraints 
Class actions often inspire in lawyers the same boundless 
enthusiasm and confidence that candy stores inspire in children.  A 
child in a candy store has remarkable confidence in his ability to 
consume an inordinate quantity of enticing deserts, and an 
unflappable desire to empirically test any limitations on his eating 
capacity that an adult might have the temerity to suggest.  Lawyers 
and judges are often similarly smitten with the alluring potential of 
class actions to compensate victims and deter wrongdoers, and tend to 
overestimate their ability to cope with the burdens that class actions 
impose.  Certification criteria must recognize this certify-now, ask-
questions-later impulse that class actions inspire by grounding 
certification decisions in a realistic assessment of how a case can be 
litigated. 
The burdens of class litigation are particularly acute when 
cases involve both common and individualized questions of fact and 
law and the court respects the finality and fidelity principles.  A court 
with infinite time and resources may have the theoretical ability to 
resolve common questions in a consolidated proceeding, and then to 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 91. An interesting question for future scholarship and empirical study concerns the extent 
to which the individual issues that defendants identify as obstacles to certification are as a 
practical matter relevant to the outcome of disputes.  A clever defendant can almost always 
identify a theoretically relevant factual or legal variation among claims that could be resolved 
only through burdensome individualized procedures, but these variations are not always 
significant.  For example, a defendant might insist on its right to cross-examine every class 
member in a fraud case in order to determine if the class member had some specialized 
knowledge that defeated his claim to have been misled, but it is difficult to predict whether such 
a protracted inquiry would reveal any material information.  The defendant will claim that it 
cannot know what class members will say unless it interrogates them, and the plaintiff will 
oppose such examinations absent proof that they will be productive.  Courts must somehow 
decide how likely the individual issue is to affect the case before concluding whether the issue is 
relevant to the certification decision.  A ruling on the defendant’s right to pursue individual 
defenses by cross-examining class members has the potential either to deny plaintiffs the 
opportunity to obtain the benefits of class litigation based on speculation about a dubious 
defense, or to deny the defendant the opportunity to raise what might be a meritorious defense 
simply because doing so would be inconvenient.  There is presently no data or scholarship to help 
courts make that judgment call.  Plaintiffs’ advocates speculate that defendants routinely rely on 
“hypothetical” defenses, while defense advocates insist that most ostensibly “common” class 
claims actually rest on individualized inquiries, but it is unclear which side has the stronger 
argument.  The truth is probably somewhere in between advocates’ extreme positions.  Empirical 
study devoted specifically to this question could therefore help to improve decisionmaking on a 
recurring question in class actions. 
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review the individual circumstances of each class member’s claim to 
resolve disputes about any remaining elements and defenses.92  But if 
review of individual questions requires a mini-trial on thousands or 
millions of claims, doing so may be practically impossible; the case 
would outlive its participants.93  Thus, regardless of whether 
certifying a class action would in some sense be desirable, there 
cannot be a class action if the resources and time are not available.94  
Desire should not obscure reality.95 
A corollary to the point that courts have finite resources that in 
practice limit their ability to adjudicate class actions featuring 
substantial dissimilarity among claimants is that courts need to have 
a realistic sense of what they can accomplish before they certify 
classes.  Decertification is always an available remedy for an 
improvident certification, but there are substantial costs to relying on 
that remedy rather than making the certification decision correctly in 
the first instance.  Certification creates immediate settlement 
pressures and induces substantial investment in the case by the 
parties and the court.  Certification also creates momentum that 
courts may be unwilling to halt.  Thus, while courts have discretion to 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 92. The practical ability of a court to resolve a complex dispute is often a function of the 
level of generality at which lawmakers define the applicable liability rule and the extent to 
which lawmakers resolve policy questions at the rulemaking stage rather than delegating these 
questions to courts for case-by-case consideration.  See James A. Henderson, Jr., Process 
Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916 (1982).  The feasibility principle is thus not 
merely procedural in nature because it helps to illuminate shortcomings in the drafting of 
substantive rules that inhibit the effective integration of substantive rights with procedural 
remedies. 
 93. See, e.g., Galloway v. Am. Brands, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 580, 585-86 (E.D.N.C. 1978) 
(estimating that adjudicating putative class members’ individualized damage claims would 
“consume well-over 100 years”).  In reality, century-long litigation is unlikely because the parties 
presumably would settle to avoid the expense of trial.  However, distortions that dissimilarity 
would create in the anticipated trial process would affect the value of any settlements.  See supra 
Part II.C. 
 94. Whether judicial resources are “available” is partly a function of a court’s discretion 
because judges must decide how much of their time to allocate to each case on their docket.  
Courts applying the feasibility principle in circumstances where adjudicating a class action could 
be possible if sufficient resources were diverted from other cases will therefore face difficult 
questions about how to weigh the competing demands of multiple claimants for scarce judicial 
time. 
 95. The frustration that arises when the desire to certify a class confronts the reality that 
certification is impossible may motivate policymakers to tailor substantive law more closely to 
the resources that are available for enforcing it.  For example, common law legal rules requiring 
proof of causation in toxic tort cases or reliance in fraud cases create management burdens that 
often preclude certification of class actions asserting tort or fraud claims, and thus limit the 
effectiveness of private law deterrents to corporate misconduct.  Some commentators have 
therefore proposed altering common law causes of action to eliminate these elements.  See supra 
note 3.  Whether these proposals are desirable is a question of substantive tort policy, not a 
question of procedural class action policy. 
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second-guess themselves by decertifying classes, they seldom have an 
opportunity to do so and are in practice reluctant to do so.96  Well-
reasoned plans for managing class actions are therefore necessary 
before certification rather than after so that the powerful and 
potentially irreparable consequences of certification are not unleashed 
absent some confidence that the case can in fact be tried as a class 
action97 or fairly settled consistent with the fidelity principle.  Courts 
have ample flexibility to be imaginative when confronting 
management problems raised by individual questions of fact and law, 
but must recognize the fine line between healthy creativity and blind 
overconfidence. 
An implication of this observation is that certification criteria 
should require courts to assess at the time of a certification decision 
whether class adjudication would be feasible in light of dissimilar 
questions of fact and law.  The concept of “feasibility” is intentionally 
vague to give courts flexibility in approaching the task of managing 
complex claims.  Factors for determining whether a management plan 
is feasible could include: (1) the time necessary to implement the plan; 
(2) the ability of the parties to adduce the evidence necessary to 
resolve disputed questions; (3) the extent to which the plan relies on 
questionable predictions or assumptions about how various stages of 
the litigation are likely to proceed; (4) the cost of resolving claims 
relative to available resources; (5) the consistency of the plan with 
applicable constraints on procedure, such as constitutional or 
statutory requirements for a jury trial; and (6) the likelihood that 
certification would facilitate a voluntary settlement (as opposed to a 
settlement negotiated in fear of a trial conducted in violation of the 
principles discussed in this Part) that would obviate an extensive use 
of judicial resources.  These factors should be sufficiently flexible to 
ensure that courts are not forced to adjudicate class actions according 
to a cookie-cutter ideal of complex litigation procedures, sufficiently 
attuned to the settlement pressures that certification can create to 
ensure that the parties are free either to settle or not to settle 
depending on their desire to buy peace, and sufficiently firm to ensure 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 96. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1301 & nn. 188-89 (2002) (“When a trial judge believes that 
settlement is likely with certification, she has little incentive to decertify the class. Accordingly, 
defendants have little incentive to file motions to decertify, with the result that there should be 
few such motions and a high settlement rate – predictions consistent with the available data.”) 
(citing Willging et al., supra note 10, at 175 tbl. 32)). 
 97. Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.11 (1995) (discouraging “conditional” 
certification orders used to “defer” final certification decisions because of their “[u]ndesirable” 
practical consequences). 
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that courts have a realistic plan for extricating themselves from a 
class action before they leap into it.98 
D. Synthesis of the Three Principles 
The finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles discussed above 
suggest several criteria that can be used to test existing rules 
governing class certification and to formulate new rules.  The 
principles are particularly helpful in guiding courts confronting 
proposed class actions where the answers to disputed questions may 
not be the same for each class member.  Combining the need for a 
judgment (principle 1), with the need to ensure that each beneficiary 
of that judgment is entitled to it (principle 2), and with the need for a 
management plan for resolving individual issues within resource 
constraints (principle 3) helps to frame the potential significance of 
similar and dissimilar questions that the parties will ask the court to 
resolve.  The three principles suggest that when a plaintiff asks a 
court to certify her as a representative of absent class members 
seeking damages, the court may do so only if it has a feasible plan for 
resolving factual and legal disputes regarding each element and 
defense applicable to each class member’s claim and for eventually 
entering judgment for or against each class member.  There must 
either be an opportunity for the parties to litigate individual claims or 
defenses, or a reason to believe that such an opportunity is not 
necessary to reach a judgment that accurately values class members’ 
claims.  The existence of individualized issues of fact and law unique 
to the circumstances of particular class members thus does not 
necessarily preclude certification if the court has a plan for coping with 
individual factual and legal inquiries.  In practice, however, 
certification will not be possible when there is no manageable way of 
reaching a final judgment that resolves all factual and legal disputes 
relevant to each class member’s entitlement to relief under applicable 
substantive law, and when one or more parties is unwilling to settle 
voluntarily. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 98. Conventional wisdom has until recently posited that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), limits the power of judges to incorporate 
practical considerations such as feasibility into their certification analysis for fear of prematurely 
assessing the merits of class members’ claims.  However, recent scholarship and the modern 
trend of judicial decisions establish that courts may consider how a claim would be tried before 
deciding whether to certify it, even if such nominally procedural analysis requires addressing 
some of the substantive aspects of contested claims and defenses.  For a general discussion of 
pre-certification “merits” analysis, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action 
Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51 (2004). 
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As we will see in the next Part, the predominance test at the 
heart of Rule 23(b)(3) does not link the certification inquiry to either 
the finality or fidelity principles, and is only loosely connected to the 
feasibility principle.  Despite the large stakes riding on certification 
decisions, the rule on which courts currently base such decisions does 
not formally account for any of the factors that this Part demonstrates 
are essential to properly deploying the class action device. 
IV. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN CLASS CERTIFICATION PRINCIPLES AND 
EXISTING CLASS CERTIFICATION RULES AND DOCTRINE 
This Part assesses how well existing certification criteria 
conform to the principles discussed in Part III.  The unfortunate 
answer is that a wide gap separates principle and practice on the 
critical issue of how courts should assess similarity and dissimilarity 
among claims when deciding whether to certify proposed damages 
classes.  The predominance test at the heart of Rule 23(b)(3) strives to 
balance the competing pull of similar and dissimilar elements within 
proposed class actions, but is inherently incapable of assisting courts 
in making principled certification decisions. 
Section A explores the historical origins and role of the 
predominance rule, revealing that it was created from thin air in 1966 
with virtually no explanation or guidance to courts.  Section B 
analyzes the practical and conceptual defects of the predominance 
rule, explaining that it is inscrutably vague, not grounded in any 
principled or practical assessment of whether dissimilarity among 
claims creates a significant obstacle to certification, and premised on a 
balancing test that does not serve any useful purpose.  Section C then 
reviews the typicality and manageability components of Rule 23 and 
concludes that they are not capable of supplementing the 
predominance test in addressing whether dissimilarity among class 
members’ claims should preclude certification.  Section D examines 
doctrine that courts have created to help apply the predominance test 
to recurring fact patterns, concluding that this doctrine shares the 
conceptual flaws of the predominance test that spawned it and 
provides an additional reason for replacing the concept of 
predominance with a more practical and principled alternative. 
A. The Origins and Role of the Predominance Test 
The predominance test was the culmination of a gradual 
evolution in class action rules from the broad and unstructured 
generalities of early equity practice toward more formal constraints on 
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judicial discretion.99  The architects of the 1966 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure had an intuition that evaluating the significance of similar 
and dissimilar aspects of proposed class claims would be important 
and crafted the predominance test to codify that intuition.  Yet the 
drafters never explained the meaning of their innovative new 
predominance standard, leaving courts and commentators to drift 
between competing visions of how goals of fairness and efficiency 
affected the significance of similarity and dissimilarity among claims 
and defenses. 
Early federal rules governing class actions did not contain any 
criteria for evaluating the effect of dissimilar individualized issues on 
a court’s decision about whether to permit a representative to litigate 
claims on behalf of an absent class.  The first federal class action rule 
– Equity Rule 48, adopted in 1842 – focused on numerosity and the 
impracticability of joinder rather than similarity or dissimilarity 
among class members’ substantive claims.100  Rule 48 did not even 
mention commonality as a relevant factor, although the Supreme 
Court in 1853 read a commonality requirement into the rule.101  In 
1912, the Supreme Court renumbered Rule 48 as Rule 38 and rewrote 
it to include an explicit commonality requirement, although there was 
still no corresponding limitation on class litigation linked to the 
existence of individualized questions.102  Equity Rule 38 survived until 
1938, when law and equity procedures merged into the new Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The new rules addressed class actions in 
Rule 23, which permitted certification of three categories of classes.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 99. For a discussion of the origins of nineteenth-century equity practice regarding group 
and representative litigation, see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO 
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 213-20 (1987); Hazard, supra note 54, at 1858-1923; Robert G. Bone, 
Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative 
Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 262-87 (1990). 
 100. Rule 48 stated:  
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest 
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be brought before it, the Court in its 
discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, 
having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interest of the plaintiffs 
and the defendants in the suit properly before it.  But, in such cases, the decree shall 
be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.   
42 U.S. (1 How.) 1v, 1vi (1842). 
 101. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302 (1853) (class suit must pursue “an 
object common” to all class members). 
 102. Rule 38 stated that: “When the question is one of common or general interest to many 
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the 
court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”  Order Promulgating Rules of Practice for 
the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 629, 659 (1912).  The procedural codes of 
most states roughly tracked the language of Rule 38.  See William Wirt Blume, The “Common 
Questions” Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878, 878 n.4 
(1932) (reviewing code language and precedent from law and equity courts). 
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Only the so-called “spurious”103 category of class actions explicitly 
required “a common question of law or fact,” but it did not require any 
formal consideration of individualized questions. 
The emphasis of early class action rules on commonality among 
claims without any corresponding focus on individuality was likely an 
artifact of the partial evolution of class actions from joinder principles 
and equity practice.  The central inquiry in joinder cases usually 
involves identifying a single common issue, status, or right uniting 
otherwise distinct claims or claimants.  The possibility that claims 
might be too distinct to litigate in a joined proceeding is a subsidiary 
question related to whether practical concerns warrant severance.  In 
contrast, equity practice offered judges substantial flexibility in 
bifurcating resolution of common and individual questions to an 
extent not present in common law damages cases requiring trial by 
jury.104  Early class action formulations apparently adapted joinder’s 
fixation on commonality without developing a counterpart to the 
doctrine of severance, and extended equity’s flexible treatment of 
concurrent common and individual questions into a modern context in 
which law and equity had merged and bifurcation was substantially 
more difficult.  Class action rules thus evolved to focus on common 
issues that united class claims without formal consideration of 
individualized issues that divided class claims. 
Emphasis on commonality at the expense of individuality 
persisted until the substantial redrafting of Rule 23 in 1966.105  The 
1966 revisions invented the concept of “predominance” to capture the 
importance of individual issues to a court’s decision about whether to 
certify a class action seeking damages.  The amended Rule 23(b)(3) 
permitted courts to certify a class only upon a finding that “questions 
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 103. The 1938 version of Rule 23 created three categories of class actions – “true,” “hybrid,” 
and “spurious” – based on the nature of the asserted substantive right.  See James Wm. Moore, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised By The Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 
551, 571-76 (1937) (proposing and explaining the new class action rule).  Commonality was not 
an explicit element of either the true or hybrid class action, although as a practical matter such 
actions were possible only when class members shared a substantial common interest.  See id.  
For a summary of the practical and theoretical problems that plagued litigation under the 1938 
version of Rule 23, see Joseph J. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REV. 
905 (1962). 
 104. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 
1300-02 (1932) (contrasting the power of law and equity courts in complex litigation). 
 105. The 1946 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure added a note to Rule 23 
discussing the effect of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), on shareholder derivative 
litigation, but did not amend the text of the rule or address questions about similarity and 
dissimilarity among class members’ claims.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR DISTRICT 
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 24-29 (1946). 
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any questions affecting only individual members.”106  The federal class 
action rule thus for the first time explicitly recognized that courts 
must consider both common and individual questions when deciding 
whether class certification is procedurally appropriate for particular 
substantive claims. 
The 1966 amendments did not define “predominate.”  The 
drafters’ official notes and unofficial working papers likewise neither 
explain what the predominance concept was intended to mean nor 
identify its origin.107  The notes suggest that courts should not certify 
classes when individual questions of fact or law are “material” or 
“significant,”108 but do not offer any criteria for assessing materiality 
or significance or for comparing the materiality and significance of 
individual questions with the materiality and significance of common 
questions.  Contemporaneous commentary about the 1966 
amendments also does not illuminate the meaning of predominance 
despite the innovative nature of the concept and its central position in 
the new Rule 23(b)(3).109 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 107. The predominance test was developed without explanation at some point between 
November 1960 and March 1963.  Compare Reporter’s Memorandum on Proposed Amendments 
(Sub-Memorandum V at 4) (1960) (noting need to replace the 1938 version of Rule 23 but not 
proposing specific language), with Reporter’s Memorandum on Proposed Amendments at EE-2 
(Preliminary Draft, Mar. 15, 1963) (including the predominance test amongst proposed reforms 
to Rule 23).  The explanatory memorandum accompanying the March 1963 draft did not explain 
the predominance test, which apparently was not considered controversial and may have 
appeared in earlier drafts (of which there is no record in the Advisory Committee’s publicly 
available files).  See Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan & Albert Sacks to Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules at 3-4 (Mar. 18, 1963).  A contentious meeting of the advisory committee in late 
1963 briefly alluded to the predominance test as being important, but did not explain what it 
was intended to mean and focused almost exclusively on other aspects of the proposed 
amendments to Rule 23.  See Transcript of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules meeting on class 
actions (Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1963).  The notes to the 1964 preliminary draft of Rule 23 also omit any 
explanation of the origin or meaning of the predominance concept.  See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE (1964), reprinted in 34 F.R.D. 325, 387-95.  Although this is pure speculation, the 
origin of the predominance concept may trace to an influential article by Zechariah Chafee, who 
proposed that one critical consideration for determining whether equity courts should resolve 
multiple related suits in a single forum was the “relative magnitude of the common questions 
and the independent questions.”  Chafee, supra note 104, at 1327.  Chafee offered only minimal 
guidance about how to conduct this balancing inquiry, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME 
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 282-83 (1950), although he did suggest caution in extending the 
availability of representative suits beyond historical precedents featuring a high degree of 
commonality among claims, see id. at 215, 224. 
 108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 109. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 390 (devoting one sentence to the predominance test 
in the course of a twenty-five page discussion of the new Rule 23: “a class action loses 
attractiveness as the individual questions are seen to have such scope or variety as to overload 
the action”); Kaplan, supra note 86, at 498 (describing the predominance inquiry as establishing 
the “tough” task of “sensing” “important themes” that run “pervasively through the entire 
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Although the drafters did not define “predominate,” they did 
provide four factors to help courts apply the predominance test.  Yet 
these factors did nothing to clarify the relationship between common 
and individualized questions in class litigation.  The first sentence of 
Rule 23(b)(3) creates two tests: predominance (“questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class [must] predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members”) and superiority (“a class 
action [must be] superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy”).110  The second sentence 
then lists four “matters pertinent” to “these findings,” with “these 
findings” presumably referring to both the predominance and 
superiority inquiries identified in the prior sentence.111 
The four listed factors in substance address only the question 
of superiority and have little relevance to assessing predominance.  
The first factor is “the interest of members of the class in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions.”112  This 
factor clearly bears on whether a class action is “superior” to 
alternatives, but does not provide practical guidance for assessing the 
relative predominance of common and individual questions of fact and 
law.  The factor’s emphasis on plaintiffs’ “interests” seems to link the 
question of predominance to whether a knowledgeable plaintiff would 
prefer class adjudication to available alternatives, yet a plaintiff might 
prefer litigating alone merely because he values autonomy without 
disputing that a case involves substantial common questions, or he 
might favor free-riding as an absent class member without disputing 
that the case involves substantial individualized questions.  A 
plaintiff’s “interests” in controlling litigation therefore do not seem to 
have any bearing on whether common or individualized questions 
“predominate.”  The second factor is “the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against 
________________________________________________________________________ 
litigation”); Charles Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. INDUS. 
& COM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1969) (noting that the predominance inquiry is “more difficult” than the 
commonality inquiry but not elaborating on how to conduct it); Sherman L. Cohn, The New 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1216 (1966) (describing the (b)(3) category as 
“pragmatic” but not defining the predominance inquiry); Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary 
Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 43 (1967) (noting that (b)(3) actions will 
involve both common and individual questions but not explaining how the predominance test 
should balance them); Charles W. Joiner, The New Civil Rules: A Substantial Improvement, 40 
F.R.D. 359, 367 (1966) (describing “great and important” important innovations in Rule 23 
without discussing predominance). 
 110. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 111. Id.; see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (linking the four 
factors to both predominance and superiority); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 
(1974) (same). 
 112. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A). 
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members of the class.”113  This factor instructs a court to incorporate 
empirical information about the conduct of related suits into its 
assessment of predominance (which the court presumably would have 
done anyway without being told), but fails to explain how.  The factor 
seems to focus on the question of superiority by linking the 
availability of a class action to an assessment of the adequacy of 
alternative remedies, and does not add any insight into how a court 
should decide when a common question “predominates” over an 
individual question.114  The third factor is “the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum.”115  This factor is obviously relevant to the 
superiority inquiry, but is circular when read in context of the 
predominance inquiry.  Concentrating predominant common questions 
in a single forum is presumably desirable, while concentrating 
predominant individualized questions in a single forum is presumably 
undesirable, but that observation does not explain how a court is 
supposed to know which questions predominate in which 
circumstances.  Finally, the fourth factor is “the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action.”116  This factor 
potentially offers limited assistance in applying the predominance 
test, and I therefore discuss it in Section C below.  Thus, with the 
possible exception of the manageability factor, the four “matters 
pertinent” in Rule 23(b)(3) do not add any content to the otherwise 
undefined concept of predominance. 
The rest of Rule 23 likewise fails to clarify or supplement the 
predominance inquiry.  Aside from the predominance test, the only 
certification criteria that directly bears on the evaluation of 
individualized questions is the requirement in Rule 23(a)(3) that “the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class.” The typicality inquiry, coupled with 
the Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability factor, supplements the 
predominance inquiry but, as shown below in Section C, does not 
mitigate any of the deficiencies in the predominance concept.  The 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 113. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(B). 
 114. This factor has added importance when the related suits are pending in state court 
because the Anti-Injunction Act limits the ability of federal courts to enjoin state proceedings, see 
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2005), and thus a federal court could conclude under Rule 23(b)(3)(B) that the 
pendency of related state court actions may pose coordination problems that would diminish the 
utility of a federal class action. 
 115. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(C). 
 116. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 
(1974) (“Commonly referred to as ‘manageability,’ this consideration encompasses the whole 
range of practical problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for a 
particular suit.”). 
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typicality and manageability tests provide some clues about how 
individual issues should influence the (b)(3) certification calculus, but 
the determination of whether individual issues are significant rests 
primarily on whether a court believes that they “predominate” over 
common issues.  The predominance test is for this reason the most 
hotly litigated of the (b)(3) certification factors and the one on which 
certification usually hinges.117 
The 1966 version of Rule 23(b) remains operative today and for 
the foreseeable future.  There are no pending legislative or 
administrative proposals to modify the Rule’s criteria for certifying 
class actions.  Substantial amendments to Rule 23 became effective on 
December 1, 2003, but none of the amendments addressed the 23(a) or 
23(b) certification factors.  Congress likewise recently adopted various 
class action reforms, but has focused on the scope of diversity 
jurisdiction and the fairness of settlements rather than on questions of 
similarity and dissimilarity among class members’ claims.118  Rule 
23(b)(3) is therefore likely to remain frozen in its 1966 state unless 
commentators begin to question it and propose alternatives. 
The conceptual problems in federal Rule 23 also undermine 
state class action rules.  Predominance is a certification factor in forty-
five of the forty-eight states with rules or statutes permitting class 
actions;119 forty states essentially copy the predominance test from 
Rule 23,120 and in five others the state rule is a close variant of the 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 117. See supra note 10. 
 118. See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 3-4, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
 119. Mississippi and Virginia do not have rules or statutes authorizing class actions.  
California, Nebraska, and South Carolina permit class actions but do not require or suggest that 
courts consider predominance.  See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (2005) (“[W]hen the question is 
one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it 
is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit 
of all.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (2004) (same); S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 23 (multifactor certification 
test).  But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b)(2) (West 2005) (requiring predominance in consumer 
class actions under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780). 
 120. Thirty-nine states have rules or statutes requiring courts to consider predominance, and 
one state has added a predominance requirement through case law.  See ALA. R. CIV. PRO. 
23(b)(3); ALASKA R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); ARIZ. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); ARK. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b); COLO. 
R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 9-8; DEL. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); FLA. R. CIV. PRO. 
1.220(b)(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23(b)(3) (2003); HAW. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); IDAHO R. CIV. PRO. 
23(b)(3); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-801(2) (2005); IND. R. TRIAL PRO. 23(b)(3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
60-223(b)(3) (2005); KY. R. CIV. PRO. 23.02(c); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 591(B)(3) (West 
2005); ME. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); MD. R. CIV. PRO. 2-231(b)(3); MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(b); MICH. CT. R. 
3.501(A)(1)(B); MINN. R. CIV. PRO. 23.02(c); MO. R. CIV. PRO. 52.08(b)(3); MONT. R. CIV. PRO. 
23(b)(3); NEV. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 27-A(a)(2); N.J. R. Ct. 4:32-1(b)(3); N.M. 
R. CIV. PRO. 1-023(C)(3); N.Y. CPLR § 901(a)(2) (McKinney 2005); OHIO R. CIV. PRO. 23(B)(3); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3) (West 2005); R.I. SUP. CT. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 15-6-23(b)(3) (Michie 2003); TENN. R. CIV. PRO. 23.02(3); TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 42(b)(4); UTAH 
R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); VT. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 23(b)(3); WEST VA. R. CIV. 
PRO. 23(b)(3); WY. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 354 S.E.2d 459, 464 
  
2005] REGULATING CLASS ACTIONS 1057 
federal rule.121  The “typicality” and “manageability” factors discussed 
below have similarly seeped from Rule 23 into state law: typicality is a 
factor in forty-one states,122 and manageability is a factor in thirty-
eight states.123 
The lack of attention to predominance and related concepts 
amidst the sound and fury of the debate over class action reform – 
which one commentator has analogized to a “holy war”124 – is 
startling.  One would have thought that the steadily increasing 
discussion of class actions since the last major rules amendment in 
1966 would have included constant attention to and reevaluation of 
the basic principles that justify converting ordinary claims into class 
actions, and in particular to the method for assessing dissimilarity 
among class members’ claims.  Yet that scrutiny has not occurred.  To 
the contrary, the advisory committee that reviews proposed 
amendments to the federal class action rule recently reached the 
seemingly inconsistent conclusions that: (1) the authors of the 1966 
class action amendments “had little conception” of how the rule would 
operate in practice and recognized that it would “require re-
examination after a period of experience,” but (2) “questions 
surrounding certification standards were not ripe for rulemaking” 
thirty-five years later.125  The amendments to Rule 23 that took effect 
________________________________________________________________________ 
(N.C. 1987) (“[A] ‘class’ exists under [North Carolina] Rule 23 when the named and unnamed 
members each have an interest in either the same issue of law or of fact, and that issue 
predominates over issues affecting only individual class members.”). 
 121. Predominance is a discretionary rather than required certification factor in five states.  
See IOWA CT. R. 1.263(e); N.D. R. CIV. PRO. 23(c)(1)(E); OR. R. CIV. P. 32(B)(3); PA. R. CIV. PRO. 
1708(a)(1); Derzon v. Appleton Papers, Inc., No. 96-CV-3678, 1998 WL 1031504, at *3 (Wisc. Cir. 
Ct. July 7, 1998) (noting that the “predominance” test “finds an echo” in and “reflects a similar 
purpose” as state class action statute). 
 122. Of the forty-five states cited above in notes 120 and 121 that have adopted a 
predominance rule, Illinois, Iowa, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wisconsin have not 
adopted a typicality requirement.  In contrast, South Carolina requires typicality but not 
predominance.  See S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 23(a)(3). 
 123. At least thirty-eight of the forty-five states that have adopted a predominance rule have 
also adapted a manageability rule; the exceptions are Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.  See supra note 120.  Kansas 
has adopted a manageability test by implication rather than explicitly.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
60-223(b)(3)(C) (noting that court should consider “procedural measures which may be needed” in 
litigating the class action). 
 124. Miller, supra note 70, at 664. 
 125. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 24-25 (rev. July 31, 2001), 
reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 586, 588-89.  In fairness to the committee, amendments to rules as 
controversial as Rule 23 are extremely difficult to adopt.  The minutes of advisory committee 
meetings during the 1990s reflect intermittent concern about predominance and related 
concepts, but there was no consensus on how to proceed and apparently the discussion did not 
lead to any concrete proposals.  See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes (Feb. 16-17, 1995) 
(observing that “[Rule] b(3) has no workable definition of predominance”); Civil Rules Advisory 
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in December 2003 track this conclusion by focusing on post-
certification management rather on than on pre-certification concepts 
such as predominance.126  The predominance concept thus remains far 
more undertheorized and overlooked then its importance would 
suggest. 
B. Defects in the Predominance Concept 
The predominance inquiry in Rule 23(b)(3) commits courts to 
answering a meaningless question, and then offers them no guidance 
for doing so.  At the outset, the test is needlessly vague because it fails 
to communicate why the relationship between common and individual 
questions is conceptually and practically important, and fails to 
identify principles that might guide courts in assessing the 
relationship.  Aside from being vague, the predominance test is also 
incoherent because the balancing process it envisions seeks to 
compare two incomparable values.  The answer to the question of 
whether common or individual issues predominate in a particular case 
is meaningless because the practical implications of individual issues 
can defeat certification regardless of how individual issues relate in 
the abstract to common issues, and regardless of the efficiencies that 
might arise from resolving common issues in a single proceeding.  
Learning how an individual question relates to a common question on 
some indeterminate balancing scale does not reveal any useful 
information about the significance of the individual question and 
cannot assist in determining whether a court should certify a proposed 
class. 
An initial problem with the concept of predominance is that it 
is has no generally accepted meaning, leading to substantial confusion 
and inconsistency in judicial efforts to apply it.  A consequence of the 
drafters’ decision not to define “predominate” in the text or notes to 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 is that commentators were left to 
divine the concept’s meaning and purpose without any substantial 
guideposts.  The effect of the lack of guidance is evident in the leading 
civil procedure and class action treatises, which offer differing 
conceptions of how courts should assess common and individual issues 
when deciding whether to certify a class.127  The lack of any consensus 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Committee Minutes (Mar. 20-21, 1997) (briefly discussing whether Rule 23(b)(3) should be 
amended to include a “common proof” or “common evidence” requirement); Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee Minutes (May 1-2, 1997) (same). 
 126. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (new provisions governing review of settlements); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(h) (new provision governing fee awards in class actions). 
 127. See, e.g., 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4:21, 
4:25 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that the predominance and superiority factors “blend” and describing 
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among commentators spills over to judicial opinions attempting to 
apply the predominance test.  Despite the critical importance of 
predominance analysis in deciding whether to certify (b)(3) classes, 
courts apply the test in a myriad of vague and distinct formulations, 
finding predominance when common issues of liability are “central,”128 
“significant,” 129 or “overriding,”130 or when there is a “common nucleus 
of operative fact,”131 or when “resolution of one issue or a small group 
of them,” even if not “conclusive,” will “so advance the litigation that 
they may be fairly said to predominate,”132 or when common liability 
questions are the “dominant core”133 or “most important”134 aspect of a 
case, or when common questions will require “most of the efforts of the 
litigants and the court”135 or will “outweigh”136 individual questions, or 
when proving common questions would require “the same quantum of 
evidence” even if the size of the class were expanded or contracted,137 
or when issues subject to “generalized proof” are “more substantial” 
than issues subject to individualized proof.138  Alternatively, courts 
sidestep the definitional problem by ignoring it and jumping directly 
into predominance analysis without articulating a guiding 
standard.139  The Manual for Complex Litigation likewise fails to fill 
the definitional void left by Rule 23 and does not demystify the 
predominance test.  Indeed, the Manual’s thirty-seven-page discussion 
of class actions does not discuss the predominance standard at all, and 
instead fosters confusion by suggesting that class definitions can 
________________________________________________________________________ 
at length the standards that courts should not use in assessing predominance without 
identifying a standard that should be used); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶ 23.44 (3d. ed.) (noting that the predominance inquiry is “pragmatic” rather than 
“precise”); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1778 (3d ed. 
2005) (reviewing several distinct judicial approaches to predominance without endorsing any 
particular test). 
 128. See, e.g., Radmanovich v. Combined Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 424, 435 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 129. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 130. See, e.g., In re Workers’ Comp., 130 F.R.D. 99, 109 (D. Minn. 1990). 
 131. See, e.g., Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 204 F.R.D. 662, 666 (E.D. Wash. 2002) 
(citation omitted). 
 132. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 133. See, e.g., In re Energy Sys. Equip. Leasing Securities Litig., 642 F. Supp. 718, 752 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 134. See, e.g., Chiang v. Veneman, 213 F.R.D. 256, 263 (D.V.I. 2003). 
 135. See, e.g., Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 434 (Tex. 2000) (citations 
omitted). 
 136. See, e.g., In re West Virginia Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 71 (W. Va. 2003). 
 137. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 138. See, e.g., Moore v. Painewebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 139. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996) (criticizing the 
district court’s “incomplete and inadequate predominance inquiry” without identifying a 
framework to guide appellate review). 
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encompass “diverse interests” without explaining how courts should 
assess the permissible scope of diversity.140 
The Supreme Court could have helped ease confusion by 
clarifying the meaning of the predominance rule (which the Court 
itself promulgated),141 but instead amplified interpretative 
uncertainty by blurring the distinct elements of Rule 23 into a single 
vague test while simultaneously condemning the subjectivity in 
certification analysis that the Court’s own doctrine creates.  The 
Court’s opinion in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor142 exemplifies the 
problem.  The Court held in Amchem that the Rule 23(a)(2) 
commonality test blurs into the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality test,143 that 
the typicality test blurs into the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy test,144 and 
that the adequacy test blurs into the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
test.145  These observations led the Court to collapse the commonality, 
typicality, adequacy, and predominance inquiries into a search for 
“unity”146 and “cohesion”147 within the proposed class.  Yet the Court 
did not develop any standards that might help judges to evaluate the 
relative significance of unity and disunity (or similarity and 
dissimilarity) among claims and defenses.  The Court achieved this 
reduction of Rule 23 into a “unity and cohesion” test while 
simultaneously repudiating the tendency of district courts to reduce 
certification analysis to a “gestalt” and “chancellor’s foot” assessment 
of fairness.148  Yet the Court’s own focus on “unity” embodies precisely 
the sort of impressionistic analysis that the Court purports to have 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 140. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 97, § 30.15. 
 141. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2005), delegates to the Supreme Court 
responsibility for promulgating rules of civil procedure subject to a potential congressional veto.  
The Supreme Court in turn delegates responsibility for proposing rules to the Judicial 
Conference of the United States Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, which further 
delegates responsibility to an Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. 
 142. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 143. Id. at 626 n.20 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982): 
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.  Both serve 
as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances 
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim 
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be 
fairly and adequately protected in their absence.  Those requirements therefore also 
tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 621 (noting relationship of Rule 23(b) to the question of whether “absent members 
can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives”); id. at 623 (“The Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”). 
 146. Id. at 621 (The “dominant concern” of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) is “whether a proposed class 
has sufficient unity.”). 
 147. Id. at 623. 
 148. Id. at 621. 
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rejected.  The Court then added that the predominance inquiry is 
“demanding,”149 but did not articulate any criteria – such as the 
criteria in Part III above – that judges could use in implementing the 
“demanding” quest for “unity.”  The Court in Amchem thus had the 
proper intuition – that dissimilarity is important – but reacted to that 
intuition with insufficient focus and clarity.  Indeed, the Amchem 
opinion is a step backward in the nearly forty-year effort of judges and 
commentators to understand the meaning of predominance because it 
layers an additional set of inscrutable concepts – unity and cohesion – 
on to an already inscrutable rule. 
The Court’s few other class action decisions are no more helpful 
than Amchem on the question of predominance.  In fact, a striking 
aspect of the Court’s burgeoning class action jurisprudence is that the 
Court assiduously avoids reviewing certification criteria – except as 
these criteria relate to conflicts of interest among class members, 
which is an issue that seems to preoccupy the Court –150 focusing 
instead on other areas of class action doctrine such as standing and 
mootness,151 diversity jurisdiction,152 tolling of statutes of 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 149. Id. at 624; see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 306-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the predominance test provides “ample assurances” that claims are not 
“unrelated”). 
 150. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852-59 (1999) (reversing approval of class 
action settlement of asbestos claims ostensibly because the trial court failed to properly apply 
certification standards governing suits against limited funds, but also because of perceived 
conflicts of interest among class counsel, class members with present damages, and class 
members likely to accrue damages in the future); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
626 (1997) (“In significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are not 
aligned.”); E. Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (holding that 
“the named plaintiffs’ failure to protect the interests of class members by moving for 
certification” and demand for a remedy in “conflict” with the preferences of class members 
rendered them inadequate class representatives); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975) 
(finding that the class representative was adequate but noting that “[t]here are frequently cases 
in which it appears that the particular class a party seeks to represent does not have sufficient 
homogeneity of interests to warrant certification”); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) 
(“[S]election of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not 
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not 
afford that protection to absent parties which due process requires.”); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 
U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853) (“In all cases where . . . a few are permitted to sue and defend on 
behalf of the many, by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the record 
fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried.”); see 
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 399 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting “the centrality of the procedural due process protection of 
adequate representation in class action lawsuits”). 
 151. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 261-68 (2003) (rejecting standing and adequacy 
challenges to named plaintiff in class action opposing affirmative action in undergraduate 
admissions); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (reaffirming Gerstein, 
infra); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) (“an action brought 
on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive 
claim, even though class certification has been denied;” mootness instead depends on how 
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limitations,153 personal jurisdiction and choice of law,154 the preclusive 
effect of class action judgments,155 the formality of certification 
________________________________________________________________________ 
certification issues are resolved on appeal); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340 
(1980) (“[E]ntry of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections did not moot their 
private case or controversy” or prevent them from appealing the denial of class certification); 
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 134-35 (1977) (holding that when a change in substantive law 
moots the claims of the class representative and a substantial number of class members, courts 
should defer ruling on the merits of remaining claims within the “fragmented” class pending 
reconsideration of whether the class meets the Rule 23(a) certification criteria); Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may be a class action, however, 
adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must 
allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by 
other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to 
represent’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975))); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 
424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976) (“Given a properly certified class action . . . mootness turns on whether, 
in the specific circumstances of the given case at the time it is before this Court, an adversary 
relationship” exists to ensure a sharp presentation of issues); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
110-11 & n.11 (1975) (holding that certification of a class action after the representatives’ claims 
have become moot does not render the class claims moot when the nature of the claim is 
inherently transitory); Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399-403 (holding that resolution of the named 
plaintiffs’ claim after certification of a class does not moot the claims of class members); 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974) (“To have standing to 
sue as a class representative it is essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he 
must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he 
represents”); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (“[I]f none of the named plaintiffs 
purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the 
defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.”); Hall v. 
Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (holding that a plaintiff cannot revive claims that were moot 
when filed by denominating the suit as a class action on behalf of members with live claims). 
 152. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301 (“Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy 
the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case.”); 
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1969) (holding that the claims of individual class 
members cannot be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement).  
The Court is currently reconsidering the questions deciding in Zahn in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., Docket 04-70. 
 153. See Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 661-62 (1983) (holding that federal law requires at a 
minimum that the filing of a class action suspends the limitations period on absent class 
members’ claims, but that state law can supplement federal tolling by permitting renewal of the 
limitations period after denial of certification); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 
350 (1983) (“The filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations ‘as to all asserted members 
of the class,’ not just as to interveners.”) (internal citation omitted); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (“[T]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable 
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had 
the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.”). 
 154. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (“[A] forum state may 
exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff 
may not possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant,” if it provides “minimal procedural due process protection”); id. at 
821 (“[W]hile a State may . . . assume jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs whose principal 
contacts are with other States, it may not use this assumption of jurisdiction as an added weight 
in the scale when considering the permissible constitutional limits on choice of substantive law . . 
. ”). 
 155. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 516 U.S. at 380-86 (holding that state court class action 
settlement releasing claims exclusively within the jurisdiction of federal courts precludes class 
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analysis,156 the form and cost of notice,157 the appealability of orders 
relating to certification and resolution of class claims,158 and 
miscellaneous questions with no connection to predominance.159  One 
would have expected that the thousands of class actions litigated in 
________________________________________________________________________ 
members from relitigating the federal claims in federal court); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 
761-69 (1989) (holding that consent decree resolving class action claims does not preclude non-
members of the class from challenging classwide remedies); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 
U.S. 867, 876-81 (1984) (holding that a judgment rejecting class action claims alleging that a 
defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination does not preclude 
individual class members from pursuing discrimination claims unique to their individual 
circumstances); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (“If the federal 
courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree 
when rendered must bind all of the class properly represented.”). 
 156. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (certification requires a “specific 
presentation” and “rigorous analysis” of Rule 23 factors); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976) (holding that fact that all parties “treated” the case as a class action 
does not make the case a class action absent certification under Rule 23); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U.S. 308, 312 n.1 (1976) (“Without such certification and identification of the class [under 
Rule 23], the action is not properly a class action” even if informally “treated” as such); Bd. of 
Sch. Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1975) (finding that class was not properly certified 
where district court failed to follow procedures in Rule 23(c)). 
 157. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350, 356 (1978) (“[W]here a 
defendant can perform one of the tasks necessary to send notice, such as identification, more 
efficiently than the representative plaintiff, the district court has discretion to order him to 
perform the task” but “ordinarily there is no warrant for shifting the cost of the representative 
plaintiff’s performance of these tasks to the defendant.”); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 
156, 177-79 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs must bear the cost of sending individual notice to 
identifiable class members). 
 158. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (holding that absent class members who 
object in the district court to the fairness of a settlement may appeal from an order approving the 
settlement without first intervening as a named party); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 
U.S. 326, 336 (1980) (“[T]he denial of class certification [is] an example of a procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of a litigation, that is appealable after the entry of final judgment.”); 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469-77 (1978) (holding that certification orders are 
not appealable under the collateral order or “death knell” doctrines); Oppenheimer Fund, 437 
U.S. at 347 n.8 (an “order allocating the expense of identification [of class members for purposes 
of notice is] appealable under the collateral-order doctrine”); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1977) (holding that when the district court denies class certification, an 
absent member may wait until after entry of judgment on the named plaintiffs’ individual claims 
before filing a motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the district court’s denial of class 
certification). 
 159. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453-54 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(analyzing applicability of contractual arbitration clause to class action claims); Gulf Oil Co. v. 
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 (1981) (“We recognize the possibility of abuses in class-action 
litigation, and agree with petitioners that such abuses may implicate communications with 
potential class members.  But the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a 
communications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the prosecution of a class 
action in accordance with the Rules.”) (footnote omitted); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 726 
(1986) (“Rule 23(e) wisely requires court approval of the terms of any settlement of a class action, 
but the power to approve or reject a settlement negotiated by the parties before trial does not 
authorize the court to require the parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed”); 
Boeing Co. v. Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 480-82 (1980) (permitting class counsel to claim attorney 
fees from the common damages fund created for class members). 
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federal court would have generated at least a few grants of certiorari 
to guide lower courts in applying the predominance test, but such 
review has not occurred,160 and “predominate” continues to lack an 
authoritative judicial gloss. 
Aside from being vague, the predominance test is not grounded 
in any principle that could guide courts in applying it to the facts of 
particular cases.  Even if “predominate” had a precise and 
authoritatively determined meaning, courts would still need to know 
why common issues and individual issues are important in order to 
know in any particular case which predominates over the others.161  
For example, if the animating principle of predominance is a need to 
promote efficient resolution of disputes, then courts might be 
relatively more willing to tolerate individual variations among claims 
as the price of achieving rough justice in complex cases.  Alternatively, 
if the predominance concept is intended to provide the defendant with 
a fair opportunity to defend itself, then courts would be relatively less 
impressed with the volume of common questions and more interested 
in the practical effect of individual issues on accurate adjudication of 
class claims and defenses.  However, rather than link the 
predominance inquiry to a broader purpose, Rule 23(b)(3) does not 
specify any purpose.  The Advisory Committee notes to the Rule try to 
fill this vacuum by linking the predominance inquiry to both fairness 
and efficiency, but fail to explain how judges should reconcile these 
often conflicting goals.162  Predominance analysis was thus 
predestined to stumble aimlessly between competing ends without 
doing justice to either. 
The predominance inquiry is further flawed because it is not 
linked to any practical assessment of how individual questions of fact 
or law would affect a class action trial.  As explained in Part III, issues 
of law or fact unique to individual class members are significant 
because they may pose obstacles to entering a classwide judgment 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 160. See, e.g., Roper, 445 U.S. at 329 n.2, 331 (denying petition for writ of certiorari on 
question of whether certification was consistent with Rule 23’s predominance test, granting writ 
on question of whether the representative plaintiffs’ claims were moot, and remanding to the 
district court after finding that claims were live without addressing the merits of the court of 
appeals’ predominance analysis); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., Docket 04-70 
(granting certiorari on question related to scope of diversity jurisdiction in class actions, but 
denying certiorari on a question related to application of Rule 23’s predominance test). 
 161. Cf. Robert A. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. 
LITIG. 79, 97 (1994) (noting the need for procedural rules to contain “general norms” for guiding 
judicial discretion). 
 162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966) (“Subdivision (b)(3) 
encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and 
expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing 
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”). 
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(finality), to adjudicating claims and defenses under the appropriate 
substantive law (fidelity), and to developing a realistic plan for 
managing litigation within resource constrains (feasibility).  Aside 
from the unhelpful “matters pertinent” discussed above (and below in 
Section C), the predominance test does not explicitly recognize the 
foregoing concerns – or any concerns – that might justify denying 
certification when individualized issues are salient.  As a result, the 
strong policy arguments in favor of class actions when a case raises 
important common questions often overshadow relatively amorphous 
concerns about individualized inquiries and lead courts to certify 
classes without any realistic sense of how to cope with the 
dissimilarities among class claims.  The problem is then magnified 
because no other aspect of Rule 23 picks up where predominance 
leaves off by explaining how to handle individual issues within the 
context of a certified class action.163  The predominance test read in 
conjunction with the rest of Rule 23 thus has the twin effects of 
encouraging courts to discount the significance of individual issues 
before certification and then to ignore individual issues after 
certification. 
The predominance concept would remain fatally flawed even if 
all of the foregoing defects could be repaired because the concept’s 
premise is incoherent.  If the meaning of predominance were clarified 
with an authoritative interpretation grounded in principle and linked 
to practical guidance, the test would still require courts to balance the 
inherently unbalanceable.  Commentators and courts do not attach 
much inherent meaning to the word “predominate” in Rule 23(b)(3), 
but generally agree that the word connotes a comparative assessment 
and thus requires judges to balance the significance of common and 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 163. Rule 23(c)(4)(B) ostensibly addresses the problem of dissimilarity among class members 
by permitting the court to divide a class into subclasses.  However, relying on subclasses is an 
ineffective alternative to replacing the predominance test.  First, Rule 23 does not offer any 
criteria for assessing the permissible degree of dissimilarity within a subclass, and thus Rule 
23(c)(4)(B) replicates the defect in Rule 23(b)(3).  Second, subclassing accommodates variances 
among homogenous groups of class members, but does not explain how to handle issues that 
require review of individual class members’ circumstances.  For example, subclasses would be 
useful in a product-liability class action if the only contested issue were whether versions of the 
product produced in different years shared the same defect.  In that case, the court could 
establish a subclass for purchasers of each year’s version, substituting several homogenous 
subclasses for the otherwise heterogeneous original class.  In contrast, if the only contested issue 
were damages, and if proof of the existence or amount of damages depended on evidence unique 
to each class member, then subclasses would not fill the void left by the failure of the 
predominance test to account for significant dissimilarity among claims and defenses.  Finally, 
presenting the facts of multiple distinct subclasses to a single jury may mitigate, but would not 
eliminate, the cherry-picking and claim fusion problems that arise from jurors’ cognitive inability 
to parse individualized issues in complex litigation.  See generally sources cited supra note 21. 
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individual questions when deciding whether to certify a class.164  
Balancing common and individual questions is a pointless exercise 
that confuses the reasons that class actions are attractive in general 
with the reasons that class actions are viable in particular cases.  
Class actions are attractive mechanisms for resolving disputes 
because the existence of a common question uniting otherwise 
disparate claims can create an economy of scale that overcomes 
collective action problems, mitigates the defendant’s resource 
advantages, and permits efficient resolution of the issues common to 
class members.  But as explained in Part III, class actions are viable 
only when the individual issues that accompany common issues are 
also amenable to resolution within the class action framework.  The 
existence of common questions is thus a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for certifying a class, while the existence of individualized 
issues beyond some threshold is a sufficient reason to deny 
certification.  Certification standards should therefore focus on 
determining whether individual issues exceed a threshold level of 
significance – and on defining what that threshold might be – rather 
than on comparing common and individual questions in a gestalt 
balancing process.  The predominance test thus systematically 
understates the importance of individual questions by trying to 
balance them against common questions instead of evaluating them 
independently. 
In addition to understating the importance of individual 
questions, the predominance test also overstates the importance of 
common questions.  The predominance test in theory permits courts to 
deny certification in cases where individual issues can be resolved 
within the parameters discussed in Part III, but nevertheless 
“predominate” over comparatively less significant common questions.  
Yet other provisions of Rule 23 address this situation more directly 
than the predominance test, and if those provisions would permit 
certification there is no apparent reason why a predominance analysis 
would add any useful information to the certification calculus.  For 
example, suppose that a court concludes that a proposed class action 
would allow “numerous” class members represented by an “adequate” 
and “typical” plaintiff to litigate a “common” question of fact in a 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 164. See, e.g., 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.44 (3d. ed. 1999) 
(predominance inquiry “focuses on the number and significance of common questions, as 
compared to individual issues”); Hines, supra note 58, at 760 (stating that the predominance 
inquiry requires a determination of whether “class members’ claims are more dissimilar than 
alike”).  But see Romberg, supra note 58, at 287-88 (suggesting that the predominance inquiry 
does not involve an assessment of whether common issues “outweigh” individual issues and 
instead requires courts to determine as a “threshold” matter whether adjudicating the proposed 
common questions would produce a “meaningful benefit”). 
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manner that is “superior” to available alternatives.  Further suppose 
that the court identifies significant questions of law and fact unique to 
individual class members’ claims, but develops a feasible and 
substantively acceptable method to cope with these individual 
questions within the context of a class action.  In such a case there 
would be no reason to care whether common questions “predominate.”  
Whatever issues in some abstract sense “predominate,” the class 
action would still be potentially useful and would be consistent with 
the principles discussed in Part III.  The predominance test is thus 
pointless in cases where individual issues are insufficient to defeat 
certification of their own force and common issues are sufficient to 
satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality test and the Rule 23(b)(3) 
superiority test.165  In contrast, the predominance test is moot when 
common questions are insufficient to render class actions “superior” to 
alternatives.  Either way, in circumstances where individualized 
issues do not impose sufficient obstacles to render certification 
impracticable, the predominance test does not accomplish anything 
useful that the commonality and superiority tests do not already 
accomplish more directly.166 
The predominance test thus fails to achieve its apparently 
intended purpose.  The drafters of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 
recognized that claims brought as putative (b)(3) class actions would 
often entail both common and individualized elements, and that courts 
would need a mechanism to determine when claims were sufficiently 
similar or too dissimilar to warrant certification for class treatment.  
The mechanism that the drafters developed was the predominance 
test, but that test is too vague, too unprincipled, too impractical, and 
too linked to a pointless balancing inquiry to provide any meaningful 
guidance to courts.  As we see in Section C, no other provision in Rule 
23 can pick up the slack left by the conceptual implosion of the 
predominance test. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 165. One could argue that common questions by definition predominate when individual 
questions are manageable and class adjudication is superior, but that would confirm that the 
predominance test does not add anything to Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority and manageability tests. 
 166. Predominance could arguably be a factor in determining superiority, but is best excised 
from the class action vernacular for the reasons noted in the text: it is vague, unprincipled, and 
impractical.  (The superiority test is also vague, unprincipled, and impractical, but that is an 
issue for another article, and in any event would not justify introducing additional imprecision 
by linking superiority to predominance.) 
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C. The Failure of Additional Rule 23 Certification Criteria to Cure 
Defects in the Predominance Standard 
The predominance test is the only element of Rule 23’s 
certification criteria that explicitly refers to the significance of 
individual issues.  The typicality167 and manageability168 inquiries 
indirectly address dissimilarity among class members’ claims, but 
neither is an effective substitute or supplement for predominance. 
1.   Typicality 
Typicality is a concept that sounds sensible but means little.169  
The typicality inquiry apparently codifies the unobjectionable 
sentiment that the representative of a class supposedly pursuing a 
common claim should not himself pursue an atypical claim, 
apparently because the 1966 drafters felt that such atypicality would 
drive a wedge between the goals and interests of the agent and his 
principals.170  Yet Rule 23’s requirement that class representatives be 
“adequate” more effectively captures this desire to link the interests of 
class representatives and class members by grounding the linkage in 
relatively well-developed principles of due process rather than in 
comparatively undefined notions of what is “typical.”  If a class 
representative will adequately represent class members consistent 
with due process, then it is difficult to see why somebody concerned 
with agency costs should care that the representative is atypical, 
especially given the consensus among commentators that a class 
representative is merely a figurehead in class litigation and thus not 
worth substantial judicial scrutiny.171  Likewise, if the class 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 167. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 168. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
 169. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.2 (2d. ed. 1993) (“It is not 
entirely clear what the rulemakers intended to achieve with this requirement.”); Issacharoff, 
supra note 1, at 354 (noting “amorphous” nature of the rule). 
 170. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 387 n.120 (“[The typicality requirement] emphasizes that 
the representatives ought to be squarely aligned in interest with the represented group.”).  The 
Supreme Court has thoroughly muddled the meaning of the typicality test to the point where it 
no longer appears to have any unique content.  See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 
n.13 (1982): 
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.  Both serve 
as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances 
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim 
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be 
fairly and adequately protected in their absence.  Those requirements therefore also 
tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement . . . . 
 171. See, e.g., Coffee, Accountability, supra note 1, at 406 (“Commentators have generally 
agreed that the representative in a class action is more a figurehead than an actual 
decisionmaker.”). 
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representative is so inadequate that allowing him to act as an agent 
for absent class members would violate due process, then his 
“typicalness” would not be a consolation. 
The typicality requirement at best promotes in a limited 
fashion the class action’s goal of efficiency by ensuring that litigation 
focuses directly on the core common issues in a case without the 
distraction of atypical satellite issues.  Analysis of typicality can thus 
be understood as an effort to control the potential sprawl of class 
actions by limiting the range of issues for the court to address.  From 
this perspective, already complicated class litigation should not be 
needlessly broadened to include claims by class members that the 
named representative does not raise, or claims by the named 
representative that the class does not raise.172  This practical aspect of 
the typicality test may also serve as a prudential adjunct to the 
general principle of Article III standing that “a plaintiff who has been 
subject to injurious conduct of one kind” does not “possess by virtue of 
that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct of another kind, 
although similar, to which he has not been subject.”173  Nowhere in 
this vision of typicality, however, is there any suggestion that 
monitoring the relationship between the claims of the representative 
and the claims of the class is an effective means of determining 
whether class claims are sufficiently similar to justify certification.  To 
the contrary, the typicality inquiry is ill-suited to assess dissimilarity 
among class members’ claims and thus cannot fix the deficiencies of 
the predominance test. 
The flaw in the typicality test when considered in light of 
defects in the predominance test is that the typicality inquiry 
compares class representatives to absent class members without 
comparing absent class members to each other.  Typicality analysis 
therefore tolerates substantial variation among class members’ 
circumstances and cannot fill the void that a more effective version of 
the predominance test would occupy.  Moreover, the typicality and 
predominance factors in practice speak past each other.  The remedy 
when a class representative is atypical is often to find a new class 
representative, but not to change the class definition.  The initial 
atypical representative thus remains a member of the class.  One 
would expect that the atypical claimant’s continued membership in 
the class would raise a red flag about predominance; after all, if 
individual questions of law or fact unique to the proposed class 
representative are so salient as to render claims encompassed by the 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 172. Cf. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) (“The typicality requirement is said 
to limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.”). 
 173. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982). 
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class definition atypical, then perhaps these individual questions 
likewise “predominate” and render class claims too dissimilar for class 
action treatment.174  Yet courts and commentators have not drawn 
this seemingly clear connection between the typicality and 
predominance inquiries because the connection appears nowhere in 
the text of Rule 23, which does not link the inquiry into a 
representative’s typicality with the broader question of dissimilarity 
among the claims of absent class members.  The Rule 23(a) typicality 
factor thus cannot overcome the defects in the Rule 23(b) 
predominance factor. 
2. Manageability 
The manageability inquiry in Rule 23(b)(3)(D) holds some 
promise for helping to grapple with questions of similarity and 
dissimilarity, but ultimately is not sufficient in its present form.  
Individual questions of fact or law unique to particular class members 
pose obstacles to the efficient management of a class action, and thus 
assessment of the manageability of a class action could be an 
opportune time to consider the significance of dissimilarity.  However, 
two problems undermine the appeal of using 23(b)(3)(D) 
manageability analysis to patch holes in the predominance inquiry.  
First, amongst the mischief that individual questions of law or fact 
create when embedded in class actions are attempts at “management” 
that violate substantive law or due process, such as attempts to 
presume individual facts out of existence or efforts to defer individual 
issues to post-judgment claims proceedings without allowing a 
complete presentation of defenses.175  Using the manageability inquiry 
to control the extent of dissimilarity among class claims is thus 
analogous to asking the fox to guard the henhouse.  Absent some 
principled guidance for determining whether a management device is 
substantively acceptable – which Rule 23 currently does not provide – 
analysis of manageability is as likely to create problems as it is to 
prevent them.  Second, the manageability inquiry is tied to the 
superiority inquiry as well as the predominance inquiry.  The 
comparative nature of the superiority inquiry replicates the balancing 
approach of the predominance test and thus tends to share the defects 
of the predominance test in evaluating the independent significance of 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 174. The fact that a proposed class representative is atypical should be particularly troubling 
to courts because lawyers who finance and initiate class action litigation usually hand-pick the 
representative.  If lawyers are unable to find a representative whose circumstances typify those 
on whose behalf the lawyers want to litigate, a court should be concerned about whether there is 
a properly defined class encompassing sufficiently similar claims. 
 175. See supra notes 24 and 28. 
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individual questions of law or fact.  The superiority inquiry also 
presupposes that a class action is one of several “available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”176  Analysis of 
superiority thus presumes that a class could be certified and asks 
whether it should be as a matter of judicial discretion.  The questions 
about dissimilarity that I address in this Article relate to the 
antecedent question of whether a class action is even “available” in 
particular circumstances, and thus the superiority rule and its 
attendant manageability inquiry are not a relevant source of guidance.  
Accordingly, a modified form of manageability inquiry (as I propose in 
Part V) might help solve or prevent problems related to dissimilarity 
among claims in proposed class actions, but the present incarnation of 
the manageability test as a vague adjunct to both the predominance 
and superiority factors in Rule 23(b)(3)(D) cannot overcome the defects 
of the predominance test. 
D. Doctrinal Consequences of Judicial Reliance on Predominance 
The analysis in this Part has so far sought to identify intrinsic 
defects in the predominance rule related to its inscrutability and to 
the incoherence of the balancing inquiry at its conceptual core.  This 
Section seeks to confirm the prior theoretical analysis by reviewing 
practical applications of the predominance test to determine if the 
test’s conceptual flaws have infused the doctrine that courts have 
developed to ensure procedural consistency when handling recurring 
fact patterns in Rule 23(b)(3) litigation.  Not surprisingly, 
predominance doctrine reflects – and in fact amplifies – the conceptual 
flaws in the underlying rule that the doctrine seeks to implement.  In 
particular, doctrine addressing three critical and recurring issues 
highlight the need to integrate more principled and practical 
guidelines into the Rule 23(b)(3) certification inquiry.  These three 
issues involve the implications for certification of individualized 
evidence of damages, individualized defenses to liability, and conflicts 
among applicable state laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 176. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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1.  Doctrine De-emphasizing Individualized Damages 
The analysis in Part III establishes that questions related to 
proving and calculating individual class members’ damages could 
raise significant obstacles to the principled resolution of class claims.  
If the applicable substantive law (the fidelity principle) links a class 
member’s entitlement to judgment (the finality principle) to proof of 
loss in a reasonably precise amount, then practical resource 
constraints (the feasibility principle) may preclude the court from 
adjudicating contested damages claims as a class action, especially as 
the size of the class – and thus the number of damages calculations – 
grows into the thousands or millions.  The problem would be even 
more acute if there is a contested question of comparative fault, in 
which case the amount of individual damages would be a function of 
individual liability, which would complicate or preclude efforts to 
streamline class litigation by litigating liability issues as if they were 
common to the entire class.177  The existence of individualized 
evidence relevant to proving and calculating damages is thus a factor 
that courts should consider before deciding whether to certify a class. 
The doctrine that courts have developed to assess the propriety 
of certifying common questions despite the need for individualized 
damages calculations highlights the flaws at the heart of the 
predominance balancing concept.  The general rule in most 
jurisdictions is that individualized damages do not defeat certification 
if questions of liability otherwise predominate.178  This doctrine is 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 177. See Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 239-41 (noting that analysis of damages in 
class actions governed by comparative fault principles requires revisiting evidence from the 
liability phase of litigation). 
 178. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (“It is primarily 
when there are significant individualized questions going to liability that the need for 
individualized assessments of damages is enough to preclude 23(b)(3) certification”); Smilow v. 
Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Where, as here, common 
questions predominate regarding liability, then courts generally find the predominance 
requirement to be satisfied even if individual damages issues remain”); In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing numerous cases); 
State ex rel. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 106 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(holding that “[t]he need for inquiry as to individual damages does not preclude a finding of 
predominance,” finding the liability question to be “common,” and not addressing the practical 
significance of individualized damages questions); In re Bell Atl. Corp. Sec. Litig., 1995 WL 
733381, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 11, 1995) (“To determine whether common questions predominate, 
the court’s inquiry is directed primarily towards the issue of liability; individual questions of 
damages will not preclude class certification.”).  Courts will sometimes deny certification when 
damages questions are highly individualized even if liability issues present common questions.  
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 306 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that although 
“[e]ven wide disparity among class members as to the amount of damages suffered does not 
necessarily mean that class certification is inappropriate,” on the facts of the particular case a 
need for “individualized damages inquiries” predominated over common liability questions). 
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usually stated as a self-evident truth, yet the doctrine suffers from 
what should be an obvious flaw: it circularly assumes its own 
conclusion.  The question being asked is, in effect, “do individualized 
damages questions predominate” and the answer being given is, in 
effect, “not when liability questions predominate.”  Lost in the shuffle 
is any attention to how the court should determine which set of 
questions in fact predominates – the finding that liability questions 
predominate over damages questions is assumed rather than proven 
on the facts of particular cases.  This circularity is at first glance 
surprising, but is alluring within the stilted context of the 
predominance balancing calculus.  As discussed above, the conceptual 
flaw in the predominance rule is that it invites a gestalt balancing of 
common and individual questions without independent consideration 
of how individual questions may in practice undermine the principled 
resolution of class members’ claims.  Doctrine attempting to assess the 
significance of individualized damages calculations manifests this flaw 
in the predominance balancing test because the doctrine reflects a 
normative conclusion that, on balance, common liability questions are 
relatively more significant – along some unspecified metric – than 
individual damages questions.179  This general conclusion about the 
propriety of certification would be impossible to reach if the 
certification inquiry required independent assessment of how 
dissimilarity among damages calculations would influence resolution 
of class members’ claims, but becomes conceivable if the 
“predominance” of common liability questions is considered in the 
abstract and without recourse to the guiding principles discussed in 
Part III. 
The underemphasis on individualized damages calculations in 
current doctrine does not mean that individualized damages should 
always be fatal to certification.  For example, certification 
notwithstanding the need to determine individual damages may be 
justified when proof of individual damages is either: (1) a mechanical 
process easily accomplished through the defendant’s business records 
(as in many cases challenging false billings) or through other 
accessible records (as in most securities fraud cases);180 or (2) not 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 179. An example of this phenomenon is In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealer 
Relations Litigation, in which the court lumped together individualized issues of “causation, 
injury-in-fact, and extent of damages” and found that common issues of liability predominated 
because of their relative “complexity.”  979 F. Supp. 365, 366 n.1 & 367 (D. Md. 1997).  The court 
apparently did not consider whether individual damages questions, even if relatively “more 
mundane” than common liability questions, id. at 367, were nevertheless sufficiently complex to 
defeat certification. 
 180. Although securities fraud suits are often cited as the paradigm case for class 
certification, recent analysis demonstrates that the paradigm is less solid than commonly 
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necessary before entry of judgment because the applicable substantive 
law permits assessment of lump-sum damages followed by a claims 
proceeding to allocate the award (as in some equity cases where 
disgorgement is a proper remedy for unjust enrichment).  However, 
proof of individual damages before the trier of fact is not always 
mechanical or avoidable in complex multiparty litigation – there may 
be clever means of doing it efficiently, but one cannot simply assume 
that such means are available or desirable.  Doctrine applying the 
predominance balancing test to focus on common liability questions 
without independent consideration of individual damages questions 
thus fails to respect the finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles 
discussed in Part III. 
2.   Doctrine Under-Weighting Individualized Defenses 
The analytic flaw that infects doctrine about the propriety of 
certifying dissimilar damages claims is also evident in doctrine about 
the significance of individualized defenses.  Courts routinely state that 
the possibility that a defendant will have unique defenses to 
individual claims is generally not a basis for denying certification.181  
This doctrine leaves room for exceptions when the breadth and 
complexity of individualized defenses pose a clear practical obstacle to 
aggregate adjudication,182 but nevertheless tends to permit 
certification notwithstanding the presence of dissimilar defenses that 
raise problems under the finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles. 
The intense focus on commonality at the certification stage 
arises from the balancing test inherent in the concept of 
________________________________________________________________________ 
believed.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, Defeating Class Certification in Securities Fraud Actions, 22 
REV. LITIG. 405 (2003). 
 181. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting a more stringent emphasis on variation among defenses as inconsistent with “the 
essence of the predominance inquiry”); Lender’s Title Co. v. Chandler, No. 04-41, 2004 WL 
1354265 (Ark. June 17, 2004) (“[T]he mere fact that individual issues and defenses may be raised 
regarding the recovery of individual members cannot defeat class certification where there are 
common questions concerning the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing that must be resolved for all 
class members.”); Haywood v. Superior Bank FSB, 614 N.E.2d 461, 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(“[T]he existence of individual issues, individual defenses of individual damages, multiple 
theories of recovery, or even the inability of some class members to obtain relief because of a 
particular individual factor will not, standing alone, defeat a class certification if the common 
questions of fact or law are otherwise predominant.”). 
 182. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 414 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding 
that “individualized, fact-intensive” questions about statute of limitations defenses predominated 
over common liability questions).  Cf. Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 147 n.25 (3d Cir. 
1998) (affirming decertification of class and noting that “[w]e acknowledge that the existence of 
affirmative defenses as to some class members may not by itself enough warrant the denial of 
certification. . . .  But we note that the defenses are only one of many matters raising individual 
issues in this case.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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predominance, reflecting a value judgment that the most important 
question in a class action is the defendant’s general liability to the 
class, and that this question is so important that it outweighs – i.e., 
predominates over – collateral questions unique to individual class 
members.  The doctrine likewise reflects a belief that the 
predominance inquiry is inextricably linked to the procedural goal of 
efficiency, to the point where courts are reluctant to allow the prospect 
of individualized inquiries to derail consolidated review of more 
immediately pressing common questions. 
The notion that individualized defenses are categorically less 
significant than common questions of liability is dubious even if one 
assumes that predominance is a coherent certification standard, but is 
fatally flawed when one rethinks the viability of the predominance 
test in light of the principles discussed in Part III.  First, with the 
exception of affirmative defenses (such as laches and waiver), most 
“defenses” are merely the mirror image of arguments necessary to 
prove liability.  For example, the defense in a fraud case that the 
defendant did not induce the plaintiff to take any action is the 
equivalent of arguing that the plaintiff has not carried her burden of 
proving reliance.  Likewise, the defense in a product liability case that 
a particular item was safe and precipitated an injury only due to 
misuse is the equivalent of saying that the plaintiff has not carried 
her burden of proving causation.  The doctrinal assumption that 
“liability” and “defenses” are somehow distinct is therefore suspect, 
particularly when the defendant proposes to disprove allegations of a 
common classwide course of conduct with individual counterexamples 
– in other words, by attempting to disprove aggregate liability by 
stating defenses to individual claims. 
Second, doctrine allowing certification notwithstanding salient 
individualized defenses violates all three principles discussed in Part 
III.  The doctrine permits a certification decision without substantial 
consideration of how defenses might affect the court’s ability to reach 
a judgment (finality), without any assessment of how defenses affect 
the plaintiffs’ ability to prove liability consistent with the substantive 
law underlying the claim (fidelity), and without any concrete plan for 
managing the case after resolution of common liability questions 
(feasibility).  The doctrine flourishes only because the predominance 
concept hinges on a balancing test, which in turn permits courts to 
define the relative importance of common questions and individualized 
defenses without considering that the practical difficulty of litigating 
individualized defenses might preclude certification regardless of 
whether resolving common questions would otherwise be desirable.  
Judicial underemphasis of defenses is thus a manifestation of the 
 1076 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4:995 
 
 
 
predominance test’s failure to assess the significance of dissimilarity 
among claims independently from the fairness and efficiency 
considerations that generally favor aggregate resolution of common 
questions.  The practical consequence of this conceptual failure is that 
courts routinely run the risk either that a certified action will grind to 
a halt before judgment when defenses raise insurmountable 
management obstacles, which would render the entire litigation a 
waste of time and money;183 that unwieldy defenses confronted late in 
litigation will instigate questionable ad hoc lawmaking to 
accommodate them;184 or that the dissimilarities among defenses will 
distort settlement outcomes.185  Accordingly, the doctrinal treatment 
of individualized defenses under the predominance balancing analysis 
is less rigorous than the finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles 
would recommend. 
3.   Doctrine Postponing Conflict of Laws Analysis 
The phenomenon of allowing a balancing test to discount 
otherwise serious individualized questions is also evident in doctrine 
holding that courts need not consider potential conflicts of law during 
the predominance inquiry.  Many class actions involve plaintiffs from 
multiple states challenging conduct that occurred in their home states 
or that originated in an array of intermediary states.  If the laws of 
states with significant contacts to the dispute materially differ, then 
the court must conduct a conflict of law analysis to select the 
applicable law for each contested issue, consistent with 
constitutional186 and common law187 constraints.  Substantial 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 183. A striking example of a class action collapsing under the weight of deferred 
individualized issues occurred in the twenty-five-year saga of litigation arising from the 1971 
prison riots in Attica, New York.  The district court held a trial on common liability questions, 
only to realize after several years of fruitless management efforts that the remaining 
individualized defense and damage questions raised intractable management problems that 
ultimately led the Second Circuit to hold, “[w]ith the benefit of hindsight,” that certification had 
not produced any “benefit” to the class.  Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 269-71 (2d Cir. 1999).  
Foresight is presumably preferable to hindsight in structuring complex and time-consuming 
litigation, which further supports the need for a class action rule that focuses substantial 
attention on dissimilarity before certification. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30. 
 185. In practice, most certified class actions settle, rendering the question of defenses moot.  
However settlement does not solve the distortion problem – it merely displaces it to a new 
context.  See infra Part II.C. (analyzing how dissimilarity distorts the valuation of claims for 
settlement). 
 186. The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, and possibly the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, preclude states from applying forum law to the claims of class members with 
whom the forum has no relevant connection.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. at art. IV, § 1; 
id. at art. I, § 8.  For example, if a New York resident files a nationwide class action against a 
Delaware company in New York state court for fraudulent representations issued from the 
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management problems arise when the outcome of the choice of the law 
calculus requires applying the varying laws of multiple states to class 
members’ claims.  For example, each substantive motion would 
require as many as fifty distinct rulings, the court would need to 
instruct the jury about the law in each of as many as fifty states, and 
the court would need to advise the jury about the limited admissibility 
of evidence that is relevant to claims in some states but not others.  
Even if the laws of the fifty states cluster into only a few distinct 
formulations on each issue, the practical burden of identifying, 
analyzing, and ruling on each cluster for each claim would be 
daunting.188 
Courts in many jurisdictions prefer to avoid conflicts analysis 
by holding that certification is permissible when there is an important 
common question of disputed fact, regardless of whether the 
implications of that fact would vary under the applicable laws of 
________________________________________________________________________ 
company’s Delaware headquarters, New York law might apply to the claims of class members 
from New York, but cannot apply to the claims of class members from, say, Alaska.  Plaintiffs 
might argue that Delaware law should apply to the claims of all class members regardless of 
domicile because the tortious contract arose in Delaware, but the viability of that argument 
would depend on the content of the applicable choice of law rule; some choice of law rules would 
favor applying the laws of each of the fifty states where injury occurred, and some might favor 
applying the law of the one state where injury-causing conduct originated.  Cf. Friedrich K. 
Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 110-21 (summarizing 
the myriad methodologies for resolving conflict of laws in complex litigation with multistate 
contacts).  For analysis of the applicable constitutional questions, see BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 572-73 (1996) (state lacks power “to punish [a defendant] for conduct that was lawful where 
it occurred and that had no impact on [the state] or its residents”); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 
324, 336-37 (1989) (states cannot “control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State” and 
regulate “commercial activity occurring wholly outside” their borders); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (state “‘may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders 
having no relation to anything done or to be done within them.’” (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 
281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930))); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 
U.S. 573, 582-83 (1986) (rejecting state’s attempt to “project its legislation” into other states); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Due Process and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses forbid a state from applying its law to a transaction absent “significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the 
occurrence or transaction”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 399 (1924) (stating that 
a Texas statute cannot govern a Tennessee insurance policy); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 
234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) (“[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of [a State] to operate 
beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional barriers by 
which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the 
preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends.”); Bonaparte v. Tax 
Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) (“No State can legislate except with reference to its own 
jurisdiction.”). 
 187. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
 188. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[B]ecause we 
must apply an individualized choice of law analysis . . . the proliferation of disparate factual and 
legal issues is compounded exponentially”), aff’d, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 1078 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4:995 
 
 
 
different states.189  Although there is a contrary trend emerging in 
federal appellate courts,190 numerous state courts (who may soon no 
longer face this question)191 and federal district courts cling to the 
notion that choice of law is not relevant to the certification inquiry 
when there is a “predominant” common question of fact.192 
The failure of courts to conduct a rigorous conflict of laws 
analysis before certifying a class violates the finality, fidelity, and 
feasibility principles.  A court cannot know whether it has the capacity 
to try claims (feasibility) consistent with substantive law (fidelity) if it 
does not know which substantive laws apply and the extent of any 
variations that the trier of fact would need to consider in rendering a 
judgment (finality).  Certification under such conditions of uncertainty 
amounts to a blind guess about whether a class action would be viable.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 189. See, e.g., Singer v. AT&T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“It is well-
established that consideration of choice of law issues at the class certification stage is generally 
premature. Many courts find that it is inappropriate to decide choice of law issues incident to a 
motion for class certification.”); In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74, 84 (D. Md. 
1991) (“[M]any courts have found it inappropriate to decide choice of law issues incident to a 
motion for class certification.”); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 135 F.R.D. 39, 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(“Along with other district courts in this circuit, this court declines to decide choice of law issues 
on a class certification motion . . . .”); Peterson v. Dougherty Dawkins, Inc., 583 N.W.2d 626, 630 
(N.D. 1998) (“[C]ourts often decline to decide choice of law issues when determining whether to 
certify a class action.”); Lobo Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 991 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 1999) (affirming certification order that “declined to decide choice of law issues incident 
to a motion for class certification”).  But see Dragon v. Vanguard Indus., 89 P.3d 908, 916-18 
(Kan. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs bear the burden of submitting a conflict of laws analysis 
sufficient to justify certification). 
 190. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Because 
[plaintiff] seeks certification of a nationwide class for which the law of forty-eight states 
potentially applies, she bears the burden of demonstrating ‘a suitable and realistic plan for trial 
of the class claims’” as “[u]nderstanding which law will apply before making a predominance 
determination is important when there are variations in applicable state law.”); In re LifeUSA 
Holding, 242 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2001) (faulting district court that “failed to consider how 
individualized choice of law analysis of the forty-eight different jurisdictions would impact on 
Rule 23’s predominance requirement”); In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(faulting district court that “failed to consider how the law of negligence differs from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction” before certifying nationwide state law class, and holding that the plaintiffs bore 
the “burden” on this issue); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (district 
courts have a “duty” to “consider variations in state law when a class action involves multiple 
jurisdictions” and the “requirement that a court know which law will apply before making a 
predominance determination is especially important when there may be differences in state 
law”); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining to accept, “on 
faith,” plaintiffs’ “assertion” that state laws are uniform and instead making a “considered” 
judgment about choice of law questions based on “extensive analysis of state law variances” 
before certifying class). 
 191. A new federal statute allowing removal to federal court of class actions involving 
plaintiffs from multiple states will probably limit the opportunity of state courts to rule on 
complex choice of law questions in class actions.  See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
 192. See supra note 189. 
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A certification standard that focused more directly on the finality, 
fidelity, and feasibility principles therefore would not permit a court to 
certify a class without first carefully considering which states’ laws 
applied, how those laws conflicted, and whether the conflicts would 
render class adjudication impracticable. 
Doctrine permitting courts to defer consideration of damages, 
defenses, and choice of law until after the decision to certify a class 
thus helps to underscore the flaws in the predominance test.  The 
predominance inquiry is not grounded in any determination about 
how individualized questions affect a court’s ability to litigate claims 
to a final judgment pursuant to a feasible plan and consistent with 
substantive law, and thus many courts have developed doctrine that is 
likewise not grounded in such determinations.  The result is that 
certification decisions overlook factors – such as the need to litigate 
individualized defenses or damages and to resolve or account for 
conflicts of law – that a certification standard should consider before 
determining whether a class action is a procedurally appropriate 
mechanism for resolving a particular dispute.  The misplaced 
emphasis of predominance doctrine on similarity among claims at the 
expense of attention to dissimilarity is thus another reason to rethink 
the viability of the underlying predominance concept. 
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V. PROPOSED REVISION TO RULE(23)(B)(3) AND IMPLICATIONS 
The conceptual and practical flaws in the predominance test 
raise the question of what should replace it.193  This Part proposes a 
new “resolvability” test that would focus on whether a class action is 
an appropriate means of resolving disputed claims that involve both 
common and individualized elements.  The proposal incorporates the 
principles discussed in Part III in an effort to avoid the practical 
problems discussed in Parts II and IV.  After presenting my proposal 
for replacing the predominance test, I discuss some of its practical and 
normative implications and suggest how these implications might 
inspire further scholarship about the dynamic overlap between 
substantive regulation of mass risks and procedural reform of group 
litigation. 
A. The “Resolvability” Test 
The principles discussed in Part III provide a foundation for 
formulating a replacement to the predominance test.  Instead of 
focusing on the gestalt relationship between common and individual 
questions, a new certification standard can more directly implement 
broader principles that address the need for: (1) final judgments 
establishing the rights and responsibilities of the parties, (2) fidelity to 
substantive law, and (3) feasible plans for managing class actions 
within resource constraints.  A new rule should be sufficiently broad 
to encompass the diverse array of potential class actions, sufficiently 
narrow to guide the development of additional layers of doctrine 
geared toward specific recurring problems, and sufficiently flexible to 
permit classwide settlements in appropriate circumstances. 
My proposal would eliminate the predominance concept by 
rewriting the first clause of Rule 23(b)(3), which currently states that 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 193. The predominance concept is so vague that in theory there is no need to replace it; 
courts and commentators could simply interpret it to more closely track the finality, fidelity, and 
feasibility principles discussed in Part III.  A common question would thus “predominate” over 
an individual question only if the court has a feasible plan for entering a judgment on both 
common and individual questions consistent with applicable substantive law.  However, trying to 
fix the predominance concept rather than abandoning it would be a second-best solution.  The 
test would still be vague and susceptible to drifting from any newly-imposed gloss, and would 
still rest on an inapposite notion of balancing inherent in the meaning of the word 
“predominate.”  Reinterpretation (or a more principled refinement of existing interpretations) of 
the predominance test would at best be an interim solution pending revision of the Rule, but is 
not a substitute for writing a more coherent certification standard to manage the increasingly 
high-stakes process of group litigation.  Notably, the 1966 drafters of Rule 23 (who wrote the 
predominance test, as well as most of the rest of the current rule) did not intend for their work to 
be permanently etched in stone, and recognized that further refinements might be necessary 
with the benefit of accumulated experience.  See supra text accompanying note 125. 
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certification is permissible when the court finds that “questions of law 
or fact common to members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”194  The amended Rule 
23(b)(3) (and similar state rules) would permit certification when the 
court finds that: 
 
The court has a feasible plan to answer all disputed questions of law and fact that must 
be resolved before entering judgment for or against class members under the law 
governing each class member’s claim and applicable defenses.195 
 
Given the inexorable desire of lawyers to create shorthand 
monikers for certification concepts – such as “typicality” and 
“adequacy” – the new test could be called “resolvability.” 
The new resolvability test would combine with the existing 
Rule 23(b)(3) superiority and 23(a)(2) commonality tests to require a 
four-step analysis of how similarity and dissimilarity among putative 
class members’ claims should affect certification.  First, the court 
would have to determine if there is a question of law or fact common to 
all class members that if answered would materially facilitate entry of 
judgment for or against the class.  Second, assuming that such a 
common question exists, the court would have to determine if any 
questions of law or fact unique to individual class members could 
affect the propriety of entering judgment for or against them.  Third, 
assuming that material individualized questions exist, the court would 
have to determine if it could feasibly resolve the individual questions 
consistent with applicable substantive law governing claims and 
defenses before entering judgment.  Finally, assuming that there is a 
feasible way to resolve individualized issues, the court would have to 
decide if doing so within a class action would be superior to using 
available alternative remedies.  Class actions seeking damages under 
Rule 23(b)(3) would thus be permissible only if they were a superior 
method of feasibly adjudicating both the similar and dissimilar 
aspects of class members’ claims to judgment under the substantive 
law governing claims and defenses.196 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 194. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  The proposal would require action either by the Supreme Court 
under the Rules Enabling Act process, see supra note 141, or by Congress, and then parallel 
action by state courts or legislatures. 
 195. The rest of the current rule would then continue as a new sentence: “The court must 
also find that a class action is superior . . . .” 
 196. The resolvability test is unlikely to create problems related to the timing of certification 
decisions that are not already present under the predominance test.  If a case is sufficiently 
complicated that an early resolvability decision is not possible – see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) 
(requiring courts to address certification “at an early practicable time”) – then it is difficult to 
imagine how a meaningful predominance analysis could be possible under the same 
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Settlements of otherwise uncertifiable classes would still be 
possible even under the new certification rubric, but careful scrutiny 
of the negotiation process and the terms of the agreement would be 
necessary to determine if the settlement is consistent with the 
principles underlying the resolvability test.  As explained in Part II.C, 
negotiated resolutions of class actions featuring excessive dissimilarity 
among claims incorporate the potential prejudicial effects of trial into 
the terms of settlements, and thus courts considering certification 
motions cannot assume that a future settlement will cure the defects 
of an improvident certification decision.  This observation, coupled 
with the analysis in Part III, suggests that class action settlements 
generally fall into one of three categories, each raising different levels 
of concern: (1) when a class action can be certified for trial consistent 
with the resolvability test, it can be fairly settled (assuming that class 
members are represented adequately); (2) when a class action cannot 
be certified for trial consistent with the resolvability test, but both 
parties would prefer a group settlement to individualized litigation, 
then a settlement might be permissible even though the resolvability 
test is not satisfied, depending on myriad considerations addressed in 
the literature on “settlement classes”;197 but (3) when a class action 
cannot be certified for trial consistent with the resolvability test, and a 
party would prefer the absence of a class action to a negotiated 
classwide agreement, then any settlement negotiated by that party in 
the shadow of a certification order raises questions – beyond the scope 
of this Article – about due process, voluntariness, and the normative 
role that consent should play in dispute resolution.198  The 
resolvability test thus does not conclusively answer the question of 
when courts should encourage or approve settlements, but does 
provide a new framework for considering the question and for 
rethinking Rule 23’s requirement that class action settlements be 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.”199 
The revised version of Rule 23(b)(3) would track the principles 
discussed in Part III and avoid the problems with the predominance 
________________________________________________________________________ 
circumstances.  Indeed, the resolvability test is an improvement over the predominance test 
because its greater specificity will help to guide courts in deciding what information they need to 
know and in structuring pre-trial proceedings to permit acquisition of that knowledge in 
preparation for the certification decision.  Although courts at the beginning of a case – before 
substantial discovery – cannot always know exactly which factual and legal questions will be 
salient at the end of a case, limited discovery coupled with the parties’ analysis of what each 
hopes to prove and disprove should be sufficient in most cases to permit courts to make 
reasonably informed certification decisions. 
 197. See supra note 90. 
 198. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 199. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C). 
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test discussed in Part IV.  Instead of relegating analysis of 
dissimilarity to the vague and conceptually hollow predominance 
balancing test, a revised rule would ground certification analysis 
directly in broader principles that should animate the class action 
device.  Rather than silently hoping that courts apply class action 
rules consistently with broader principles, the new rule would require 
courts to do so by incorporating these principles directly into the text 
of the rule.  The principles regarding final judgments, fidelity to 
substantive law, and feasible management within resource constraints 
discussed in Part III would no longer be mere aspirations of class 
action jurisprudence, and instead would factor directly into day-to-day 
decisionmaking.  The dubious doctrines that predominance has 
spawned – such as the notions that consideration of defenses, 
damages, and choice of law are irrelevant at the certification stage – 
would fade away because they are facially inconsistent with the 
concept of resolvability.200 
The proposed resolvability test would also mitigate the 
problems of cherry-picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking 
discussed in Part II.  All three problems arise when courts permit 
certification to obscure the differences among dissimilar aspects of 
claims and defenses, such that the trier of fact perceives commonality 
in circumstances where there is really individuality.  A revised 
certification standard that spotlights dissimilarity will make 
individualized issues much less prevalent in certified class actions and 
much more prominent in the cases in which they remain.  Adherence 
to the fidelity principle should reduce instances of ad hoc lawmaking, 
and adherence to the finality and feasibility principles should ensure 
that procedural mechanisms exist to highlight the dissimilar aspects 
of class members’ claims so that claim fusion and cherry-picking 
become harder to attempt and easier to detect.201 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 200. Plaintiffs might attempt to evade revisions to Rule 23(b)(3) by trying to squeeze (b)(3) 
classes into the (b)(1) or (b)(2) molds, but doctrine exists to prevent such circumvention of the 
(b)(3) requirements.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834-48 (1999) (reviewing 
limits on (b)(1) class actions); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410-18 (5th Cir. 
1998) (reviewing limits on (b)(2) class actions). 
 201. The resolvability test’s focus on dissimilarity may also have the added benefit of 
creating incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to structure class definitions in a manner that 
minimizes the likelihood that class members with strong claims will subsidize members with 
weaker claims.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers currently have an incentive to define proposed classes as 
broadly as possible to encompass the maximum number of fee-generating damages recipients.  If 
we assume that lawyers initially focus on claims with the highest value, we can surmise that as 
the class definition grows broader, the new entrants will have claims with progressively less 
merit and value, in effect diluting the value of the initial members’ claims.  Amending Rule 
23(b)(3) creates an opportunity to reverse incentives regarding the breadth of class definitions.  A 
rational plaintiffs’ lawyer must balance the marginal potential gain from expanding the class 
definition against the catastrophic loss that would ensue if a court concludes that the class 
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Eliminating the predominance test would not eliminate 
subjectivity from certification decisions, but would help to redirect 
subjective analysis along more relevant lines and facilitate 
development of doctrine to guide decisionmaking.  Both the 
predominance and resolvability tests entail subjective elements, but 
the predominance test is so conceptually hollow that it has not 
generated coherent doctrine to help structure judicial discretion.  In 
contrast, the subjective inquiries arising from the proposed 
resolvability test are linked to practical and theoretical guideposts 
that should permit courts to develop a helpful body of precedent to 
guide certification analysis.  The primary areas of subjectivity under 
the proposed rule involve: (1) determining what is and is not “feasible” 
for a court to accomplish in a class action; (2) identifying creative and 
yet acceptable mechanisms to “resolve” claims in a class proceeding; 
and (3) deciding when a defense is sufficiently likely to be “applicable,” 
or when a question is sufficiently “disputed,” to raise a potential 
obstacle to certification.  These questions will recur in numerous 
contexts but will raise similar practical problems that should over 
time generate a body of precedent to provide relatively concrete 
guidance to courts struggling with certification decisions.202 
________________________________________________________________________ 
definition is too broad and therefore refuses to certify any class or sua sponte defines a much 
narrower class.  The lawyer will assess the risk of expanding the class definition in light of how 
the court is likely to react, which in turn is a function of the procedural standard governing 
judicial review of class definitions.  Thus, if the resolvability standard would be less receptive 
than the predominance standard to broadly defined classes that encompass substantial 
dissimilarity, then lawyers will likely try to frame their proposed classes more narrowly (unless 
they are risk-takers, in which case they might still frame classes broadly with the hope of being 
able to submit a narrower class definition if the court rejects the broad definition).  Assuming 
that a narrow class has a higher proportion of members with meritorious claims, then the 
resolvability test would help to ensure that marginal claimants with comparatively low-value 
claims do not dilute the distribution of an aggregate award.  Plaintiffs with low-value claims 
could of course still file their own separate class actions, but the settlement value of their claims 
would presumably be relatively low. 
 202. For example, plaintiffs and defendants will often dispute whether the myriad individual 
defenses that the defendant insists must be litigated are likely to meaningfully alter the outcome 
of any particular class member’s claim or are simply hypothetical musings designed to throw a 
wrench into the certification machinery.  See supra note 91.  As this dispute recurs, courts will 
develop standards for parsing credible defenses that should be adjudicated from dubious 
defenses thrust into the case solely for tactical purposes.  The ensuing doctrine would not be 
unduly novel, as many federal courts already engage in similar pre-certification analysis of 
substantive issues that are likely to arise in the course of class litigation.  See Gen. Tel. Co. v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind 
the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.”); E. Texas Motor Freight Sys., 
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12 (1977) (“Where no class has been certified, however, 
and the class claims remain to be tried, the decision whether the named plaintiffs should 
represent a class is appropriately made on the full record, including the facts developed at the 
trial of plaintiffs’ individual claims.”).  Similar kinds of questions about tactical pleading also 
arise in diversity cases when courts must determine if a non-diverse party is properly part of a 
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Jettisoning the concept of predominance in favor of a more 
nuanced focus on the ability of class litigation to resolve both common 
and individualized aspects of claims and defenses should therefore 
better align the principle and practice of class litigation.  A new 
procedural rule will not end the debate over the desirability of class 
actions as remedies for group injuries, but could help reorient that 
debate by eliminating the distracting practical and conceptual 
problems that the predominance inquiry creates. 
 
B. Avenues for Further Scholarship 
The resolvability test – and in particular its emphasis on 
fidelity to substantive law – is likely to reduce the frequency of class 
actions absent countervailing changes to the substantive rules that 
class actions enforce.  The primary reason that some cases will not be 
amenable to certification is that traditional tort law and many 
statutory causes of action incorporate a compensation model of 
entitlements that hinges on proof of individualized questions of fact 
and law, such that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in their favor 
only if they can prove elements of a claim that are tied to each 
person’s unique circumstances.203  Defendants presumably will latch 
on to individualized issues involved in proving entitlement to 
judgment as a basis for defeating certification.  Thus, while the 
predominance test tolerates comparatively heavy emphasis on 
common elements of class members’ claims, the resolvability test 
would attach heightened significance to individualized aspects of 
claims and defenses that materially affect the propriety of entering 
judgment for or against individual claimants, which would tend to 
justify fewer proposed class actions. 
The practical consequences of the resolvability test raise three 
interrelated questions for future scholarship that highlight the 
indeterminate boundaries between substantive and procedural 
considerations in group litigation.  The first question posits a need to 
develop procedures responsive to substantive objectives, the second 
question posits that achieving substantive objectives may require 
tailoring liability and damages rules to available procedures, and the 
third question posits that the criteria for measuring the quality of a 
________________________________________________________________________ 
case or has been “fraudulently joined” solely to defeat federal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Marshall v. 
Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 203. Compare note 3 supra (discussing common law and statutory causation and reliance 
elements that hinder certification), with note 24 supra (discussing how federal statutes 
regulating securities permit inferences of causation and reliance that facilitate certification). 
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procedure requires a value judgment linked to the aspirations of the 
substantive laws that the procedure must implement.  All three 
questions address the regulatory vacuum that decreased availability 
of the class action would create while illuminating the dynamic 
interplay of substantive and procedural considerations in the 
regulation of mass risks. 
First, if class actions will be less available to compensate 
victims of legal wrongs, procedural architects must develop alternative 
compensation mechanisms to overcome the collective action problems 
that often make civil litigation impracticable in cases involving large 
numbers of somewhat similar and somewhat dissimilar injuries.  
Class actions are not the only means of aggregating claims, and thus 
any procedural reform that makes class actions more difficult to 
sustain without removing claimants’ underlying preference to 
aggregate requires investigating alternatives to class litigation.204  
Second, courts and legislators should consider the extent to which 
substantive remedies favoring compensation over deterrence are 
worth their cost in procedural flexibility.  By stressing the practical 
consequences of dissimilarity among otherwise common class claims, 
this Article highlights how substantive laws that fixate on individual 
entitlements to damages rather than the scope of the defendant’s 
wrongful behavior complicate and potentially preclude aggregative 
litigation.205  If the price of focusing on individual entitlements is that 
those entitlements become more difficult to vindicate in class actions, 
then it is worth thinking about whether the focus of statutory and 
common law rights should transform to facilitate group litigation and 
the deterrent pressures that such litigation creates.206 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 204. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: 
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (2004) (noting that 
even without class actions, tort claims have “persistently resolved themselves into what are 
essentially bureaucratized, aggregate settlement structures”); Howard M. Erichson, Mississippi 
Class Actions and the Inevitability of Aggregate Litigation, MISS. C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) 
(“[A] prohibition on class actions channels mass disputes into other modes of formal and informal 
aggregate dispute resolution.”).  Even when individualized claim processing is preferable to 
aggregation, some procedures are relatively more amenable to high volumes of claims than 
others.  For example, Congress has created compensation systems that depend on administrative 
rather than judicial adjudication, such as programs linked to black lung disease, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 
901 et seq, the side effects of vaccines, see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa et seq., and the September 11 
terrorist attacks, see Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 
115 Stat. 230 (2001). 
 205. See supra note 3 (citing examples of substantive reforms that facilitate aggregate 
litigation). 
 206. Assessments of procedural innovations are inextricably intertwined with preferences 
regarding the laws that procedures enforce.  See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the 
“Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 299-300 (1973) (“Whether we characterize any 
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Finally, a corollary to the preceding point about the relative 
importance of compensation and deterrence is that this Article’s 
emphasis on dissimilarity among claims highlights an open question 
about the distributive implications and relative desirability of over- 
and under-deterrence, and over- and under-compensation.  A 
consequence of aggregating dissimilar claims is that the trial and 
settlement distortions discussed in Part II may cause defendants to 
pay higher or lower damages than the applicable substantive law 
requires.  Likewise, the allocation of damage awards among class 
members may be imperfect, such that some will receive more than 
they deserve under the applicable substantive law, and some will 
receive less.  Aggregation of dissimilar claims can thus over- or under-
deter, and both over- and under-compensate.  Yet not aggregating 
claims creates analogous harms.  The collective action problems that 
arise absent aggregation may prevent victims of a wrong from 
obtaining a remedy,207 and even when adjudication is feasible 
plaintiffs will have varying chances of success depending on their 
ability to bear the burdens of litigating alone, the quality of their 
counsel, and the idiosyncrasies of the judge and jury.  Alternatively, 
individual nuisance suits on weak claims might extract larger 
settlements than would be possible if the defendant could lower its 
transaction costs by fighting all related claims in the same proceeding.  
Thus, the absence of aggregation creates the potential for over- or 
under-deterrence and both over- and under-compensation.  Among the 
normative questions that arise from this analysis are whether over-
deterrence is preferable to under-deterrence, whether over-
compensation is preferable to under-compensation, and whether either 
preference depends on if the procedural cause of the over-/under- 
problem is a rule fostering access to adjudication or a rule foreclosing 
it.  The answers to these questions will influence the design of 
substantive regulations and procedural rules by helping to prioritize 
the relative importance of access to adjudication, accurate resolution 
of aggregate claims, and accurate resolution of individual claims.  
Highlighting the procedural consequences of aggregating dissimilar 
claims thus helps to illuminate a broader set of problems affecting 
deterrence and remediation of large-scale injuries. 
Refining certification criteria to grapple more directly with 
dissimilarity among claims would thus have both substantive and 
procedural consequences, necessitating further creative efforts at 
substantive and procedural innovation.  There is a connection between 
________________________________________________________________________ 
revised [class action] practice as an ‘abuse’ or a ‘reform’ depends largely on our evaluation of 
policies underlying the type of litigation likely to be affected.”). 
 207. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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when class actions are available, what class actions can accomplish, 
and how much compensation and deterrence substantive laws can 
achieve.  Adjusting one link in the chain requires rethinking the 
others 
*  *  * 
In sum, it is time to excise “predominance” from the vernacular 
of class action discourse and replace it with a more practical 
“resolvability” approach that recognizes the problems of cherry-
picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking and respects the 
principles of finality, fidelity, and feasibility. 
 
